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Abstract 
 
 This thesis explores the reception history of the book of Job, particularly in Søren 
Kierkegaard’s Three Upbuilding Discourses and Repetition, Wilhelm Vischer’s “Hiob, ein 
Zeuge Jesu Christi,” and Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics. It examines the hermeneutical 
presuppositions of these three scholars and how the scholars themselves fit into the history 
of interpretation, showing that they use a post-critical allegorical interpretation in order to 
explore the freedom of God and humanity. 
 Chapter one offers a defense of using reception history in biblical studies. By 
walking through Mikhail Bakhtin’s theories on great time and the chronotope, it argues that 
great texts continue to live and grow even after their completion and canonization. During 
this “afterlife,” their meaning expands as more readers participate in their interpretations. 
Chapter two examines the afterlife of the book of Job in the hands of Christian exegetes, 
focusing on allegory and freedom in the interpretations by Gregory the Great, Thomas 
Aquinas, Martin Luther, John Calvin, and Immanuel Kant. Chapter three looks at the 
unusual and rich interpretations of Job by Kierkegaard—the autonymous upbuilding 
discourse on Job’s response to his suffering in the prologue and the novella Repetition as an 
interpretation of the dialogue between Job and his friends. Chapter four examines the 
interpretation of the book of Job in Vischer’s mini-commentary. Vischer sees the character 
of Job as one whose devotion to God goes beyond the laws that God purveys and the 
doctrine that seeks to explain God. Referring specifically to the works of Kierkegaard and 
Vischer, Karl Barth’s work on Job—the focus of chapter five—sees the book of Job as 
illustrative of Jesus Christ’s relationship to God and humanity. All three scholars 
incorporated allegory while ruminating on the freedom of God in the book of Job. The final 
chapter evaluates their interpretations while addressing their similarities and differences. 
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Introduction 
 The history of the interpretation of the book of Job bears witness to its difficulty. 
Though the book tackles many great questions that humanity has been asking for millennia, 
it does not answer these questions in ways very straightforward. Each successive 
interpretation of the book of Job seems to raise more questions than it answers, and that 
inspires later interpreters to enter into the book as well, perhaps hoping for more definitive 
results. The following thesis, rather than making another definitive stab at the “meaning” of 
the book of Job, intends to examine the interpretations themselves—specifically the 
interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard, Wilhelm Vischer, and Karl Barth. 
At its heart, this thesis is a reflection on biblical hermeneutics. It asks how these 
scholars come to the conclusions they do in their readings of Job. What preconceptions, 
prejudices, historical circumstances, and theologies lie behind the hermeneutical moves they 
attempt? How do they perceive the nature of the biblical Canon that inspires some of their 
interpretive claims? How do they respond to their predecessors in biblical interpretation and 
the interpretation of the book of Job in particular?  
Of course in examining the hermeneutics that undergird the scholars’ theses, the 
thesis also examines the interpretations themselves. The main reason for examining these 
three readers in particular is their shared themes of the book of Job that they emphasize. The 
latest of the three interpreters, Karl Barth, refers explicitly to the earlier interpreters, 
highlighting Vischer and Kierkegaard as his most important predecessors in his reading of 
the book of Job. Vischer offers Barth his most important hermeneutical key for reading the 
book of Job—the question whether Job fears God for nought. Kierkegaard offers Barth his 
most important philosophical insight in understanding the phenomenon of what Job 
experiences—the category of repetition. By looking at these three readers, in particular, 
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especially as filtered through Barth’s eventual reading, we gain a better understanding of 
Barth’s own hermeneutic, but also we gain a deeper understanding of the book of Job, itself. 
Beyond these filters into which Barth, Vischer, and Kierkegaard read Job, the important 
theme of divine and human freedom as postulated in the book of Job emerges. All three see 
Job as arguing against his friends for being too tied to human formulations of God. God 
cannot be bound by these formulations because of God’s freedom. The dogma posited by the 
friends may be sound to an extent, but in the end it limits God’s freedom. The book of Job, 
these three scholars contend, presents the character of Job as free as well, paralleling the 
freedom of God. Job, through his sufferings, is able to break free of the constricting dogma 
of his friends and become his own free agent. In his freedom, unrestricted by the dogma 
presented by his friends, he can recognize God’s freedom and learns to rely on God and not 
the law that God purveys. 
As one examines Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth and their hermeneutics, one 
notices that they stand out from the crowd. They tend to buck the common trends of their 
eras. Historical criticism acts as a tool, perhaps, but the results of historical criticism are not 
the final goals. They do not discount the validity of biblical scholarship, but recognize that 
biblical scholarship limits the freedom of the interpreter. The three scholars are critical of 
systems that place artificial parameters around the text. In this way, their interpretations of 
Job allegorize the story of Job as they perceive it. Job, like Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth, 
stands away from the crowd and conventional wisdom. Historical criticism takes on a mask 
of retributive theology, with its system and limited outcomes. By looking only at the roots of 
the text, historical critics appear like Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar, working backward from 
the results to what must have been the cause, while Job looks beyond the limited scope to 
God.  
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One of the tools these scholars use that puts them outside of the mainstream of their 
times is, in fact, allegory itself. Specifically, they utilise the narrower type of allegory called, 
alternatively, typological and figural interpretation. In the case of Vischer and Barth, they 
use typological interpretation to aid their readings of Job. Kierkegaard also incorporates 
allegory and typology into his interpretation, but his looks very different from the later two 
scholars’ use of it. However, within his interpretation he presents a typological theory that 
buttresses Vischer and Barth’s canonical typology. Thus, Kierkegaard’s theory undergirds 
Barth’s hermeneutic and Vischer’s exegetical observations undergird Barth’s interpretation. 
Any reader will notice that the allegorical interpretations of these three differ greatly from 
much of the allegory used in the early Middle Ages to the point that they tend to deny 
utilizing allegory at all.1 Nevertheless, as I hope to show, allegory and typology are 
important aspects of their hermeneutical method of the interpretation of Job. 
Included in the reflection on the biblical hermeneutics of these three scholars is an 
exploration on the role of the reception history of biblical texts in biblical interpretation. 
Reception history has become more and more prevalent in recent years, but relatively few 
theories have emerged to help explain its relevance to biblical studies. Chapter one attempts 
to add to this inchoate discussion using the literary theories of the Russian scholar Mikhail 
Bakhtin as a starting point. Bakhtin argues that great texts exist in great time, a phrase I will 
unpack below. He also argues that dialogue exists in perpetuity. The forward focused vision 
of dialogue that Bakhtin presents relates to the temporal aspects of typological interpretation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Erich Auerbach, in his important essay “Figura,” recognises this particular problem when he writes, “The 
strangeness of the medieval view of reality has prevented modern scholars from distinguishing between 
figuration and allegory and led them for the most part to perceive only the latter.” (Erich Auerbach, “Figura,” 
in Scenes From the Drama of European Literature (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973), 74.) On the other 
hand, though Auerbach makes important distinctions between figuration and allegory, their differences are 
perhaps too sharply defined. Below, I argue, along with Henri de Lubac, that figuration and typology do not 
greatly differ from allegory. Rather, I suggest that typology is a type of allegory—not equivalent, but subsumed 
under it. 
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Chapter one continues with an examination of typology and allegory and how they relate to 
the hermeneutics of Vischer, Barth, and Kierkegaard. 
Noting in chapter one that texts do not rise up out of nowhere, it is also important to 
note that interpretations of texts do not rise up out of nowhere. Chapter two maps the Joban 
interpretations of major Christian readers from Gregory the Great to Immanuel Kant, setting 
the stage for Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth. Attention will be paid primarily to instances 
of allegory and freedom in their readings. 
Chapter three tackles the particularly complex interpretations of Job offered by Søren 
Kierkegaard. Just as the first two chapters of Job differ generically from the following 39 
chapters, Kierkegaard breaks his interpretation of Job into two generically different 
documents. He explores the words of Job in the prosaic prologue in his autonymous 
upbuilding discourses, but saves his reading of the poetic dialogues for the pseudonymous 
novella Repetition. The generic differences require attention and explanation by the reader of 
Kierkegaard before one can make sense of the readings themselves. 
Several decades after Kierkegaard, in the interbellum period in Germany, the Old 
Testament scholar Wilhelm Vischer presented his interpretation of Job in the form of a mini-
commentary. Chapter four acts as a close reading of this commentary, noting its historical 
context and the theology that Vischer intends to convey in his reading. Of special 
significance is his thesis that Job cares not for goods or the Good, but only for God’s 
goodness that resides beyond good and evil—a clear reference to Nietzsche’s book on 
morality called Beyond Good and Evil. Vischer’s Job is a character who comes to realize 
that his devotion to God means he must look beyond the laws and morality that God puts 
forward to the God who puts them forward. His is a deeply personal God, not in the sense 
that God is his property, but that God is a personality and not a purveyor of a system. 
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Pivoting off of Vischer, and with direct dependence on Kierkegaard, is Karl Barth’s 
reading of Job, which is found in the small print of his Church Dogmatics, and is examined 
in chapter five. Vischer’s essay presents Barth with what Barth would come to see as the key 
to understanding the book of Job. Vischer’s emphasis of the wager between the Satan and 
God, culminating in the Satan’s question over whether Job serves God “for nought” inspires 
Barth to explore the rest of the book of Job through the wager. He eventually argues that Job 
is a type of Jesus Christ, “a witness to the true witness,” whose devotion to God is free from 
quid pro quo. Both Job and God are free agents who freely choose each other. 
While chapters three through five explore Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth 
independently, the sixth chapter of the thesis evaluates the three interpretations of Job next to 
each other. Specifically, it evaluates Barth’s interpretation of Vischer and Kierkegaard in his 
reading of Job, and it continues by looking at the picture of freedom all three interpreters 
present to their readers. 
The thesis concludes with a brief example of how the observations on Job of these 
three scholars might benefit the exegesis of specific passages in the book of Job. I apply 
Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth to the first speech of Bildad the Shuhite in chapter 8, a 
passage the three scholars do not look at very closely. The intention is to show how the 
conversation on the book of Job, which has been ongoing since before the version we have 
was even written down, continues into the future. As Bakhtin would say, the dialogue is 
“unfinalizable.”  
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Chapter 1: Job in Great Time 
 In an article entitled “Reconsidering Job,” published in 2007 in Currents in Biblical 
Research, Carol Newsom writes,  
reception historical studies either tend to provide broad overviews or to focus on 
specific periods or traditions. Moreover, they also tend not to be methodologically self-
reflective. As biblical scholars increasingly begin to do reception historical work, this 
area of study is likely to be reconfigured, since biblical scholars will have to think 
through what it means for reception history to be considered an integral part of biblical 
studies.2 
 
A few years earlier, in her well received book The Book of Job: A Contest of Moral 
Imaginations, she concludes her study with the advice, “The only conclusion to a study of 
the dialogic structure of Job can be the advice to go and reread the book in the company of 
others who will contest your reading.”3 
 My intention in this thesis is to read the book of Job in the company of others in such a 
way as to self-reflect methodologically on reception historical exegesis. In taking Newsom’s 
advice in her book, I believe that one must integrate reception history into biblical studies. 
The company of others need not exclude the dead, after all. Moreover, if one takes 
Newsom’s admiration of the literary theory of Mikhail Bakhtin seriously, one must include 
the interpretations of a book like Job throughout history as utterances in an ongoing dialogue 
that began before the book of Job existed in any form. This last statement may confuse at 
first, but should become clear presently. 
 Because the book of Job has generated so much interest over the centuries, a 
comprehensive study of the reception of the book would necessarily be a broad overview 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Carol A. Newsom, “Reconsidering Job,” Currents in Biblical Research 5, no. 2 (2007), 176-77. 
3 Carol A. Newsom, The Book of Job: A Contest of Moral Imaginations (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 264. 
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and would not provide one with much more than a survey of the landscape.4 This work, by 
contrast, focuses on a particular strand of thought in Job interpretation.  In particular, I look 
at the readings of Job by Søren Kierkegaard, Wilhelm Vischer, and Karl Barth—a 
philosopher, a biblical scholar, and a theologian, respectively—who focus much of their 
attention in their readings of Job to notions of divine and human freedom and incorporate 
aspects of allegory into their exegetical methods.  
 In this section I intend to show how Mikhail Bakhtin’s discussions on time can help in 
developing a theory for reception history of the Bible. As Newsom suggests, though biblical 
scholars are beginning to incorporate the history of interpretation into their research, we lack 
sufficient arguments for its inclusion in the process of exegesis and perhaps even knowledge 
of how some seemingly antiquated ideas might fit into our modern readings. 
 Newsom highlights Susan Schreiner’s work on Calvin’s sermons on Job as very 
important in current research on Job, but it does remain difficult to know how to incorporate 
Calvin’s panegyrical descriptions of Elihu into modern readings that are even critical of 
Elihu’s inclusion in the book as well as what Elihu says.5 Even stranger to modern ears are 
the allegorical interpretations of Job by Gregory the Great.6 
 Bakhtin, however, seems to argue, though not directly, that if one accepts his 
dialogical theories, one must take into account the reception history of a text, particularly a 
great work like the Book of Job. In order to show this, we must review the confluence of 
several of Bakhtin’s various concepts that lead up to his later works that invoke the idea of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Stephen Vicchio’s three-volume work on Job throughout history, which impresses with its breadth but 
lacks much insight into the many works he covers. Stephen J. Vicchio, Job in the Ancient World (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf and Stock, 2006); Stephen J. Vicchio, Job in the Medieval World (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2006).; 
Stephen J. Vicchio, Job in the Modern World (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2006). 
5 Carol A. Newsom, "Reconsidering Job," 176. See Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom be Found: 
Calvin's Exegesis of Job From Medieval and Modern Perspectives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994). 
6 Pope Gregory I, Morals on the Book of Job, trans. Anonymous, 3 vols., vol. 1-3, A Library of the Fathers of 
the Holy Catholic Church (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1844). 
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great time. 
 Before doing so, however, it will be useful to present a brief explanation of why 
Bakhtin proves a useful thinker to utilise over other hermeneutical and literary theorists. 
Bakhtin does share many similarities to other major hermeneuts both on the Continent and in 
the Anglo-American tradition. It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to go into much 
depth with these similarities and differences, but a brief overview will go far in defending 
Bakhtin’s inclusion in this thesis.7 
 David Paul Parris presents, in an entire monograph, his theoretical justification of 
reception historical exegesis using the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hans Robert Jauss. 
There are many similarities between Parris’ analysis of Gadamer and Jauss and mine below 
of Bakhtin. For instance, Bakhtin’s discussion of addressivity and genre memory relates well 
to Gadamer’s position that Vorurteil is inherited from tradition and contains an anticipatory 
nature.8 Gadamer’s understanding of the importance of the individual events of history 
relates to Bakhtin’s.9 Vorurteil in Gadamer’s thought also coheres well with Bakhtin’s 
favouring one’s particularity in history and culture as a starting point in dialogue with an 
ancient text from another culture. One should also note that Parris holds that Gadamer 
promotes active dialogue with tradition rather than passive obedience, a sentiment seemingly 
shared by Bakhtin.10 Likewise, Bakhtin shares some similarities with Jauss, particularly with 
Jauss’s seven theses in his landmark essay “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For a more in depth analysis of Bakhtin’s similarities and differences with other major scholars of 
philosophical hermeneutics, I direct the reader to Michael Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique: M.M. Bakhtin 
and the Theory of Ideology (London: Routledge, 1992). See especially chapter 4, “Bakhtin’s Critical 
Hermeneutics.” 
8 David Paul Parris, Reception Theory and Biblical Hermeneutics, Princeton Theological Monograph Series 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2009), 3. 
9 David Paul Parris, Reception Theory, 4. 
10 David Paul Parris, Reception Theory, 10. 
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Theory.”11 Of particular interest in his essay is his fourth thesis in which he writes: 
The reconstruction of the horizon of expectations, on the basis of which a work in the 
past was created and received, enables us to find the questions to which the text 
originally answered and thereby to discover how the reader of that day viewed and 
understood the work… [This reconstruction] brings out the hermeneutic difference 
between past and present ways of understanding a work, points up the history of its 
reception—providing both approaches—and thereby challenges as platonizing dogma 
the apparently self-evident dictum of philological metaphysics that literature is 
timelessly present and that it has objective meaning, determined once and for all and 
directly open to the interpreter at any time.12 
As will be shown below, Jauss picks up on the gap between the present reader and the 
original text that draws the reader to the history of the text’s reception in a way similar to 
Bakhtin.  
 On the other hand, Bakhtin’s differences between these two German thinkers help us 
think about the reception history of the Bible in fresh, and perhaps, more useful ways. 
Michael Gardiner points out many similarities between Gadamer and Bakhtin, suggesting 
that dialogue could be a synonym for hermeneutics in the Gadamerian sense. Gadamer’s 
description of dialogue, however, appears much more sanguine than does Bakhtin’s. 
Gardiner’s main criticism of Gadamer is that Gadamer’s hermeneutics “ignores the crucial 
dimension of power, and of the specifically ideological deformation of language-use.”13 
Bakhtin’s work on carnival and the carnivalesque as responses to hegemonic power 
structures, however, displays a keen understanding of power and that understanding lies in 
the subtext of much of his other work. While dialogue and self-understanding to Gadamer 
seem to bring about mutual understanding on their own, Bakhtin’s recognition of the 
problem of power makes him more appropriate for the incorporation of dialogue in the 
interpretation of the Bible. The Bible, after all, is a hegemonic text which has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Hans Robert Jauss, “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory,” New Literary History 2, no. 1 
(1970): 7-37. 
12 Hans Robert Jauss, "Literary History," 18-19. 
13 Michael Gardiner, Dialogics of Critique, 116. 
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interpreted by the powerful in its history. In looking at the book of Job, in particular, which 
is a story of a man in dialogue with the representatives of the more powerful ideas of their 
time, the recognition of the problem of power is important. Gardiner does fault Bakhtin for 
not addressing the problem of power in an entirely coherent manner, but commends him for 
his general awareness of the problem.14 In the case of reception history of Job, we will be 
dealing with the powerful interpreters up until the enlightenment, when we will shift to 
thinkers who are battling the dominant theories of their day. Power, therefore, should be 
accounted for when looking specifically at the interpretations of Kierkegaard and Vischer in 
particular and should not be a forgotten entity in the exploration of Barth, either. 
 As a student of Gadamer, Jauss inherits some of these same problems, which Shepherd 
discusses at length in two essays cited above. One concern of several of Jauss’s critics is the 
vagueness of his term “horizon of expectations.” At times the horizon of expectations seems 
to be a property of the text’s readers while at other times it appears to be a property of the 
text itself, betraying a “lack of rigour” on Jauss’s part.15 In the end, David Shepherd faults 
Jauss for betraying his initial confidence in the history of reception by falling back to more 
traditional notions of inherent meaning within the text itself.16 The problem with this is that 
the readers in Jauss’s dialogue become less stable and independent and the dialogue ceases 
to be true dialogue. This is not to say that Bakhtin’s dialogue regards all interlocutors as 
equal in power. Rather, it forces successive interpreters to allow the other voices to speak so 
that true dialogue can happen, but which recognizes the disparity of power and allows those 
less historically powerful voices to be heard. 
 I do not want to overstate the usefulness of Bakhtin over and against Gadamer, Jauss, 
and others and want to stress that Bakhtin himself suffers from vagueness, based largely on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Michael Gardiner, Dialogics of Critique, 116. 
15 David Shepherd, “Bakhtin and the Reader,” in Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, ed. K. Hirschkop and D. 
Shepherd (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 102. 
16 David Shepherd, "Bakhtin and the Reader," 103. 
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his unsystematic writing style. He does not present an independent theory of reading, after 
all, but posits several ideas over many articles, monographs, and years that one must piece 
together. Some of the differences above may also appear as mere hair-splitting, for, in the 
end, if Bakhtin, Jauss, and Gadamer can all lead us to the importance of including the history 
of a biblical text’s reception, each scholar’s views should actually lend credence to its 
inclusion in the process of interpretation. Bakhtin’s theories, however, seem more ready to 
take into account the complex history of the Bible. 
 It is Bakhtin’s broad scope and attention to history that makes him uniquely useful to 
biblical scholars. Consider Walter Reed’s early book on Bakhtin and the Bible.17 Bakhtin’s 
theory of language and literature, Reed contends, “positions itself between the fragmenting 
referentiality of the historical view and the consolidating authority of the theological 
perspective.”18 Bakhtin, therefore, promotes the reading of the Bible as a powerful utterance 
in a dialogue rather than “merely a part of a much larger archive of documents and other 
cultural evidence of human expression”19 on the one hand and the inerrant or infallible self-
contained word from God on the other. In practice, the Bible has maintained a place between 
these two extremes, for even those who hold the Bible as the inerrant Word of God find 
themselves in sharp disagreement as to what the message of that Word might actually mean. 
Bakhtin allows us to recognize the cultural power of the Bible without that power being 
distorted beyond its practicality and use. 
 The years following Reed’s exploration of the Bible as dialogical utterance have seen 
the proliferation of many and diverse uses of Bakhtin in biblical studies. Very often, scholars 
have seen Bakhtin’s importance in the development of genre studies as fruitful for furthering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Walter L. Reed, Dialogues of the Word: The Bible as Literature According to Bakhtin (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
18 Walter L. Reed, Dialogues of the Word, ix. 
19 Walter L. Reed, Dialogues of the Word, ix.  
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our understanding of the diverse witnesses in the Hebrew Bible, in particular. See especially 
the anthology Bakhtin and Genre Theory in Biblical Studies, edited by Roland Boer.20 That 
book shows, among other things, the similarities between genre studies and form criticism 
and how Bakhtin’s theories of genre can “enliven” form criticism and genre studies. What 
this chapter means to do, then, is to take Bakhtin’s theories of dialogue and history even 
further. 
 Note, for instance, form criticism’s interest in the history of the text. When we look at 
other historical-critical methods, however—text criticism, in particular—the history of the 
text is complicated. Text criticism’s attempts to recover the original text from the many 
versions that it has given rise to leads one to question what text we are trying to recover. 
Bakhtin’s language and literary theories allows one to recognize the problems that arise in 
text critical examinations without having to smooth them over in order to interpret the text.  
 Barbara Green hints at Bakhtin’s usefulness for reception theory, referring her reader 
back to Shepherd’s brief works on Bakhtin and reader oriented criticism.21 While Shepherd 
focuses some on Jauss’s theories, he tends more to pit Bakhtin against reader oriented 
theorists like Iser and Fish. I would like to push Bakhtin even further than Shepherd, to gear 
Bakhtin’s ideas specifically to the Bible and history of its reception. The key idea from 
Bakhtin that leads to a defence of reception historical exegesis is embedded in his somewhat 
elusive term great time. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Roland Boer, ed. Bakhtin and Genre Theory in Biblical Studies, vol. 63, Semeia Studies (Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2007). 
21 Barbara Green, Mikhail Bakhtin and Biblical Scholarship: An Introduction, vol. 38, Semeia Studies (Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2000), 28. Green writes, “Considering that Bakhtin situated the role of the author 
as simultaneously a reader, and in some ways as almost a peer of authored characters, one is led to ask how can 
these insights be aligned with reception theories as they have developed in the last couple of decades?” Though 
Green does not do the aligning herself, she later, in a footnote, refers to Shepherd’s works cited above. 
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The Bible as Unfinalizable Dialogue 
Bakhtin’s most extended discussion on great time comes from his “Response to a 
Question from the Novyi Mir Editorial Staff” in the book Speech Genres and other Late 
Essays.22 This rather brief essay raises important concerns about the goal of interpretation of 
ancient texts. What he says seems to conflict with Paul Ricoeur, among many other 
hermeneuts, who explains that “to ‘make one’s own’ what was previously ‘foreign’ remains 
the ultimate aim of all hermeneutics. Interpretation in its last stage wants to equalize, to 
render contemporaneous, to assimilate… This goal is achieved insofar as interpretation 
actualizes the meaning of the text for the present reader.”23 Bakhtin, on the other hand, 
argues that “to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be 
located outside the object of his or her creative understanding—in time, in space, in 
culture.”24 The reason for this is because nothing new arises from the appropriation of 
information. It acts merely as a transaction where one person gains something already extant 
from another. Bakhtin argues that a dialogue between cultures brings something new into the 
world. “We raise new questions for a foreign culture,” he writes, “ones that it did not raise 
itself; we seek answers to our own questions in it; and the foreign culture responds to us by 
revealing to us its new aspects and new semantic depths.”25 In other words, the final goal of 
hermeneutics is not to equalize, as Ricoeur argues, but to add.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “Response to a Question From the Novyi Mir Editorial Staff,” in Speech Genres and 
Other Late Essays, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986). 
23 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Ft. Worth: TCU press, 1976), 
31-32. 
24 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Response to a Question," 7. Emphasis in original. 
25 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Response to a Question," 7. 
26 Bakhtin reveals in an early essay, however, that though the goal of hermeneutics is to remain outside the 
object of understanding, one may need to appropriate the text in an earlier stage. Thus, Ricoeur’s goal is an 
early step in Bakhtin’s larger goal. In a passage that seems to describe the method of the young man’s 
interpretation of the book of Job in Kierkegaard’s Repetition, Bakhtin writes: 
“Let us say that there is a human being before me who is suffering… What I have to do is to experience and 
consummate him aesthetically… The first step in aesthetic activity is my projecting myself into him and 
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Dialogue is not confined to the moment. When Bakhtin suggests that dialogue is 
unfinalizable, he argues that even if the conversation partners cease participating in a 
dialogue, the dialogue can still continue even into perpetuity. In fact, the dialogue has no 
discernible beginning and so its unfinalizability refers to both sides of the time line of the 
dialogue. To understand this eternality of dialogue in the Bakhtinian sense, one presupposes 
the concept of utterance as basic unit of speech. Bakhtin explains this most comprehensively 
in another late essay called “The Problem of Speech Genres.”27 In this essay he explains that 
the utterance is the “real unit of speech communication” as opposed to the sentence, since 
the sentence often obscures genre and other contextual elements that help in the discernment 
of meaning.28  
One major distinction between the utterance and the sentence that is important for 
this description is that an utterance has no real limit in length, superficially. That is, an 
utterance can be as short as a grunt or as long as a novel.29 Thus, our case study, the Book of 
Job, acts as an utterance in this paradigm. As Barry Sandywell states, “the concept of 
utterance also includes the congealed ‘products’ or material deposits of past acts of 
dialogue—the artifacts, practices, commonsense, philosophical doctrines, written texts, and 
institutions that make up the operative contexts of a living culture.”30 Therefore, the Book of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
experiencing his life from within him… I must appropriate to myself the concrete life-horizon of this human 
being as he experiences it himself… During the time I project myself into him, I must detach myself from the 
independent significance of all these features that are transgredient to his consciousness… But in any event my 
projection of myself into him must be followed by a return into myself, a return to my own place outside the 
suffering person, for only from this place can the material derived from my projecting myself into the other be 
rendered meaningful ethically, cognitively, or aesthetically.” (Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in 
Aesthetic Activity,” in Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim 
Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 25-26.) 
27 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “The Problem of Speech Genres,” in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. Caryl 
Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986). 
28 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," 71. 
29 Gary Saul and Caryl Emerson Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1990), 125-26. 
30 Barry Sandywell, “The Shock of the Old: Mikhail Bakhtin's Contributions to the Theory of Time and 
Alterity,” in Bakhtin and the Human Sciences, ed. Michael Mayerfeld Bell and Michael Gardiner (London: 
Sage Publications Ltd, 1998), 203. 
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Job, and, for our purposes here, interpretations of the Book of Job in subsequent epochs act 
as different utterances in the same dialogue. 
This point, that a dialogue can contain such large and seemingly closed-ended 
utterances, reflects the importance of addressivity in Bakhtin’s thought. Addressivity, in fact 
is “a constitutive feature of the utterance; without it the utterance does not and cannot 
exist.”31 Every utterance arises from a previous utterance and anticipates another. In the case 
of Job, one might argue that the Book of Job might be responding to different utterances. 
Some argue that the book attempts to answer the retributive theology of the Deuteronomist 
or perhaps it is an Israelite response to other Ancient Near Eastern wisdom writings. One 
might argue that the “final,” canonized form of the book responds to earlier manifestations 
of the Book of Job that now figure into the final form. Consider the Elihu speeches that some 
later author wrote before the book’s eventual canonization. Whatever the case, the Book of 
Job did not rise up and, in Bakhtin’s words, “disturb […] the eternal silence of the 
universe.”32 It instead responded to earlier utterances. The interpreter, then, must view an 
utterance as one voice in a dialogue, “a response to preceding utterances.”33 
Likewise, an utterance gives rise to responses. Bakhtin writes, “Each utterance 
refutes, affirms, supplements, and relies on the others, presupposes them to be known, and 
somehow takes them into account.”34 Thus, an ancient text is not a standalone document. It 
has antecedents and responses that also come into play in its meaning. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," 99. 
32 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," 69. 
33 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," 91. 
34 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," 91. Consider also these quotes by Bakhtin in other essays: “…every 
literary work faces outward away from itself, toward the listener-reader, and to a certain extent anticipates 
possible reactions to itself.” (Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes 
Toward a Historical Poetics,” in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1981), 257.) Emphasis in original. “The word in living conversation is directly, 
blatantly, oriented toward a future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the 
answer’s direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same time 
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This brief summation of Bakhtin’s theory of the utterance in a dialogue does not 
warrant, on its own, attention to the other utterances in relation to a given ancient or biblical 
text. However, it supports the practice in some way since it shows that the history that 
precedes a text is not the only element that exists in the textual dialogue. The text continues 
to develop as the dialogue continues. Bakhtin explains how this can be the case in some of 
his other works that deal with his theory of time, one of which comes in his discussion of the 
chronotope. 
The Chronotope and the Nature of Time 
Bakhtin describes the chronotope as a way of representing time and space in a novel, 
but his understanding of time in general is implicit in his discourse.35 One element of time 
that bears importance for this defense of reception history does relate to Bakhtin’s favoring 
of the novel as an important development in literary history. Because the novel exhibits the 
quotidian better than other artistic forms, it is a superior medium in temporal representation. 
In describing the chronotope in Goethe’s works, he sees “essential traces of human hands 
and minds that change nature, and the way human reality and all man has created are 
reflected back on his customs and views.”36 The importance of this representation of 
humanity’s ability to affect change on the future reflects Bakhtin’s vision of the world as one 
in which one’s activity in this world matters, thus relating to ethical responsibility and 
creative works, both.37  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
determined by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering 
word. Such is the situation in any living dialogue.” (Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” in The 
Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 280.) 
35 See Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman and Its Significance in the History of Realism (Toward a 
Historical Typology of the Novel),” in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael 
Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), and Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Forms of Time" for Bakhtin’s 
full discourses on the chronotope. 
36 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Bildungsroman," 32. 
37 Gary Saul and Caryl Emerson Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 397. See also Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Toward a 
Philosophy of the Act, trans. Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993). 
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Related to the notion that actions in the present bear consequences in the future is the 
idea that historical events are not arbitrary but that history is a process where past, present, 
and future are linked together.38 Thus, it follows that each utterance in an unfinalizable 
dialogue maintains some importance in the development of meaning. Previous receptions in 
the history of interpretation of a biblical text are not random aberrations but necessary links 
in the history of the text—that is, necessary to the existence of the text we have at present 
time. 
As the text as utterance proceeds through time, interacting with other utterances in 
the eternal dialogue, it experiences various chronotopes in what Sandywell calls the 
“heterotemporality of social existence.”39 The nature of history means that different people 
in different times and cultures experience the world in different ways. When these people are 
readers of the same text, the meaning of the text is enriched even beyond the knowledge or 
ability of the original author or readers.40 At the very least, the readers are enriched by the 
multitude of meanings discovered in the text. 
By understanding time and text in this way, the importance of the reception history of 
a text becomes self-evident. By relying merely on the interpretation of the text in its own 
world and the contemporary world, a large swath of its meaning falls by the wayside. In 
other words, the biblical text as we receive it today is not the biblical text that was read at its 
inception or canonization. Even supposing that we have somehow recovered the original 
autograph of the text does not mean that the utterance is the same as it was in its own epoch. 
The dialogue it has been participating in over the centuries has changed it and enriched it in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Gary Saul and Caryl Emerson Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 405. 
39 Barry Sandywell, "The Shock of the Old," 197. 
40 Gary Saul and Caryl Emerson Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 429. In Bakhtin’s own words: “The work and the 
world represented in it enter the real world and enrich it, and the real world enters the work and its world as 
part of the process of its creation, as well as part of its subsequent life, in a continual renewing of the work 
through the creative perception of listeners and readers.” (Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Forms of Time," 254.) 
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that more of it is available for the modern reader to interpret. It has grown over time as 
readers excavate the buried meaning. Thus, part of our goal in biblical interpretation should 
be to interpret the dialogue which incorporates the text while we interpret the text.  
Bakhtin claims that the utterance is an unrepeatable linguistic unit.41 As it enters into 
different contexts, though it may contain the same words in the same order as before, it 
changes. This is the case for a single reader since the reader reacts differently to the second 
utterance than to the first.42 It follows that it is the case with different readers as well. The 
Book of Job carries with it a different meaning to a first century Jew than it does to a 21st 
century North American. A medieval Italian will also have read a different utterance than 
either the ancient Palestinian or Modern Westerner. Thus, even if the hermeneutical goal 
were to understand the ancient text as an ancient reader might, the quest would be futile.  
Great Time 
Near the end of his career Bakhtin adds to his understanding of time and the 
chronotope in his “Response to a Question from the Novyi Mir Editorial staff,” in which he 
gives his opinion of contemporary Russian literary and cultural studies.43 In this essay, he 
presents his most sustained description of the concept of great time. Unfortunately, the 
brevity of the essay still requires much speculation and deduction on the part of the reader to 
understand the full significance of this concept. 
Great time does arise sparsely throughout his later works, including in the essay 
“Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences,”44 where he compares great time to small 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences,” in 
Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1986), 108. 
42 Gary Saul and Caryl Emerson Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 126. 
43 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Response to a Question." 
44 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences,” in Speech Genres and Other Late 
Essays, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 169. Note, 
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time. Small time, he describes as “the present day, the recent past, and the foreseeable 
[desired] future.” Great time, on the other hand is “infinite and unfinalized dialogue in which 
no meaning dies.”45 Thus, great time houses all interpretations of a text, while small time has 
a limited scope and falls short in what it can provide the interpreter.46 
Great time, therefore, relates to that interconnectedness described in much of 
Bakhtin’s discussion on time and dialogue. In fact, Sandywell calls Great Time “the 
temporal equivalent of ‘polyglossia’ at the level of cultural traditions… The ‘polyglot We’ 
of great time includes anonymous others who reach back into the sources of cultural 
creativity and possible interlocutors solicited by future acts of interpretation.”47 Great time, 
then, relates directly to Bakhtin’s theories on time and dialogue.  
The general meaning of great time as Bakhtin describes it is the idea that “works 
break through the boundaries of their own time, they live in centuries, that is, in great time 
and frequently (with great works, always) their lives there are more intense and fuller than 
are their lives within their own time.”48 He gives several examples of this phenomenon in his 
writings. He argues that Shakespeare “has grown because of that which actually has been 
and continues to be found in his works, but which neither he himself nor his contemporaries 
could consciously perceive and evaluate in the context of the culture of their epoch.”49 In 
another essay, untranslated at the present time, he says that “Homer, and Aeschylus, and 
Sophocles, and Socrates, and all the ancient writers and thinkers remain, with equal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
however, that the Bakhtinian authorship of this “essay” has come into question in recent years. The words most 
likely are Bakhtin’s, but the various paragraphs are likely not in chronological order (David Shepherd, “A 
Feeling for History? Bakhtin and 'the Problem of Great Time',” The Slavonic and East European Review 84, 
no. 1 (2006), 35.). 
45 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Methodology," 169. 
46 See Maria Langleben, “M. Bachtin's Notions of Time and Textanalysis,” Russian Literature 26 (1989), 181. 
47 Barry Sandywell, "The Shock of the Old," 208. 
48 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Response to a Question," 4. Emphasis in original. 
49 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Response to a Question," 4. 
 20	  
entitlement, in great time…”50 Presumably, he would say the same about Goethe, but instead 
with Goethe he praises him for having incorporated this thought in his work. Goethe views 
the past as resounding in the present, “taking on complex new layers of significance in each 
historical epoch.”51 
Great works, therefore, outgrow their own epochs. To focus entirely on the culture 
they represent is to ignore a great portion of their lives. As Bakhtin writes, “trying to 
understand and explain a work solely in terms of the conditions of its epoch alone, solely in 
terms of the conditions of the most immediate time, will never enable us to penetrate into its 
semantic depths.”52 They gain new meanings over time and require interpreters to harvest 
these meanings.  
Bakhtin uses an agrarian metaphor in his Novyi Mir essay as well, but in doing so 
reminds us that the eternal dialogue stretches backward. He states that “great literary works 
are prepared for by centuries, and in the epoch of their creation it is merely a matter of 
picking the fruit that is ripe after a lengthy and complex process of maturation.”53 This 
statement reminds us that the great work responds to what comes previously. If the reception 
history of a text is a relatively untapped resource in biblical studies, that does not obviate the 
need for historical criticism. In fact it suggests that reception history is a component of 
historical criticism. The text responds to history and anticipates response in the future. It 
picks the ripe fruit and then plants more for future respondents. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Reproduced partially in David Shepherd, "A Feeling for History," 33-34. 
51 William D. Lindsey, “The Problem of Great Time,” Journal of Religion 73, no. 3 (1993), 325. 
52 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Response to a Question," 4. We can presume that the “immediate time” he mentions in 
this essay is similar or the same as the “small time” mentioned in “Methodology for the Human Sciences.” 
53 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Response to a Question," 4. 
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 That the fruit is ripe relates to the way Bakhtin views creativity. Creativity is constant 
and responds to immediate opportunities and needs.54 The Book of Job is a product of its 
culture and epoch as much as it is a product of its author or authors. Thus studying the Book 
of Job requires studying its history and epoch. However, the Book of Job’s appearance in the 
world spurs the creativity of its readers. It contributes to the immediate culture and future 
ones as well. It continues to live in its own residues which necessitate creative response.55 
Modern interpretations of the Book of Job, therefore, could not exist without those that had 
come previously. To understand how we arrived at our conclusions requires the knowledge 
of the previous generations’ contributions. 
 Looking at an image of a text in great time, one sees a dialogue of a series of 
utterances. The subject of the dialogue is the text, but the text is also an utterance. Some of 
the utterances give rise to the subject and others respond to it. Each of these utterances are 
also products of their own chronotope, and thus, contain their own “outsideness,” which 
allows for newness in the dialogue. When discussing the role of the readers in this dialogue, 
Morson and Emerson write: 
…[Readers] can take maximal advantage of the differences and of their outsideness 
by an act of creative understanding that is truly dialogic in the best sense. Readers 
may make the differences an occasion for exploring the potential of the work in a 
way not available to its original author and readers, and so become enriched by 
something truly in the work but needing their own special experience to provoke.56 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Gary Saul and Caryl Emerson Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 414. 
55 Gary Saul and Caryl Emerson Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 229. See also Mikhail M. Bakhtin, 
"Bildungsroman," 36, where he writes, “The ghostly, terrifying, and unaccountable in it were surmounted by 
the structural aspects, already disclosed by us above, which are inherent in this way of visualizing time: the 
aspect of an essential link between the past and present, the aspect of the necessity of the past and the necessity 
of its place in a line of continuous development, the aspect of the creative effectiveness of the past, and, finally, 
the aspect of the past and present being linked to a necessary future.” Emphasis in original. 
56 Gary Saul and Caryl Emerson Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 429. 
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The picture here is that the reader, though creative in one sense, does not create meaning, as 
in the reader-response criticism of Stanley Fish. Rather, he or she unlocks meaning inherent 
in the text. The dialogue, therefore, is necessary to extract meaning.57  
Summary of Bakhtin’s arguments for Reception History 
 To be sure, Bakhtin does not directly advocate the incorporation of reception history 
into the interpretive process. However, his descriptions of time and the interpreter’s 
hermeneutical goals seem to warrant the inclusion of reception history in the exegesis of an 
ancient text. Before continuing with an evaluation of Bakhtin’s theories and the problems 
that might arise from them, let us review the various reasons for incorporating the history of 
interpretation based on Bakhtin’s dialogical theories. 
 Firstly, the dialogue the interpreter has with a text did not start with the interpreter’s 
impetus. In the case of the Book of Job, the dialogue has been ongoing for more than two 
millennia. Important points have arisen in that long period that one need not forget. It is also 
likely that earlier interpreters have raised points that modern interpreters will raise 
independently. This, however, cannot be guaranteed and there is no reason, anyway, to 
reinvent the wheel. 
 Secondly, in arguing that the hermeneutical task should not require the modern 
interpreter to renounce his or her own culture, epoch, or context, but to “raise new questions 
for a foreign culture, ones that it did not raise itself,”58 Bakhtin advocates a creative 
understanding of the text. What this also does, however, is place the modern interpreter in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Relatedly, Shepherd writes that “what is missing in Fish’s formulations is the acknowledgement of and 
insistence on the social and historical constitution of prior meaning which makes Bakhtin’s model so 
persuasive,” invoking the chronotope in his assessment of reader based theory. (David Shepherd, “The 
Authority of Meanings and the Meanings of Authority: Some Problems in the Theory of Reading,” Poetics 
Today 7, no. 1 (1986), 141.) 
58 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Response to a Question," 7. 
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the same situation as the earlier interpreters in their own epoch and culture. The modern 
interpreter may conceivably be more able to enter into the mind of the author through the 
knowledge gained throughout history—knowledge of ancient culture, rhetoric, philology, 
etc. Since this should not figure into the goal, however, the earlier interpreters can remain in 
the dialogue without a temporal hierarchy silencing them. Great time democratizes 
interpretation. Of course, priority will be given in the end to that interpretation that can speak 
best into our own culture and epoch, but earlier interpreters should become partners in this 
quest. 
 Related to this second point is the realization that the goal of earlier interpreters of 
biblical texts fit much more closely to Bakhtin’s stated desires than most modern methods. 
Rather than focusing on what the text might have meant, pre-modern exegetes were more 
intent on seeking answers to their own epoch’s questions. 
 Thirdly, the “sclerotic deposits” of the ancient text as utterance that litter the time-
space of the eternal dialogue have been picked up by other interpreters along the way.59 That 
is, their creative reading has unlocked meaning and they, in turn, have deposited their own 
sclerotic deposits for us. Bypassing what has been left for us in the dialogue means a loss of 
data. 
 Lastly, by bypassing the millennia of data left for us by pre-modern exegetes, we also 
short circuit the dialogue. The interpretation of the text we have received is the result of 
centuries of small discoveries, betraying the prosaic nature of historical activity. The gradual 
nature of the eternal dialogue reminds us that others have trod before us. Without their work, 
the modern interpreter must begin at the beginning. We do not stand on the shoulders of 
giants so much as we stand on the shoulders of those standing on the shoulders of others 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," 292. 
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with very few giants among us. This requires a humble posture, but it is also empowering. 
We recognize that very little of what we do can be considered groundbreaking or 
trailblazing. On the other hand, minor additions to the knowledge of a text are necessary for 
the continuing dialogue. Each voice in the dialogue affects change. This is empowering for 
us and also important for the voices that have gone before us. William Lindsey describes 
great time as “time in which the past inhabits the present in voices that did not have their full 
say in the past and time in which the future enters the present proleptically, insofar as it 
opens space here and now for voices that otherwise would have no opportunity to speak.”60  
The above, admittedly, acts more as a defence for and theory of the incorporation of 
reception history into the practice of biblical studies rather than as a prescription for how one 
might integrate the two practices. Bakhtin, to my knowledge, does not offer a method of 
interpretation,61 though in practice biblical scholars have been using earlier receptions of 
biblical text selectively since the medieval era.62 
Questions remain, though, as to how far one is willing and able to take the logical 
conclusions of Bakhtin’s theories of time seriously in this regard. One issue that might 
hinder the historical critic from using the interpretations of a biblical text from previous 
epochs actually relates to the change that has come about through history. Would those who 
have participated in this dialogue actually agree with their own exegesis if given the 
knowledge that we have received by benefit of time? That is, would recent discoveries or 
linguistic developments that illumine our knowledge of the text have an important effect on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 William D. Lindsey, "The Problem of Great Time," 324. 
61 A method of interpretation, after all, would look a great deal like a system, which Bakhtin criticizes. It would 
also seem to hinder creative response within the dialogue. 
62 Patristic studies are plentiful among certain confessional groups, of course. Other scholars have tapped into 
more recent receptions in different ways. In the case of Job, Clines refers to Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding 
Discourses to aid in his interpretation of Job 1:21 (David J. A. Clines, Job 1-20, vol. 17, WBC (Waco: Word, 
1989).) More recently, Susannah Ticciati has used Barth’s interpretation of Job as a starting point for her own 
theology (Susannah Ticciati, Job and the Disruption of Identity: Reading Beyond Barth (London: T & T Clark 
International, 2005).) Newsom highlights other examples (Carol A. Newsom, "Reconsidering Job," 175-77.)  
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earlier exegetes if they were given the information we have received by benefit of our place 
in history? Would this problem then preclude using these aspects of their exegesis that do 
not hold up to modern knowledge? 
Obviously, one cannot incorporate the interpretations of all exegetes throughout 
history of a given biblical text. The number of interpreters of the Book of Job, for example is 
so vast that allowing all to speak into our own work would be counterproductive.63 One will 
also find that one cannot reconcile the various readings of a text. However, the existence of 
irreconcilable views does not preclude dialogue, nor does it justify the silencing of earlier 
writers or views. Likewise, dialogue would not seem to mean passive acceptance of the 
interpretation.64 Bakhtin, instead, seems to be advocating the acceptance of other readers in 
history into the conversation, or, perhaps advocating the interpreter’s involvement in the 
conversation that has been ongoing already. 
Job as Scriptural Utterance 
 When dealing with a passage from the Bible, one encounters another set of layers or 
voices in this dialogue, for the Canon itself is a reception of previous utterances. The book of 
Job preceded the Canon and perhaps the dialogues of the book of Job preceded the book of 
Job. The receptions of Job encountered in this thesis complicate the dialogue even further 
since they treat the book of Job as an utterance in the larger biblical Canon rather than an 
utterance that stands on its own. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See again, for instance, Stephen J. Vicchio, Job in the Medieval World.; and Stephen J. Vicchio, Job in the 
Modern World. There is very little room in these surveys of Job in the history of interpretation for analysis or 
engagement with the texts.  
64 For a potential example of passive acceptance (or perhaps more likely, a clever avoidance of conflict with 
authorities), note the final line in the prologue to Thomas Aquinas’s Literal Exposition on Job. In discussing 
his goal of expounding the literal sense of Job rather than a spiritual or mystical sense, he writes, “Blessed Pope 
Gregory has already disclosed to us its mysteries so subtly and clearly that there seems no need to add anything 
further to them” (Martin D. Yaffe, “Interpretive Essay,” in The Literal Exposition on Job By Thomas Aquinas, 
The American Academy of Religion Classics in Religious Studies (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 69.) 
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 Consider Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth’s interpretations in comparison to Kant’s. 
One major difference between Kant’s interpretation of Job and the three interpreters that lie 
at the centre of this project, besides the obviously huge difference in length, is his view of 
the Bible. Kant certainly did not hold the Scripture in as high regard as the others. More 
importantly, however, is the fact that he fails to mention any other biblical texts in his 
discourse on Job as both Barth and Vischer do. Kierkegaard also appears not to raise other 
texts during his discourse on Job in Repetition, but as I shall argue, his publishing Fear and 
Trembling on the same day as Repetition (but under a different pseudonym) shows he sees 
the need to read those two texts in proximity—two texts which include lengthy exegeses of 
the Akadah and Job. Kierkegaard also elsewhere waxes about the authority of all texts in the 
Canon, so we need not belabor the point.  
 We will, in their respective chapters, give each interpreter their due. In these early 
stages, however, it behoves us to generalise Kierkegaard, Barth, and Vischer as exegetes 
who hold the biblical Canon in a higher authority than many other scholars of their eras. All 
three recognise the importance of historical criticism and do not often begrudge those who 
practice the more wissenschaftlich aspects of biblical studies. However, the results of those 
studies make up only minor portions of their own exegesis and certainly do not satisfy them 
as the ends of biblical study.  
 Of course, their attitudes toward the scriptures, though idiosyncratic in some 
respects, reflect the norm over the course of the history of biblical interpretation. Most 
exegetes utilise some manifestation of theological exegesis and generally treat the Bible as a 
whole rather than a mere anthology of disparate texts. However, I do not want to take this for 
granted. In the current epoch, the norm in academia still finds much to scorn with theological 
exegesis, Canonical approaches to exegesis, as well as the reception history of biblical texts. 
In the following section, I continue to lay the hermeneutical groundwork for approaching the 
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book of Job in these respects, continuing to use Bakhtin as an aid in the undergirding. 
Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth are not grand proponents of the reception history of biblical 
texts for exegesis, but they do approach texts theologically and with attention to the Canon. 
Bakhtin’s theories, which help defend the use of reception history also aid in defence of 
proto-Canonical approaches—especially his theories of the utterance versus the sentence. 
The Utterance versus the Sentence 
 In some of Bakhtin’s later essays he incorporates his earlier misgivings about Kant’s 
desire for objective analysis in ethics illustrated in his tract “Toward a Philosophy of the 
Act” into his more mature work on literary theory. Bakhtin expresses a frustration towards 
modern linguistic analysis because it focuses too much on the objective data found in the 
sentence. 
 His problems with the sentence, best exemplified in his essay “The Problem of 
Speech Genres” are that these basic units of communication lack much of the intangible 
information that makes up a dialogue. To begin to rectify the problem of the abstract and 
objective data that cannot take into account aspects of genre like irony, Bakhtin proposes 
using the “utterance” as a unit of speech instead. 
 One cannot measure an utterance in the same way as one measures a sentence.65 
While a sentence generally consists of a subject and a predicate, an utterance can consist of 
any number of combinations of words. Indeed, an utterance need not consist of any words at 
all, for a grunt can communicate more than a long string of words in certain contexts. One 
very telling difference between an utterance and a sentence is that a sentence is repeatable 
while an utterance is not. The same sentence in different contexts makes for different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Even the sentence, however, confounds. Many linguists have argued how one determines the limits of the 
sentence. See Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 7. 
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utterances. Despite being verbally identical, two utterances actually carry different 
contextual meanings while the sentences carry the same abstract meaning.66 To show the 
significance of this for a biblical passage, let us see how one might view a single verse from 
Job as multiple utterances when it is repeated in different contexts. “I am not at ease, nor am 
I quiet; I have no rest; but trouble comes,” says Job in 3:26 concluding his first speech.67 The 
verse as recorded in the Leningrad Codex expresses anguish in typical Hebrew parallelism. 
As a sentence, one has much to explore. Three parallel clauses—a negation followed by a 
first person singular Qal qatal intransitive verb—give way to a fourth clause with a third 
person positive transitive verb that rhymes with the previously thrice repeated negation lo´ 
and an abstract subject.  
However much the sentence expresses, it does not explain much without viewing it 
in its larger context. The entire utterance takes up the entire chapter where the reader gets 
more of a sense of what has led to this finale of misery. But even in the context of chapter 3 
Job’s specific misfortunes remain a mystery. Some scholars devoted to the Wissenschaft of 
the text might resist seeing chapter 3 in the context of the whole book of Job. There are 
many reasons to believe that the prologue to Job and the dialogues do not share the same 
author or era of production. In this context, the dialogues of Job and his friends remain mute 
regarding the cause of Job’s exasperation. On the other hand, the larger context in which 
chapter 3 falls can include the first two chapters which lay out the cause of Job’s suffering, 
both the heavenly motivation and the physical stripping away of Job’s family, possessions, 
and health. If the sentence that concludes chapter 3 has these first two chapters as its context, 
the grammar of 3:26 does not change but the utterance does.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Gary Saul Morson & Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 126-27. 
67  זגר אביו יתחנ־אלו יתטקש אלו יתולש אל 
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This generates little controversy. However, Barth and Vischer in particular, read the 
book of Job not merely as a whole utterance, but also in the context of the biblical Canon. In 
this case, Job 3:26 not only gains specificity from its proximity to Job 1-2 but also ironically 
foreshadows Christ’s resurrection after Jesus experiences a similar turmoil to Job during his 
incarnation and passion.  
Viewing the utterance in this larger context does not negate the validity of the more 
grammatical-critical reading; it merely points to the importance of the subjectivity of the 
individual reader. One who accepts the Christian Canon as a single secondary genre made up 
of multiple primary genres like Job chapter 3 will react differently to Job 3:26 than someone 
who views all utterances in the Bible as singular and disparate.68 The final form of the book 
of Job (if one can even use such a phrase, considering the unfinalizability of any utterance in 
the hermeneutic of Bakhtin) is less a product of an author, or even a redactor, as it is an 
occurrence in the course of an ongoing dialogue.  
 What Bakhtin’s musings on great time imply and what he discusses more explicitly 
in his essay on speech genres is the dialogical nature of all utterances. Each utterance 
responds to a previously uttered statement and also anticipates future responses.69 Bakhtin 
writes, “each utterance refutes, affirms, supplements, and relies on the others, presupposes 
them to be known, and somehow takes them into account.”70 Noting that Job does not appear 
as if from nowhere, we must acknowledge that it enters great time in response to previous 
utterances. These previous utterances may include the work of the Deuteronomist or the sage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Bakhtin discusses the difference between a primary speech genre and a secondary speech genre in Bakhtin, 
Speech Genres, 72 ff. In the case of the book of Job, chapter 3 would be a primary genre as would chapters 1-2; 
the book as a whole would be a secondary genre incorporating multiple primary genres. I am suggesting that 
the Bible itself can also be a secondary genre made up of many primary genres. 
69 Similarly, Ricoeur writes, “My experience cannot directly become your experience. An event belonging to 
one stream of consciousness cannot be transferred as such into another stream of consciousness. Yet, 
nevertheless, something passes from me to you. Something is transferred from one sphere of life to another.” 
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 16. 
70 Bakhtin, Speech Genres, 91. 
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of Proverbs as is often surmised. Bakhtin, however, implies that it anticipates responses as 
well. This is easy to imagine. Consider the arguments of the friends. They not only express 
the likely sentiments of many sages within their own tradition, but also lend the potential 
arguments of other future sages to the argument in order to flesh out the meaning of the book 
of Job as a whole.  
 However, despite anticipating the response, it does not obviate response. The 
dialogue continues. In some ways, we see a response in the New Testament. Though 
mention of Job in the New Testament is rare or even debatable, what is not debatable is that 
the authors of the New Testament and the authors of Job share a literary culture where the 
themes that arise in both utterances relate to one another in various ways. Perhaps one could 
think of the authors as attendees at a dinner party sitting on different ends of the table. They 
may not respond directly to one another, but all those seated around the table assure that the 
themes of the conversations overlap in some respect. Perhaps they even overhear the other’s 
words, which influence their own thoughts. 
 Before moving on, one might note that much of what came above can be buttressed 
further by some of Kierkegaard’s own ideas that emerge in his book Repetition. Besides 
containing much of his work on Job, Repetition also introduces the category of repetition. I 
deal with the category of repetition at length in chapter three, but some things deserve 
mentioning here in the context of reception history of a biblical text. 
 Consider first, the word repetition, which has a specialized meaning in the work of 
Kierkegaard. In its most basic form, repetition suggests taking something that occurred in the 
past and bringing it into the present. Kierkegaard seems to suggest that it goes into the future 
as well, but clearly a forward moving focus is implied in some way. When the young man 
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“repeats” the book of Job in the second half of Repetition, he moves the book of Job into the 
present.  
One might protest the semblance of repetition with Bakhtin’s theory of the utterance. 
Recall that an utterance is unrepeatable, which seems to fly in the face of the very idea of 
“repetition.” However, as will become obvious later, some scholars have problems with the 
translation of the Danish word Gjentagelsen as “repetition” and believe that a better 
translation might be “resumption”71 or “retaking”72 since it has more to do with the 
existential reality of the interpreter than the text itself. Jolita Pons begins her exploration of 
Kierkegaard’s hermeneutics with a discussion on the use of biblical quotation and the nature 
of quotation in general. She notes that, apropos to Bakhtin’s theories on the utterance, “a 
verbally exact quotation that would seem to be a perfect repetition is ambiguous, because it 
is not clear whether it can keep its integrity in the new context.”73 Clearly, the young man’s 
interpretation of Job reflects this ambiguity. 
 Also, what will become more evident when we look more closely at Repetition and 
the interpretation of Job within the book is that when the young man does appropriate the 
book of Job into his own life, he does not attempt so much to enter into the mind of Job or 
the author(s) of the book of Job as he attempts to bring Job into his own mind.  
The young man’s goal does in some ways seem to fit Ricoeur’s goal, as mentioned 
above, of the hermeneut over Bakhtin’s. The young man does not seem to want to locate 
himself outside the text, but Bakhtin writes of the importance of being located “outside the 
object of his or her creative understanding—in time, in space, in culture,” and the young 
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Either/Or to Sickness Unto Death (Routledge, 1996), 28. 
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man does remain in his own time, space, and culture as will become evident in chapter three. 
Notably, once the receiver appropriates the text into his life, in the hermeneutics of 
Kierkegaard, the text does not transform, but is the agent of transformation. Iben Damgaard 
observes that in the upbuilding discourse that discusses Job, which Kierkegaard published 
the same year as Repetition, the good reader of Job should transform the text into action (and 
could not interpretation be included under the label action?).74  
Perhaps one will argue that Kierkegaard and the young man take things too far. There 
may be a place for ostensible objective analysis that bypasses the history of the text in great 
time. However, any analysis of any text from the past will need to take the text out of its own 
context in order to analyze it. Pons writes:  
Quotation introduces an object into circulation. This object might acquire a new 
value from that which it originally had. Because quotation detaches fragments of text 
from their respective contexts and attaches them to other contexts, there arises a 
tension between their independent value and the sense that the quotation might have 
had in its original context.75 
Pons is discussing quotations of text, which may be very brief, but they also may be very 
long. On the surface there is a difference between a quotation used to defend one’s own 
opinion, as someone may do with the platitudes Polonius recites to Laertes in Hamlet, and a 
commentary of a biblical book in the Old Testament Library, but the tension exists in some 
form in both examples.  
Kierkegaard embraces the inevitable. The history of Job interpretation shows how the 
book’s meaning is dependent at least partially on the context of the interpreter him or 
herself. Those who attempt to gain a pure and objective interpretation of the ancient book 
will be partially hindered by the distance between the interpreter and the context of the 	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original text but also he or she will be hindered by the impossibility of escaping one’s own 
context. The reception history of a biblical text is an important component of the meaning of 
the text for all the reasons cited above, but it also is important because once a person in the 
present makes a final claim on the meaning of the text, the present becomes a part of that 
reception history. The text appropriates each successive attempt at interpretation as it moves 
through great time. 
Inherent in the movement through great time is an assumption of the unity of time 
itself. Each utterance responds to a previous utterance and so each utterance relates in some 
way to other utterances in the dialogue. It goes without saying that all utterances in the 
dialogue are connected. This same theory of utterances’ relation to the unity of time lies 
behind typological interpretations of biblical texts, for typological interpretation assumes 
unity in the temporal. The typological imagination of Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth in 
their interpretations of Job follows. 
The typological imagination in the Job of Kierkegaard,  
Vischer, and Barth 
 
 A single term that adequately describes the confluence of exegetical methods found 
in these different but related interpretations of Job will fall short. I use the term “typological” 
as a descriptor, noting that it falls under the broader category of allegory.76 Barth’s and 
Vischer’s Christological interpretations of Job bear little resemblance to Gregory the Great’s 
use of allegory and, perhaps Christological might act as a better adjective when discussing 
Barth and Vischer than typological, for it merely suggests that one somehow employ Christ 
in his interpretation. It also seems to allow one some freedom in that employment. However, 	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Scenes From the Drama of European Literature (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973), 47-48.) 
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using Christological would obviously exclude Kierkegaard’s interpretations from the 
discussion even though I contend they belong. 
 When we look at Kierkegaard’s interpretations below I will note how Repetition, in 
particular, relies on both allegory and a typological understanding of history. While many 
have disputed the identification of typology with allegory, other major voices have 
maintained that one should view typology as a subsection of allegory.77 Henri de Lubac, in 
his dispute with Jean Daniélou over the nature of allegory and typology, asserts that 
“allegory had traditionally been a broader term, containing typology as one element among 
others.”78 Indeed, Erich Auerbach notes that “Tertullian uses allegoria almost synonymously 
with figura, though much less frequently.”79 Two considerations arise when deriving what 
allegory indicates. The first aspect of allegory one must acknowledge emerges when 
examining a very general definition of allegory based on its etymology. As David Dawson 
explains, the origin of the word allegory derives from the Greek words allos (other) and 
agoreuo (to speak in the assembly, to proclaim), thus allegory is something other than what 
is proclaimed in public.80 That is, an allegorical reading can offer something other than the 
“literal” meaning of the text, but it might also provide a new meaning to a text other than the 
accepted reading. In any case, the allegory or allegorical reading only exists in the presence 
of a “literal” meaning.81 Dawson also proposes that allegory or “interpretations and 
compositions designated as ‘allegorical’ must have a narrative dimension.”82 The use of a 
metaphor becomes allegorical when the metaphor extends over the course of a narrative.83 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 David Dawson, Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992), 16. 
78 Cited in Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 182. 
79 Erich Auerbach, "Figura," 47. 
80 David Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 3. 
81 David Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 7. 
82 David Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 3. 
83 David Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 5-6. 
 35	  
Examples of allegory, therefore, include The Pilgrim’s Progress, which tells the story of a 
spiritual journey using material objects.  
If one uses these two descriptions as a rubric for identifying allegory, then 
typological interpretation does seem to fall under the heading of allegory, too.84 How 
typology distinguishes itself under most definitions of allegory is its relationship to history. 
In typology, the type precedes the antitype so that the antitype fulfils the type in some way. 
While allegory in general can find parallels between two disparate, discontinuous texts, 
typology argues for a particular philosophy of history in which a character or event 
prefigures a later fulfilment, usually in the person or work of Jesus Christ.85 Hans Frei 
describes allegory in part as “the attachment of a temporally free-floating meaning pattern to 
any temporal occasion whatever, without any intrinsic connection between sensuous time-
bound picture and the meaning represented by it.”86 Though “the line between allegory and 
typological or figural interpretation was often very fine,” Frei writes, “when the temporal 
reality of an earlier instance was dissolved in favor of its meaning… the application of that 
meaning remained riveted to a temporal occurrence.”87 Therefore, C. S. Lewis’s The Lion, 
the Witch, and the Wardrobe qualifies as allegory and not typology since Narnia exists 
outside of the realm of the historical time-space continuum. Typology is a type of allegory in 
which the repeatability of events in different contexts contributes theologically to one’s 
understanding of a future-directed history.  
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We will have to look at each of the individual Job interpretations in order to see how 
the different texts by Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth fit under the above understanding of 
allegory and typology. At first glance, Barth and Vischer seem very intent on practicing 
allegorical interpretation. However, Vischer especially has a complicated relationship to 
allegory, typology, and spiritual interpretation of biblical texts. Henri de Lubac writes:  
The exegesis of a Karl Barth, a Roland de Pury, a Wilhelm Vischer, are reminiscent 
in many ways of the exegesis of the early Fathers. Their vehement rejection of the 
ancient word ‘allegory,’ though, is not uniquely attributable to the ambivalences of 
this word, to which we have already referred. It is derived from their difficulty in 
recognizing a real progress in the order of knowledge from one Economy to the 
other.88 
Whether or not they practice allegory or typology while shunning the terms is up for debate. 
Vischer’s allegorical imagination applied to the book of Job 
 Vischer essentially equates typology as it had been understood historically with 
allegory, arguing that using the method of typology in Old Testament exegesis relates to 
transposing the literal sense of the text in figures and symbols of Christ.89 Vischer claims to 
oppose typology as employed in this way because the word was made flesh and transposing 
the literal into the figurative spiritualizes the fleshed word, reversing the text as it was given 
to the church. It imposes a meaning onto the text rather than accepting what the text wants to 
say.90 His rejection of typology and allegory must surprise those accustomed to thinking of 
Vischer as an allegorical reader who seems to transpose the literal meaning of Old 
Testament texts into something that refers to Christ.  
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 James Barr and Brevard Childs had a brief but spirited back and forth on the use of 
allegory in modern biblical exegesis where they broached the work of Vischer.91 Childs 
holds that Vischer’s approach equals allegory92 and Barr counters with a rather extensive 
essay showing that Vischer’s method runs counter to allegory and instead is an idiosyncratic 
literal approach fuelled by a high Christology.93 It seems certain that Vischer would agree 
with Barr, noting his harsh words reserved for allegory and typology, though he would 
obviously not have agreed with Barr’s final negative assessment of his work.  
 Barr’s description of Vischer notes the propensity to quote reformed theologians, 
including and especially Luther and Calvin, but almost no scholars from earlier than the 
reformation like Origin or other fathers, which would go far in showing his lack of interest in 
allegory.94 Indeed, Vischer often cites historical critics positively including Wellhausen in 
his Job discourse. Barr’s final analysis of The Christuszeugnis, in particular, claims that 
Vischer fails to offer a “sound explanation of how [his Christological conclusions] had been 
reached in the first place or of why they should be accepted other than because the reader 
personally liked them.”95 Comparing the Christuszeugnis with Vischer’s later essay on 
exegetical method, one would have to concede to Barr’s assessment to some degree. 
Vischer’s method does seem to advocate a plain sense reading of the Bible that incorporates 
a good understanding of the biblical languages. The exegesis of the Bible, in fact, should 
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proceed with the same method as that used in the interpretation of other human-written texts 
in antiquity.96 The sense that responds to the Holy Spirit, he contends, is the literal sense.97  
On the other hand, how one might arrive at interpretations that find Jesus in the Old 
Testament often seem like flimsy word association in the Christuszeugnis. Rendtorff gives 
an example in Vischer’s reading of Genesis 1 in which Vischer explains that the light that 
God calls forth in 1:3 “is—the expression can no longer be avoided if we are to expound our 
text fathfully [sic] and guard it against every kind of speculative misinterpretation—‘the 
glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ’ (2 Cor. 4:6).”98 Rendtorff finds this makes 
Vischer’s method obvious: 
He interprets a central concept in the Old Testament text by way of a New Testament 
quotation in which the same word appears, related to Christ; and then he expands the 
Christological aspect, a detailed quotation playing a central role (in this case Calvin, 
but more frequently Luther or Hamann). So here, on the basis of the keyword “light” 
in Gen. 1:4, he develops in essentials the beginnings of a Christological theology of 
creation.99  
Rendtorff’s criticism is helpful in understanding Vischer, but does lack mention of the likely 
reason that Vischer went to 2 Corinthians 4:6 first before looking at other New Testament 
passages that contain the word light in relation to Jesus Christ. The author of 2 Corinthians 
specifically alludes to Genesis 1:3, 4, saying, “For it is the God who said, ‘Let light shine out 
of darkness,’ who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of 
God in the face of Jesus Christ.” Vischer follows this up with several New Testament 
passages on light (among them Heb. 1:3, 1 Tim. 6:16, 1 John 1:5, and James 1:17), but the 
passage he goes to first has an explicit intertextual relationship with the passage he intends to 
interpret. 
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It should also be noted that Rendtorff’s and Barr’s treatments of Vischer makes the 
Christuszeugnis seem as though Vischer sees Jesus in every passage of the Pentateuch. This 
is not, however, the case. The book, instead, reads like a brief commentary on the Torah with 
the occasional, sometimes eye-opening, discovery of Christ’s existence in the Old 
Testament, as in the example above. “The Witness of Job to Jesus Christ” is even more 
modest. Christ makes no appearance in Vischer’s mini-commentary other than in a single 
parenthetical comment until his exegesis of the entire book is complete. After assessing the 
epilogue, Vischer concludes that “the Book of Job points beyond itself.”100 
Primarily, the book of Job points beyond itself to the culture that gave birth to the 
story, a culture in which the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ also arises. Vischer 
takes care not to claim the conclusion to the book of Job acts as an allegory or type to Christ, 
but skirts close enough to that claim that his English translator inserts the idea into the essay. 
Vischer uses the terms Zeichen, Gleichnis, and Vorbild to describe the relationship of Job to 
Jesus, translated into English as “type,” “parable,” and “type,” respectively.101 Despite 
Vischer’s protesting the use of the words allegory and typology in his later essay, his final 
three pages of his Job essay fit leading definitions of the typology.  
Typology is a rhetorical technique and a philosophy of history and Vischer’s 
observation of literary parallels between the book of Job and the Gospels fits that description 
well.102 When one arrives at the end of the book of Job, he notes that the book does not 
straightforwardly answer the question posed at the beginning of “whether there is a man who 
fully corresponds to the good Will of the Creator and justifies His work of Creation.”103 	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Rather, the book changes the question along the way and ends up pointing back to God. 
Job’s speeches turn the Satan’s question back onto God, thus pointing the book beyond 
itself, thus Vischer argues for a rhetorical thrust to the parallels.  
Vischer ends by comparing Job’s story to major events in the gospels. God restores 
Job’s life, which foreshadows the more dramatic resurrection of Christ. The Greek 
translation of Job adds that Job will rise again, strengthening the resurrection parallels. 
Before Christ’s resurrection, Jesus also is tempted by Satan, tested by his friends, declared in 
the wrong as evidenced by Judas’s betrayal, and seemingly forsaken by God. Through all of 
this, Jesus also remains steadfastly obedient to God. Vischer does not find Jesus in the story 
of Job so much as finds Job in the story of Jesus. The Job event—though Vischer does not 
claim it to be an historical event—finds its final fulfilment in the Christ event.  
Vischer writes in the first pages of the Christuszeugnis, “The two main words of the 
Christian confession ‘Jesus is the Christ’… correspond to the two parts of the Holy 
Scriptures: the New and the Old Testaments. The Old Testament tells us what the Christ is; 
the New, who he is… So the two Testaments, breathing the same spirit, point to each 
other.”104 Despite Vischer’s claims to the contrary, his description of the Canon has much in 
common with the patristic exegesis that he has difficulty accepting.  
De Lubac, in describing the spiritual exegesis of the fathers, writes,  
… the objective continuity of figure and reality is well-translated, on earth, by 
continuity of awareness… It is there that the entire dialectic of the two Testaments is 
drawn tightly together: the New Testament in its entirety is brought forth by the Old, 
while at the same time the Old Testament in its entirety is interpreted by the New.105  	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De Lubac’s aphorism describes Vischer’s canonical theory seemingly better than Vischer 
himself. De Lubac himself, following Emil Brunner, criticizes Vischer’s own description as 
“overshooting the mark,” because it “becomes absolutely true… only after the event, only at 
the moment when the event is perceived, only when the Old Testament, thanks to this 
recognition of Christ, begins to be read in the spirit of the New.”106 Any reader of Vischer’s 
interpretation of Job would recognize that, though de Lubac’s description finds the mark 
somewhat in the Christuszeugnis, the criticism does not hold in the Job interpretation. The 
book of Job receives Vischer’s full attention, with little to no distraction from Christological 
claims or interjections from the New Testament. Rather, “The Witness of Job to Jesus 
Christ” fits better into de Lubac’s above description since Vischer merely highlights 
parallels between the story of Job and the gospels. One finds it difficult to determine which 
story bears witness to which, the reason being that they each bear witness to each other. 
Vischer pivots off of Duhm’s observation that the story of Job resembles some of 
Shakespeare’s plays, suggesting that the book of Job “has a genuinely Israelite and biblical 
touch, and may be compared with the empty tomb of the Crucified One in the Gospels.”107 
The thrust here is not that Jesus is present in the book of Job, but that the story of Job and the 
story of Jesus point to each other through culture and Canon. 
The result of Vischer’s particular typological interpretation at the particular era that 
he produces such texts subverts the dominant reading of his day, another indication that his 
interpretive method might qualify as a type of allegory. Dawson argues that “religion, 
especially in the guise of a sacred text, can function as a counterhegemonic force, and, 
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further, that allegory has been one of the principal means by which such challenges have 
been mounted.”108  
Dawson explains his theory with an example: 
If I draw on Platonic theories of the soul’s origin and destiny in order to read this 
biblical story allegorically as an account of the soul’s ascent from bodily distraction 
to mental purity, I may do so because I want to reinterpret Plato’s account by placing 
it within a scriptural framework. But in so doing, I may in fact subtly alter the 
meaning that Plato’s account has on its own terms by making the once-eternal soul 
now directly created by God.109 
One can see how Vischer’s Christological interpretation of Job might fit this pattern as well, 
given the political and theological currents occurring in Germany in contrast with Vischer’s 
own at the time of his writing. By drawing on the story of the gospels to help explain the 
story of Job, he “subtly alters the meaning” that Job has on its own terms. However, keeping 
in mind that in the Job interpretation especially, Vischer mainly points to the similarities 
between the two texts’ narratives; he is also explaining the story in the gospels by drawing 
on the story of Job. The dominant reading of the Gospels at the time found little relationship 
with them to Old Testament texts and Jewish culture. Vischer alters the meaning of the 
gospel story by placing it within Old Testament framework. Because of the reciprocal 
relationship between the testaments, he also alters the meaning of the book of Job, placing it 
within the framework of the story of Jesus Christ. The book of Job points beyond itself to the 
Gospel of Jesus Christ. Job’s devotion to God in the midst of great physical and social 
suffering reminds the reader of Christ, but Vischer, in making this case, forces the reader to 
see Jesus in the light of Job. The book of Job, as a text prior to the New Testament, in some 
ways subordinates the Gospels. Referring to his example on Plato, Dawson writes, “… one 
might not only declare that scripture rather than Plato offers the most persuasive description 
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of the soul’s transformation, but also insist that Moses preceded Plato and that Plato derived 
all his best insights from original Mosaic wisdom.”110 Might this not be said about Vischer’s 
essay as well? Since Job preceded Jesus and is useful in describing the person and work of 
Jesus, one must at least grant that Job, as well as the Old Testament, needs a place at the 
table of Christian theology. 
 Of course one could argue that primacy works the other way as well and based on 
Vischer’s later work one might be able to make that argument rather strongly. Emil Brunner 
criticizes the Christuszeugnis for what he perceives as Vischer taking into account…  
…only the unity, and not the variety of the revelation in the O.T. and the N.T.: owing 
to this he obscures the historical character of the revelation by the orthodox view of a 
revealed doctrine (Christology). Out of the correct theological statement that the 
Revealer in the O.T. is the same in the N.T., he derives an erroneous principle of 
exposition: that the O.T. in all its parts bears witness to this Revealer: Christ.111 
Brunner remains sympathetic to Vischer’s protest against “evolutionism,” which would 
replace the Old Testament witness with the New Testament, but finds equally problematic 
what he views as Vischer dehistoricizing the Bible, suggesting, perhaps, that Vischer uses 
allegory, but not typology. He argues that the New Testament witness introduces something 
new to the Old Testament. When Vischer finds Jesus present in the Old Testament then 
primacy is given to Jesus, which would subvert the plain meaning of the text. Vischer 
“know[s] beforehand what the text ought to say. [He does] not ‘expound’ the text, but [he] 
‘read[s] into’ it what [he] choose[s].”112 
 Readers of Vischer’s exposition on Job, however, will recognize that Brunner’s 
criticism does not apply to that essay however much or little it might apply to the 
Christuszeugnis. The book of Job receives Vischer’s full attention until the end of his 	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exposition of chapter 42. Though he might overshoot the mark a few years later with his 
more famous book that Rendtorff will claim has “had its day,”113 “The Witness of Job to 
Jesus Christ” is a somewhat modest recognition of parallel stories, but it took a bold voice 
with a unique typological imagination to make the observation in the era and culture that he 
did.  
At the very end of the essay, Vischer reassures his readers that though their lives 
have come after Christ, in contrast to Job, Job remains a witness to Christ for the believer. 
God’s activity in the world holds importance throughout time. Vischer’s philosophy of 
history weighs Job’s witness as equal to those who come after, who have had full knowledge 
of Christ’s witness. The character of Job resembles Christ and, thus, by observing the 
responses of Christ and also of Job in the face of trials by friends, angels, and God, one may 
grasp an idea of the normative response to trials in one’s own life. Job, therefore, is a witness 
to Christ because he acts similarly to Christ when faced with similar trials. 
Karl Barth’s Typological Reading of Job 
 Barth and Vischer have plenty in common regarding their reading of Job, which 
should come as no surprise to those who know their common history. They both, as Swiss 
reformed scholars in Germany, left for Basel during the rise of National Socialism. Barth’s 
Christological interpretation also bears a resemblance to Vischer’s, though it takes quite a 
different form. Vischer’s essay reads more like a commentary of the book of Job which 
concludes with a comparison between the story of Job and the story of Christ.  Barth’s, on 
the other hand, breaks the book of Job into four thematic sections for individual analysis.  
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 The first section looks at Job in the prose tales in chapters 1, 2, and 42. The second 
looks at Job in the poetry of chapters 3-31. The third looks at God’s response and the fourth 
at Job’s three friends. Between each of these sections Barth discusses the doctrine of Christ 
as a response to “the falsehood and condemnation of man.” To be sure, within these sections, 
the image of Job conforms to a picture of Christ to the point that one can look at the book of 
Job and find parallels to the Gospels. Barth claims it would be “difficult to read the Book of 
Job attentively without being aware of the fact that the figure of Jesus Christ as the true 
Witness unmasking the falsehood of man is delineated in it in distant, faint, fragmentary and 
even strange yet unmistakeable outline.”114 
 For Barth, Job acts as a witness to Jesus Christ because one sees Job in two forms—
the pure form of the prose tale and the more complicated historical form of the poetry. Jesus, 
likewise, presents himself in two forms. First, Barth notes his pure form in which Jesus is 
intimately and uniquely connected to God. “God exists in a relationship to Him and He to 
God which has no parallel on either side, which distinguishes Him from all other men.”115 
Barth shows how Job’s relationship to God fits this description, if not so radically as Jesus, 
and if lacking the saving significance of Christ’s.116 Secondly, though Christ exists in this 
pure form, he presents himself to humanity in the Gospels where the pure form is hidden and 
concealed in his suffering state. “Passion was the action in which in His existence the name 
of God was hallowed, His kingdom came, His will was done on earth as in heaven; the 
action in which God reconciled the world to Himself in the humiliation of the Son of God 
and exaltation of the Son of Man.”117 In the same way, Job undergoes grave suffering, 
cursing his day and undergoing ostensible abandonment by God. Throughout Job’s 	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contention with God, he remains true to the deity. His pure form of the prologue, though 
obscured through his harsh words, remains throughout the narrative.  
 In this way, Barth’s Christological exegesis resembles Vischer’s, but it leans heavier 
on the Christology. Barth’s main purpose in this section of his Dogmatics exposits the 
doctrine of Christ. His exegesis of the book of Job, though substantial in length and 
significant in its own right, mainly serves to illustrate Christ’s role in the doctrine of 
reconciliation. Vischer, as argued above, works in reverse—the Gospel of Jesus Christ 
primarily acts as an illustration to bolster the importance of the book of Job. 
 Barth’s typology goes beyond the comparison of Job to Jesus, however. Job does 
resemble Christ in his relationship with God, but as he reminds his readers occasionally, Job 
is not Jesus Christ. Christ’s special relationship to God the Father adds another layer of 
comparison to the typology of Job and the Gospel. Just as Job has a pure form in the 
prologue and epilogue, which is obscured in the poetic sections, so does God. We read about 
God in his heavenly court, surrounded by his angels and in his omnipotence allow for Job’s 
suffering. In the poetic section, this power is obscured to the point that Job does not 
recognize God. When Christ appears in his obscured form, “as the wholly Rejected, Judged, 
Despised, Bound, Impotent, Slain and Crucified,” “He unmasks us as liars.”118 In the book of 
Job, it is God, not Job, who unmasks the friends as liars. God appears in the obscure form of 
Job’s suffering and Job’s friends cannot recognize God in that form. They remain steadfast 
in their faithfulness toward their previous understanding of God’s pure form, while Job 
remains steadfast in his faithfulness to God in whatever form God appears, even if Job feels 
God abandons him in that form.  
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 Christ, in his suffering earthly form, appears as a stumbling block to the Jews and as 
foolishness to the Greeks. Christ, then, appears in the book of Job not only as Job but also as 
God. Barth does not explicitly state this position, but insinuates it through the language used 
to describe God’s appearance to Job and his friends in the poetry. Barth makes clear that 
“Job is not Jesus Christ,”119 but leads the reader to conclude Christ’s presence in God’s 
character in the book without affirming or denying the connection.  
 Barth’s Job does not correlate directly with Jesus Christ as overtly as Vischer’s Job 
does, but a narrative dimension does emerge as do other typological elements that would 
suggest that Barth’s reading might also qualify as allegory. The person of Jesus seems 
representative in both Job and Job’s God, which is clearly more than mere metaphor. To 
Barth, the person of Jesus Christ in some ways contains the narrative of the book of Job. 
Also, like Vischer, Barth does not refer to the Fathers, but like the ancient exegetes, he 
“organizes all of revelation around a concrete center, which is fixed in time and space by the 
Cross of Jesus Christ”120—the ultimate manifestation of God’s revelation.  
Lastly, as described by de Lubac again, by referring back and forth between the 
doctrine of the reconciliation of Christ and the story of Job as told in the Old Testament, 
Barth comments “on the New Testament through the Old, and then on the Old through the 
New.”121 When Barth introduces his interpretation of Job, he suggests that “it would not be 
difficult to illustrate this line of thought [on the freedom of God and man] both in general 
and in detail from the pages of the New Testament… But this would take us far afield, and 
might involve mere repetitions of exegetical proofs already adduced… And I will admit that 
secondarily I have had before me in this field a noteworthy figure in the witness of the Old 	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Testament…”122 Later in the section the above introduces, Barth brings in the New 
Testament to help with his interpretation of Job, writing, “As a remarkable Edomitish 
outsider, he belongs to the context of the witness of the history of Israel which is only 
moving towards the history of Jesus Christ… and with suitable qualifications Job may thus 
be called a type of Jesus Christ, a witness to the true Witness.”123 Job, therefore, helps 
explain Jesus Christ, but Barth exposits the book of Job in the context of the witness of the 
history that finds its culmination in Jesus Christ, fitting Barth quite well into the tradition of 
spiritual interpretation that arose in the figural imagination of the early Fathers.  
Barth may avoid and perhaps reject the term allegory and its derivatives in his 
theological interpretation, but much of his exegesis of Job certainly qualifies as typological 
interpretation as well in its broader terms. Of course Barth does not merely reproduce the 
interpretations of the early Church Fathers, but brings some of their goals in exegesis into a 
modern, post-enlightenment context. Barth does not reject the discoveries made by his 
contemporaries, but does not allow them to overshadow the meaning of the book of Job in 
the context of biblical history either. 
 Obviously, Barth’s typological reading of Job bears little in common with 
Kierkegaard’s, whose Repetition carries nary a mention of Christ outside of a recognition of 
his followers. However, Repetition and the category of repetition flesh out a future-directed 
typology that complements the figural imaginations of Barth and Vischer. 
Kierkegaard’s Typological Reading of Job in Repetition 
 Though Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Job lacks the Christological aspect of Barth’s 
and Vischer’s, it bears witness to an allegorical and typological imagination. In fact, 	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Repetition in particular contains three distinct aspects of allegory related to Kierkegaard’s 
reading of Job. 
 First, the story of the young man in Repetition is not merely an interpretation of Job, 
it is an allegory of Job. The young man represents Job and Constantin Constantius represents 
the friends. The young man’s story is essentially a repetition of the story of Job. In this case, 
Repetition works as allegory but not typology since the narrative lacks the temporal relation 
with the biblical story. I will describe the details of the allegorical representation of Job in 
Repetition in chapter three in more detail.  
 On the other hand, the character of Job seems, to Kierkegaard, to have a typological 
relationship with the character of Abraham. Multiple times does Kierkegaard place the two 
characters beside each other. He published Fear and Trembling and Repetition on the same 
day in 1843 and many years later he compares Job’s loss and Abraham’s willingness to give 
up Isaac and contrasted their “Jewish piety” with Christianity’s call to voluntarily forsake all 
and follow Christ.124 
 Kierkegaard does not, however, compare Job to Jesus in the ways the two later 
interpreters do. Nevertheless, his typological understanding of the text anticipates and 
perhaps informs Vischer and Barth, which brings us to the most significant aspect of 
typology in Repetition. The category of repetition contains implicitly within it a future 
directed typology born partly out of a Bible-instigated theology. Frye holds up Repetition as 
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“the only study I know of the psychological contrast between a past-directed causality and a 
future-directed typology.”125 
 The name alone explains much of what constitutes typology in narrative. The 
antitype quite obviously repeats many of the aspects of the type. In the Job interpretations of 
Barth and Vischer, Jesus seems to repeat the experience of Job’s suffering and dialogue with 
his friends and God. However, as will be detailed in chapter three, the Kierkegaardian 
category of repetition has a much more specialized sense than a mere repeating of events. 
 When Kierkegaard contrasts repetition with recollection, he endorses a future focus. 
Recollection brings about despair, as illustrated by Constantin’s recollection of his childhood 
at a farce. The young man, likewise, focuses on the ideal image of his beloved, inspired by 
his own recollection, which leads to suffering and disillusionment about his own life. The 
young man experiences repetition when he focuses on what has yet to come. The divine 
repetition comes about partly through this future focus.  
 One might note that any interpretation of an ancient text requires some recollection. 
To understand Job, after all, requires one to look back in time. However, the interpretation of 
Job in both Repetition and the upbuilding discourse defers the focus back to the activities of 
the interpreter. The purpose of the upbuilding discourse is to inspire the reader to act. The 
young man, likewise, interprets the book of Job through appropriation. As he moves forward 
in the book, he moves forward in his life. The character of Job is projected forward in time, 
not unlike the character of Job in both Vischer and Barth’s versions. Thus, repetition 
embodies typology as made manifest in biblical interpretation. Auerbach observes: 
Figural prophecy implies the interpretation of one worldly event through another; the 
first signifies the second, the second fulfils the first. Both remain historical events; 
yet both, looked at in this way, have something provisional and incomplete about 	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them; they point to one another and both point to something in the future, something 
still to come…126 
 
 Recall the above discussion of reception history using the literary theory of Bakhtin. 
The general thesis that biblical scholarship should necessarily include the history of the 
Bible’s interpretation leading up to the present era complements especially Kierkegaard’s 
forward focused category of repetition. The Bakhtinian defence of reception history projects 
an ancient text forward as it grows in great time. At each successive interpretation, the text 
undergoes a repetition. As the interpreter of the text in the current era, reading through these 
successive interpretations throughout history shares much in common with other studies of 
typology—for instance, studies of the use of the Old Testament in the New Testament, 
which are many and varied, and certainly include the more noteworthy works of Wilhelm 
Vischer. 
 In all cases, the interpreter sees how the earlier text projects itself into the future, thus 
growing in great time. The text, therefore, is not static but future-directed. The text itself, if 
one might conflate the narratology of Bakhtin and the philosophical theology of 
Kierkegaard, does not control its own “repetition” in the way that Constantin and the young 
man wish to do in Repetition, but experiences repetition outside of its own control.  
 Kierkegaard’s category of repetition, then, undergirds the typological readings of 
Barth and Vischer, and not only in the way described above. In all three interpretations, the 
text of Job defers some meaning to the future. Vischer clearly finds meaning in the book of 
Job that impacts the meaning he finds in the Gospels. Barth, likewise finds meaning in Job 
that impacts Christian theology as a whole.  In all three, their interpretations of Job are 
meant to impact their readers’ lives in significant ways. This may seem like a rather 	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mundane “discovery” but it places these three scholars in somewhat unusual places in their 
fields and in their eras and cultural contexts. Vischer, after all, was attempting to study the 
Old Testament in a cultural context that seemed to think the Old Testament had little to no 
impact on its readers’ lives. It had become a document void of meaning to the Christian. By 
showing its relation to the New Testament and to the life of Christ, Vischer attempts to show 
the book of Job’s relation to the Christian life. Barth and Kierkegaard, as well, turned to the 
book of Job as a text that might help them in the edification of their readers. Job, in both 
interpreters’ texts, acts as an illustration supporting a larger thesis. Barth has Job in his mind 
as he expounds upon the reconciliation of God in the doctrine of Christ and Kierkegaard’s 
young man turns to Job in his letters to Constantin in order to buttress claims about his own 
personal journey. By referring to Job as a way to support a larger thesis, the interpreter 
implies a figural understanding of the book of Job. 
Kierkegaard’s book Repetition, promoting the forward moving category of repetition, 
also contributes to Barth’s reading of Job as Barth approaches the book of Job in great time. 
Kierkegaard’s reading of the book of Job alters its meaning in the chronotope. Barth even 
admits that his interpretation of Job is quite dependent on Kierkegaard and Vischer—two of 
his major points on Job come directly from them. Without Vischer and Kierkegaard’s 
insight, Barth might not have much on Job to present. Even considering his dependence on 
them, he does show some disagreement, especially with Kierkegaard. Not all of his 
disagreement is warranted, however, and he may share more in common with Kierkegaard 
than even he realizes, due to complications that Repetition’s pseudonymous authorship 
creates.  
If Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth are participating in a dialogue, it is necessary to 
understand how that dialogue transpires. Before moving to Kierkegaard, the next chapter 
will track Job through Christian readers up to Kierkegaard. 
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Chapter 2: Gregory, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and Kant on Job 
as predecessors to Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth 
 
 The interpretations of Job by Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth are distinctively 
Christian interpretations. The typological imagination that each employs is part of the 
Christian tradition, Christ being the anti-type for Job in both Barth’s and Vischer’s work and 
Kierkegaard positing a typological theory that supports their reading. All three 
interpretations, however, depart in extraordinary ways from other major Christian 
interpreters. The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the most important and 
dominant precedents regarding Job in the Christian tradition. Because the most important 
aspects of the Job of Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth are their typological imaginations and 
their vision of the Book of Job as one documenting God and Job’s free devotion to each 
other, I confine most of my discussion to the earlier interpreters’ incorporation of those 
elements.  
 Needless to say, a survey of all Christian interpretations of Job goes beyond the 
scope of this thesis, as do examinations of Jewish interpretations. While there is much to 
admire in the various Jewish interpretations from antiquity up until the enlightenment, it 
seems as though their views had little impact on the readings of the three main scholars in 
this current study. Instead, I focus on Gregory the Great’s Moralia, Thomas Aquinas’s 
Literal Exposition on Job, the preface to Luther’s translation of Job, Calvin’s Sermons on 
Job, and Immanuel Kant’s essay “On the Failure of all Attempted Philosophical 
Theodicies.” 
 We will see five strikingly different views of Job—striking because four of the 
scholars share similar views on the authority of scripture. Kant, whose theology and view of 
scripture do not fit as snugly within orthodox Christianity as the other figures, has ideas that 
 54	  
became highly influential in western thought and were certainly familiar to Kierkegaard, 
Barth, and Vischer if his interpretation of Job was not explicitly so. 
Gregory the Great’s Job 
 Gregory’s Moralia, as one might expect, reads very differently than a modern 
commentary on Job. In order to understand better how he reaches the conclusions he does, it 
helps to know what he thinks of the Bible and how he reads it. One will note that he has a 
high view of the Scriptures, calling them “a letter of the omnipotent God to his creature.”127 
As for who the creature is, of course this might include any human. However, the proper 
place to read and interpret the letter from God is the Church.128  The authors of the text act, 
in some way, as conduits for the word of God. In the preface to the Moralia itself, Gregory 
explains inspiration thus: 
Blessed Job also, being under the influence of the Holy Spirit, might have written his 
own acts, which were, for that matter, gifts of inspiration from above, as though they 
were not his own; for in so far as it was a human being, who spoke things which were 
of God, all that he spake belonged to Another, and in so far as the Holy Spirit spake 
of what is proper to a human being, it was Another that gave utterance to the things 
that belonged to him.129 
 
None of this should surprise anyone with even cursory knowledge of the history of 
biblical interpretation. Gregory’s hermeneutic begins to emerge as more original when he 
discusses the Bible’s effect on the reader. Scripture, he explains, acts as a mirror to the 
reader’s “inward face”. In the Bible “we learn the beauties that we possess; there we are 
made sensible what progress we are making, there too how far we are from proficiency.”130 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Stephan C. Kessler, “Gregory the Great (C. 540-604),” in Handbook of Patristic Exegesis: The Bible in 
Ancient Christianity, ed. Charles Kannengiesser (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 1344. See also Susan E. Schreiner, 
Where Shall Wisdom, 25.  
128 Stephan C. Kessler, “Gregory the Great: A Figure of Tradition and Transition in Church Exegesis,” in 
Hebrew Bible/Old Testament, ed. Magne Saebo (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 146. 
129 Pope Gregory I, Morals, Pref. 1.3. 
130 Pope Gregory I, Morals, 2.1.1. 
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If Gregory sees this as such an important aspect of the Bible, his decision to focus his entire 
commentary on a book of the Bible around the morals that one can glean from the text 
should not surprise. 
 Also important in this description of the Bible is Gregory’s focus on the interiority of 
the Christian. The outward face of a person differs from his inward face. The text of the 
Bible has an outward letter and an inward spirit.131 The spiritual and physical natures in the 
world at large differ greatly in Gregory’s hermeneutic.132 Thus Gregory, following Origen, 
believes that behind the literal text lies a spiritual meaning, which the responsible exegete 
must discover.133 This is especially true for the Old Testament, which prophesies the 
revelation of Christ in the New Testament.134 The nature of the Bible necessitates for 
Gregory a threefold order of exegesis—an interpretation of the historical aspects of the text, 
an interpretation of the allegorical aspects, and a moral interpretation.135 
 Gregory understands that under this rubric one must still entertain certain 
compromises. In an epistle to Leander discussing the Moralia, Gregory explains some 
problems in holding to the rubric too tightly. Regarding the importance of the literal aspects 
of Job 31:16-20, he writes that “if these words [Job’s oath concerning his responsibility to 
the poor] be violently strained to an allegorical signification, we make void all his acts of 
mercy.”136 He likewise warns against the isolated use of the literal interpretation when he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Stephan C. Kessler, "A Figure of Tradition," 140-41. 
132 Note also that his propensity for allegorical interpretation extends to the secular world, which one should 
read like the Bible. (Stephan C. Kessler, "Gregory the Great," 1342.) 
133 Stephan C. Kessler, "Gregory the Great," 1350. 
134 Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 23. 
135 While Gregory does not abandon the theory of this threefold interpretation in the Moralia, in practice, he 
only ostensibly sustains this for a few chapters of his work on the book of Job. By the middle of the book, the 
labels drop and he combines the method under the same heading. 
136 Pope Gregory I, Morals, Epistle 4. Katharina Greschat writes of Gregory’s hermeneutic as it emerges in the 
preface: “Der Schriftinterpretation kommt demnach die Funktion eines Bindegliedes zwischen den 
Notwendigkeiten dieser Welt und dem Streben nach der Ewigkeit zu.” (Katharina Greschat, Die Moralia in Job 
Gregors Des Großen: Ein Christologisch-Ekklesiologischer Komentar, vol. 31, Studien Und Texte Zu Antike 
Und Christentum (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 52.) 
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notes that “doubtless whereas the literal words when set against each other cannot be made 
to agree, they point out some other meaning in themselves which we are to seek for.”137 
Thus because Job’s outburst in chapter three seems to contradict the narrators declaration in 
1:22 that Job did not sin with his lips, Gregory seeks something other than the literal 
meaning.138  
 What this rubric must eventually lead to is the moral interpretation. Gregory was a 
scholar, but his exegesis was not merely academic. As papal Deacon and later Pope, he was 
also a pastor and so he emphasizes the need to conform one’s actions to the Holy Scriptures 
to the end that even one who has not read the text could understand the Bible through the 
actions of him who has.139  
 Gregory’s general scriptural hermeneutic is made manifest in the Moralia, which 
touches on all aspects of the Christian life, leading one scholar to call it a “Christian 
encyclopaedia not in a logical but biblical form.”140 Despite its immense scope, the Moralia 
does sustain a few ideas throughout its hundreds of thousands of words. Namely, Gregory 
focuses on the suffering of the righteous by way of allegorizing the character of Job as a type 
of Christ and the Church.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Pope Gregory I, Morals, Epistle 3. One should note that Gregory’s interpretation of the Song of Songs does 
not entertain notions of the literal meaning since, in that book, “God descends to the language of human love in 
order to inflame and to exalt man to the divine love.” (Stephan C. Kessler, "Gregory the Great," 1343.) 
138 Pope Gregory I, Morals, Preface 7. See also Susan E. Schreiner, “The Role of Perception in Gregory's 
Moralia in Job,” StPatr 28 (1993), 91. 
139 Stephan C. Kessler, "Gregory the Great," 1340. De Lubac cites a poem by Sixtus of Siena which divides the 
four senses of Sacred Scripture by the work of different fathers. Gregory’s emphasis on morals was seen as his 
specialty, while other fathers filled important roles in the other senses: “Under the guidance of Jerome you will 
learn history derived from Greek and Latin sources. / Origen and Ambrose will lay open allegories and 
anagogy. / Chrysostom and Gregory will set forth the senses that are apt to form morals…” (Henri de Lubac, 
Medieval Exegesis. Vol 1, the Four Senses of Scripture, trans. Mark Sebanc, Ressourcement (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1998), 4.) 
140Stephan C. Kessler, "A Figure of Tradition," 140. 
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 As with many interpreters—including Calvin, Kant, and Kierkegaard—Gregory’s 
biography seems an important impetus for him to write a major work on the book of Job.141 
However, unlike the others we will look at, the suffering Gregory experienced was not social 
but physical.142 Gregory does not carry the opprobrious animosity towards Job’s friends that 
Kierkegaard does, especially, since he identifies more with Job’s skin conditions than his 
loss in social status. More importantly, Gregory views suffering itself not as a problem to 
overcome, nor as an evil.143 This likely stems partly from his allegorical interpretation, 
viewing Job as a type of Christ and Christ as someone the Church should strive to be like.144 
If Christ is the pinnacle of humanity and his sufferings carry such special significance, then 
suffering in itself may not be something to overcome but to endure or even to embrace. 
Susan Schreiner notes three spiritual realities that Gregory sees arising from suffering as self 
knowledge, freedom, and perception.145 By self knowledge, Gregory means that the sufferer 
turns inward and can focus on the depth of his sin. Gregory also indicates that suffering acts 
as a chastening of the sufferer, writing, “For unless a grain of mustard seed be bruised, the 
extent of its virtue is never acknowledged. For without bruising it is insipid, but if it is 
bruised it becomes hot, and it gives out all those pungent properties that were concealed in it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Katharina Greschat, Die Moralia, 47-48. 
142 Gregory writes in his opening epistle: “For many a year’s circuit has gone by since I have been afflicted 
with frequent pains in the bowels, and the powers of my stomach being broken down, makes me at all times 
and seasons weakly; and under the influence of fevers slow, but in constant succession, I draw my breath with 
difficulty; and when in the midst of these sufferings I ponder with earnest heed, that according to the testimony 
of Scripture, He scourgeth every son whom He receiveth; the more I am weighed down by the severity of 
present afflictions, from my anticipations for eternity, I gather strength to breathe with so much the better 
assurance. And perchance it was this that Divine Providence designed, that I a stricken one, should set forth Job 
stricken, and that by the scourges I should the more perfectly enter into the feelings of one that was scourged.” 
(Pope Gregory I, Morals, Epistle 5.) So Gregory even feels that he has an advantage in his interpretation 
because of his sufferings. 
143 Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 27. 
144 Pope Gregory I, Morals, 1.24.33. 
145 One can argue that really perception is so intrinsically connected to self-knowledge and freedom (in that 
one’s freedom depends on his perception) that perception itself does not merit its own category. However, 
Schreiner’s thesis on the reception history of Job is that the theme of perception or human understanding ties 
together the various precritical interpretations of the book of Job. The early interpreters seem all to be asking 
how a sufferer can perceive God’s providence in his life. (Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 19.) 
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Thus every good man, so long as he is not smitten, is regarded as insipid, and of slight 
account.”146 
 If suffering leads to introspection and chastening, then one might desire suffering 
over well-being. In fact, tranquillity bears a danger that suffering does not in that it makes 
one complacent with earthly desires. In Gregory’s dualism, the Christian should desire not 
earthly things but heavenly ones, thus suffering actually frees one from that attachment to 
the physical world. When our present life oppresses us, it shows “the way of liberty, while it 
tortures.”147 Of course Gregory’s belief that suffering leads to freedom and that tranquillity 
leads to bondage stems partly from Jesus, who preaches a kingdom where the last shall be 
first and the first shall be last and the monarch of that kingdom has a crown of thorns and 
hangs on a cross rather than sits on a throne. Thus, the paradox Gregory perceives has 
biblical precedent. 
 Despite the Moralia’s silence in the critical era, Gregory’s influence does stretch 
over the centuries and seems to affect Kierkegaard, Barth, and Vischer in many ways, albeit 
likely indirectly since they never cite him. Many aspects of the Moralia touch on themes that 
the later scholars find embedded in Job as well, namely, allegory and freedom. Concerning 
allegory, though Vischer will verbally reject the allegory of the patristic era embodied by the 
Moralia, he and Barth both fall into the tradition sustained by Gregory but largely 
abandoned in the Reformation and in the Enlightenment in that they find much in the book 
of Job to compare to Christ. However, Barth and Vischer’s interpretations of Job would still 
offer much in the way of exegetical insight into Job without their parallels to Jesus—their 
parallels making up a small portion of their work. With the Moralia, on the other hand, 
allegory and tropology are such important aspects that one could hardly imagine it without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Pope Gregory I, Morals, 2.6. 
147 Pope Gregory I, Morals, 26.13.21. 
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those elements of exegesis. His entire scheme hinges on seeing how the literal Job refers to 
the allegorical Christ, who in turn instructs the Church in how to act. Thus, some of the 
moral teaching in Job Christ passes on. Though it does appear in the section of his Church 
Dogmatics on the Reconciliation of Christ, Barth’s interpretation of Job could stand alone. 
Vischer’s interpretation does rely more on how Job and Christ share a one-to-one 
relationship. However, even Vischer’s “Job as Witness to Christ” has a striking paucity of 
mention of Jesus through the majority of the text compared to the Christ-soaked Moralia. 
This difference extends beyond the superficial, as will become more evident in the section 
on Vischer. Briefly, one can note differences in the assumptions with which the two 
interpreters begin. Regarding Gregory, he develops a system of exegesis that incorporates 
the methods of Augustine and Origen, two already well-respected exegetes. Gregory is also 
writing for monks as apocrisiary for the Pope and abbot of St. Andrews monastery, so his 
authority is well established.148 Vischer, on the other hand, writes in a hostile environment of 
scholars who not only likely see Christological typology of the Old Testament to be 
anachronistic, but he also writes in a political environment which holds all things Jewish in a 
hermeneutic of suspicion at best and which is blatantly anti-Semitic at worst. Vischer’s 
program does not begin with the assumption that the Old Testament prophesies Christ, but 
he uses Christ to promote the Old Testament.149 Nevertheless, Vischer’s attempt to link Job 
with Christ does have precedent with Gregory in some way. 
 Gregory and all three of the later interpreters also discuss freedom in the text of Job. 
Again, however, their emphases differ. Freedom in Gregory is contingent on the Augustinian 
metaphysic that he espouses.150 Suffering brings freedom because it causes the sufferer to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 4. 
149 More will be said on this in the chapter on Vischer. 
150 R. A. Markus argues that Gregory’s allegorical hermeneutic corresponds with his metaphysic. He writes that 
“Gregorian religion was in every way a religion of detachment: scriptural in its substance, it detached the 
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look to a place different than the physical world. Thus the freedom that dominates Gregory’s 
interpretation focuses on the liberation of the human from sin and even from the world.151 
Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth, however, focus their attention on the freedom of God in 
God’s interaction with creation in general and humanity in particular. In Vischer and Barth, 
especially, Job 1:9 acts as the hermeneutical lens through which they view the rest of the 
book, and they understand that verse to raise the question of whether God has the freedom to 
act outside humanity’s expectations as well as whether a human can express a disinterested 
devotion to God. Gregory does not entertain that thought and spends a relative little time 
discussing that verse.152 
Thomas Aquinas’s Job 
 Roughly six and a half centuries after Gregory composed his Moralia Thomas 
Aquinas wrote his Literal Exposition on Job, a commentary that more closely resembles a 
modern commentary in several ways. For one, Thomas relies mainly on expositing the words 
of the text without attempting to reveal any allegorical dimensions of the text. He explains 
his motive in avoiding the allegorical interpretation partially in his prologue where he 
commends Gregory’s disclosure of Job’s “mysteries” to the point that he, Thomas, need not 
“add anything further to them.”153 For the most part, Thomas abides by his rule. However, he 
does betray this in his interpretation of the second half of Job 19, a passage of high relevance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reader from the letter of the scripture, helping to detach him, at the same time, from the world he was to read in 
its light.” (Robert Austin Markus, Gregory the Great and His World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 50.) 
151 “… Gregor wolle seine Leser mit den Moralia in Job einzig und allein zur contemplatio des Göttlichen 
anleiten, damit sie sich mit Hilfe der Schriftmeditation schon hier immer weiter von dieser Welt lösen und auf 
dem Weg zur Ewigkeit voranschreiten können.” (Katharina Greschat, Die Moralia, 244.) 
152 “Whereas God is a just and a true God, it is important to enquire how and in what sense He shews that He 
had afflicted Job without cause. For because He is just, He could not afflict him without cause, and again, 
because He is true, He could not have spoken other than what He did. So then that both particulars may concur 
in Him that is just and true, so that He should both speak truth, and not act unjustly, let us know, that blessed 
Job was both in one sense smitten without cause, and again in another sense, that he was smitten not without 
cause.” (Pope Gregory I, Morals, 3.3.3.)	  
153 Thomas Aquinas, Job, 69. 
 61	  
to his overall interpretation of the book of Job.154 In this section, Thomas views the redeemer 
in the famous passage Job 19:25 (“I know that my redeemer lives”) as the resurrected Christ 
who would grant resurrection to all of humanity in the end times. This somewhat unusual 
passage in the otherwise “literal” reading of Job contains two of the more important aspects 
of Thomas’s reading of Job—that Job is in the right because he has faith in God’s 
providential activity and his belief in the resurrection of the dead. 
 Of these two themes, Thomas explicitly holds that the book of Job is about 
providence,155 but Thomas’s belief in the resurrection is intrinsically related to how God 
provides for humanity—a debt he owes to Maimonides. 
 Thomas’s focus on the literal interpretation of Job as opposed to the spiritual 
meaning differs from Gregory not merely because he did not want to reinvent the wheel. The 
difference stems also from differences in their hermeneutics, which in turn stem from 
differences in their ontologies. While Gregory’s dualism gives him the impetus to look 
behind the physical reality to the spiritual meaning behind that reality, Thomas’s Aristotelian 
ontology focuses on the visible realities before him, which he understands as “good and true 
and beautiful in themselves.”156 One must take care to note that the word sense (sensus) 
refers to what we might term “authorial intent,” thus, Thomas perceives metaphor and other 
figures of speech as metaphor and figures of speech on top of their actual literal meaning. He 
derives meaning from the conventions of language rather than from importing spiritual truths 
from the life of Christ or the Church. As clarification, note that from Job 19:9, when Job 
accuses God of taking “away the crown from [his] head,” Thomas describes that as Job 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Indeed Susan Schreiner calls it Thomas’s “hermeneutical key to the book.” Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall 
Wisdom, 74. 
155 Thomas Aquinas, Job, 68. 
156 Nicholas M. Healy, “Introduction,” in Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to His Biblical Commentaries, 
ed. Daniel A. Keating and John P. Yocum Thomas G. Weinandy (London: T&T Clark International, 2005), 8. 
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announcing the loss of his dignity rather than a physical crown.157 This explanation gets at 
the heart of the argument rather than the grammar.158 
 Thomas’s hermeneutic, as many biblical hermeneutics, contains the complicating fact 
that biblical books have two authors—the human author and the divine author.159 While non-
biblical books can only have a literal sense, the divine origins of the Bible can allow for 
typological and spiritual meanings beyond the literal sense.160 Thus, Job can prophesy Christ 
in chapter 19 despite the centuries dividing them because God authors both the Old and New 
Testaments.161 As Yocum states it, “the meaning of the literal text may go beyond what the 
human author understood. In addition to this, while human authors use words to signify 
things God, the Creator of all things, may use those things signified by the words of the text 
to signify other things.”162 
 Two things in particular draw Thomas’s tendency toward spiritual interpretation. 
First, as Gregory employs the spiritual dimension in Job when the book seems to contradict 
itself, Thomas similarly believes that when the literal sense of Scripture “appears to be 
claiming something clearly untrue, its divine author must intend a meaning other than the 
apparent.”163 Second, he willingly compares Job to Christ and often refers to the New 
Testament when interpreting the Old Testament and also utilises the help of earlier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Thomas Aquinas, Job, 265. 
158 Karlfried Froehlich, “Christian Interpretation of the Old Testament in the High Middle Ages,” in Hebrew 
Bible/Old Testament, ed. Magne Saebo (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 542. 
159 Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 71. 
160 Karlfried Froehlich, "Christian Interpretation," 545. 
161 John Yocum, “Aquinas' Literal Exposition on Job,” in Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to His Biblical 
Commentaries, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy et. al. (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 26-27. 
162 John Yocum, "Literal Exposition," 26. 
163 Nicholas M. Healy, "Introduction," 17. 
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authorities within his traditions in order to present an interpretation “more familiar and 
approachable to his Christian reader.”164 
 Though Thomas has a willingness to draw upon these earlier traditions, he also 
employs a later medieval “scholastic method” of interpretation that helps explain his 
conclusions and occupation with certain aspects in the book of Job.165 This method requires 
the three elements of reading (lectio), disputation (disputatio), and preaching 
(praedicatio).166 In particular, Thomas sees disputation as important in the book of Job since 
he views the friends’ debates with Job as a medieval disputation.167 This focus on the 
developing argument between Job and his friends arises from Thomas’s focus on the literal 
sense of the text. Gregory’s focus on the allegorical aspects allows him to ignore the finer 
points of the arguments since they deferred their meaning elsewhere.168  
In this extended debate, Thomas sees the argument develop linearly, but it eventually 
reaches a stalemate, which necessitates the Theophany.169 In fact, despite the physical 
suffering and loss of family and property that Job experiences, Aquinas seems to point to the 
result of the debate itself as an aspect of Job’s suffering on top of his material losses. The 
social suffering that Job perceives trumps the physical suffering that spurred the debate in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Martin D. Yaffe, “Interpretive Essay,” in The Literal Exposition on Job By Thomas Aquinas, The American 
Academy of Religion Classics in Religious Studies (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 11. Note here that Vischer 
might owe more to Aquinas than to Gregory, despite appearances and, perhaps, preconceptions. However, even 
here there is likely no direct line of comparison, but rather a common spirit that Aquinas and Vischer share. 
165 Norman Kretzmann, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and 
Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5. 
166 Nicholas M. Healy, "Introduction," 12. 
167 Eleonore Stump, “Biblical Commentary and Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. 
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168 See Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 73. 
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the first place.170 The debate, perhaps, has gone beyond mere disputatio, since Job accuses 
the friends of persecuting him like God: 
… as if to say: The persecution from God is sufficient for me, but it would be your 
place rather to offer consolation. Now he shows how they were persecuting him, 
adding and glut yourselves on my flesh?, a question which properly pertains to 
disparagers who are said to feed on human flesh inasmuch as they are delighted by 
the infirmities of others.171 
 
This is not to say that Aquinas minimises the afflictions instigated by the Satan under 
God’s allowance. The suffering Job receives from his friends is unnecessary, for the most 
part, which explains God’s rebuke of Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar. However, Thomas does 
see a purpose in the suffering Job receives from God.172 Partly, the purpose is to vindicate 
God in his wager with the Satan. God uses the suffering to declare Job’s virtue.173 However, 
Thomas also implies that suffering chastens the sinner, a common sentiment among Job 
interpreters.174 The suffering of Job, therefore, relates to Thomas’s major theme of God’s 
providence in the book of Job. 
In the prologue to Thomas’s commentary, he writes that: 
the diligence of later philosophers examining the truth with sharper insight has 
shown with evident proofs and arguments that natural things are controlled by 
providence; for one would not find such a reliable course in the movement of heaven 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Thomas determines this by the order of Job’s reparations in chapter 42. He writes, “Now chief among Job’s 
adversities, as it were, was that he had been deserted by his friends; therefore, the remedy for this adversity is 
put first when Now there came to him all his brothers and all his sisters and all who knew him before.” Here is 
also a reference to Job 19:13. (Thomas Aquinas, Job, 472.) In his discussion of chapter 19, he notes that Job, 
when listing his afflictions, mentions firstly his loss of honour and glory in verse 9. (Thomas Aquinas, Job, 
264.) He notes that in verse 22 Job views the debate as a type of persecution on top of God’s affliction. 
(Aquinas, Job, 268.) 
171 Thomas Aquinas, Job, 268. 
172 On 1:20-21, Thomas writes, “For it would not be pleasing to God that anyone suffer adversity except for the 
sake of some good coming from it.” (Thomas Aquinas, Job, 89.) 
173 Thomas Aquinas, Job, 92. 
174 Eleonore Stump, "Biblical Commentary and Philosophy," 263. See also Martin D. Yaffe, "Interpretive 
Essay," 24. Note, however, that Thomas does not emphasise the chastening nature of suffering as previous 
interpreters. Schreiner, in fact, argues that Thomas shifts “away from the therapeutic notion of suffering… to 
questions about providence,” noting that the chastening nature of suffering and providence are mutually 
exclusive. (Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 55.) 
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and of the stars and in the other effects of nature unless all these things were ordained 
and governed by some supereminent intelligence.175 
 
Because the world is ordered towards the will of God, one must conclude that the suffering 
of individuals must also have that orientation. However, different views of providence may 
have different theories as to how the suffering fits into God’s plan. Job’s friends, according 
to Thomas, view the world as predictable and ordered with one to one correspondence 
between sin and suffering.176 However, this view does not account for the complexity of the 
world—that evil itself somehow fits into God’s order. In the end, God’s declaration that Job 
had spoken rightly while his friends had not derives from the friends’ “perverse dogmas” 
associated with their simplistic understanding of providence.177 
 The missing element in the friends’ dogmas turns out to have been a belief in the 
resurrection. Job’s faith in the afterlife, expressed in his speech in chapter 19, suggests that 
he believes God would justify the apparent injustice of his suffering eventually.178 His 
friends, on the other hand, cannot reconcile the apparent incongruity between Job’s suffering 
and his claims of innocence; they have no belief in a future life of reward and punishment 
contingent upon the deeds in the present life.179 Thus the problem posed in the book of Job, a 
problem which God does not address directly, relies on a prophetic pronouncement by Job 
that Aquinas interprets as reference to Christ. 
 There are, of course, several problems with Aquinas’s overall interpretation that go 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Most problematic is the notion that the book of Job does not 
clearly contain passages that refer to a resurrection of the dead and contains others that seem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Thomas Aquinas, Job, 67. 
176 Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 75. 
177 Aquinas, Job, 214, 471. See also Stump, "Biblical Commentary and Philosophy," 262. 
178 Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 76. 
179 See Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 73. 
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to deny it altogether (of the latter, we will examine below). Chapter 19 is notoriously 
difficult to interpret, so to base one’s exegesis of the whole book on that passage seems a bit 
dubious, today.180 However, granting that chapter 19 may allude to an afterlife, it does seem 
that Aquinas’s interpretation of Job’s suffering might merely extend the parameters of God’s 
justice to fit the friends understanding of providence. That is, the friends perceive that Job 
must have sinned because he has been punished instead of rewarded. However, Thomas 
argues that Job has not yet received his reward, a reward that likely looks similar to the 
friends’ understanding, but presented in a different time. If the doctrine of resurrection does 
not appear in the book of Job, a more complex hermeneutic must be employed to explain 
how one can utilise the doctrine of resurrection in a book that does not contain it or 
determine a very different interpretation of the book as a whole. 
 In light of this important aspect of Thomas’s interpretation of Job, let us look at the 
similarities between Thomas’s interpretation and those of Kierkegaard, Barth, and Vischer. 
For the most part, these later interpretations do not share much in common with Thomas. 
Thomas’s reluctance to incorporate Christological readings into his commentary, due to his 
goal of describing the literal sense means a general paucity of typological comparisons of 
Job and Christ. Even his interpretation of chapter 19 does not compare Job to Christ. Rather 
Job declares a faith in Christ apart from himself. 
As mentioned above, Thomas views the argument between Job and his friends 
developing linearly, which requires at least a qualified belief in the unreliability of the 
friends’ arguments. As we will see below, Calvin seems to have a difficult time viewing the 
friends’ claims as open to doubt. In this way, Thomas anticipates the later scholars in a way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Chapter 19 was seen as a high point in Job for many years, though. 
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that bypasses Calvin, one of Barth and Vischer’s heroes. It also bears a resemblance to the 
Socratic irony that Kierkegaard relies on so heavily.  
 Another instance that bears a resemblance to the Socratic irony that Kierkegaard 
employs, but in a much smaller scale, is Thomas’s exposition of Job 10:21, where Job says, 
“before I go, and do not return, to the shadowy land covered by the mist of death.” Thomas, 
here, would seem to encounter a problem that would dismantle his entire exegesis of the 
book. Job fairly clearly seems to deny the possibility of an afterlife. However, Thomas 
interprets this as Job appropriating the position of his adversaries in the debate. Thomas 
writes: 
…one should say that he is speaking in the manner of a debater—according to the 
opinion which his adversaries hold—before the truth is manifested. Now below Job 
will manifestly indicate the truth of resurrection; therefore, in all the preceding 
passages he speaks of resurrection supposing the opinion of those with whom he was 
debating, who did not believe that there was another life except this one, but [did 
believe] that men are either punished or rewarded in his life alone for the good and 
the evil deeds which they do.181 
 
Akin to this is Kierkegaard’s hermeneutic of appropriation, whereby the interpreter assumes 
the role of the character who one wants to understand. Thomas’s use of this method, 
however, seems less a purposeful interpretive strategy than a way to sustain his overall thesis 
of Job without foregoing the passages that seem to undermine it. 
 Thomas’s departure from Gregory’s reading is not limited to his lack of allegory or 
irony. His literal interpretation and his focus on the disputation in the dialogues also depart 
from Gregory’s understanding of Job’s suffering. Gregory’s own physical ailments along 
with his flattening of the arguments in the poetic sections led him to prop up the physical 
suffering of Job as the main problem to solve. Thomas, as mentioned above, views Job’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Thomas Aquinas, Job, 192. See also Thomas on 7:11 and 23:3. Cf. Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall 
Wisdom, 80. 
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social situation as the main cause of Job’s suffering. This he shares with the later scholars, in 
particular with Kierkegaard. Like Kierkegaard, Barth, and Vischer, Thomas is much more 
critical of the friends than Gregory and sees them as exacerbating the problems initiated in 
the prologue. 
 The main themes that tie together Kierkegaard, Barth, and Vischer are those of 
freedom and trust in God. Thomas’s Job does contain aspects of freedom that relate to the 
later interpreters, however, they are quite muted for various reasons. In fact they are muted 
partly because of the type of faith that Job has. Thomas’s Job has a much greater confidence 
than the Job most people see.182 His faith in the resurrection of the dead means that he seems 
to see his suffering as an element in a system.183 This is radically different than the Job of 
Barth (as well as Vischer and Kierkegaard). Barth sees God as completely free from 
universal systems. With Barth, it is God alone that Job must trust and not a doctrine separate 
from God, like resurrection. God’s freedom means that Job may not receive reparations in 
the afterlife and so Job need not display the confidence that Thomas bestows upon him. 
Schreiner describes Thomas’s Job as not finding “deliverance from history but rather faith in 
the ultimate order of history.”184 When God afflicts Job, it is not without reason, but  
without a reason which is manifest and perceptible by the afflicted man. For if the 
afflicted man were to perceive the reason why God is afflicting him and that the 
afflictions are useful to him for his salvation, it is manifest that he would believe that 
he had been heeded, but since he does not understand this, he believes that he has not 
been heeded.185 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Eleonore Stump, "Biblical Commentary and Philosophy," 261. 
183 Note here a similarity between Thomas’s Job and the Abraham described in Hebrews 11:17-19. Thomas 
would not be the first, nor the last, to imply a comparison of the plight of Job to that of Abraham in the 
Aqadah. See, for instance, how Kierkegaard compares the two in the next chapter. Curiously, Thomas makes 
no explicit mention of the binding of Isaac in his entire Literal Exposition on Job.  
184 Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 89. 
185 Thomas Aquinas, Job, 174. 
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 Thomas’s Job, therefore, looks quite different from the later interpreters that we will 
encounter. His guiding principles stemming from his prejudgments make this so. On the 
other hand, his interpretation does share some features with the later Lutheran and Calvinist 
scholars that they do not share even with Luther and Calvin.  
Luther on Job 
Though Barth’s and Vischer’s reformed tradition grants them some inevitable 
similarities to Calvin, whom we will examine presently, they, along with Kierkegaard, are 
also firmly placed in the tradition of Martin Luther. Luther influences all three in several 
areas and his influence certainly extends to the three interpretations of Job, especially 
Kierkegaard’s. However, Luther does not present his readers with an extended interpretation 
of Job of his own. The preface to his translation of Job provides us with only a little evidence 
of how he might have interpreted the book of Job in a commentary, lecture, or sermon.  
In his preface to the book of Job, Luther makes a few points that are relevant to the 
interpretations of Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth. He claims the book “deals with the 
question whether misfortune comes from God even to the righteous.”186 Of the friends, 
Luther claims that they have a “worldly and human idea of God and his righteousness, as 
though he were just like men and his justice like the justice of the world,”187 which applies 
well to Vischer, especially, who proposes that the friends imagine that Job takes God to 
court, but that Job recognizes the futility of such a worldly exercise.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Martin Luther, Word and Sacrament I, trans. Charles M. Jacobs, vol. 35, Luther's Works (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1960), 251. 
187 Martin Luther, Word and Sacrament I, 251. 
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Regarding Job’s sinlessness Luther seems to grant that Job did not deserve the initial 
suffering he received from God, but spoke wrongly in his complaints about the suffering.188 
Luther’s conclusion regarding the plot of the book is that “God alone is righteous, and yet 
one man is more righteous than another, even in the sight of God.”189 
Luther views the hiddenness of God’s grace as an important theme in the book of Job 
and also, like Calvin, omits any explicit comparison between Job and Jesus Christ. Glatzer 
notes that Luther does not mention how the book might preach Christ, an important aspect to 
Luther’s Old Testament hermeneutic,190 which seems to have directly influenced Vischer in 
his Old Testament exegetical method.191 Luther’s Job, therefore, may not have influenced 
Vischer or Barth directly, but their similar worldviews may have contributed to the later 
interpreters’ interpretations despite the relatively small one in Luther’s corpus. 
On the other hand, Luther makes a small but significant comment that may have 
influenced Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourse on Job. Luther claims that the book of Job 
may best be understood by those “who experience and feel what it is to suffer the wrath and 
judgment of God, and to have His grace hidden from view.”192 As we will see, one of 
Kierkegaard’s purposes in the discourse is to convince the reader how he or she might relate 
to Job’s sufferings. Job’s sufferings under the wrath of God may seem extraordinary to the 	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that Job sinned “in his suffering,” which clearly comes after the narrator describes Job as blameless. The 
narrator barely speaks at all about the morality of Job once the dialogues begin, which is where Luther claims 
Job speaks wrongly. 
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190 Nahum Norbert Glatzer, The Dimensions of Job: A Study and Selected Readings (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1969), 32.  
191 See Wilhelm Vischer, “La Méthode De L'Exégèse Biblique,” RTP 10, no. 2 (1960): 109-23. 
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casual reader, but Kierkegaard claims that we have all experienced something in our lives 
that relate to Job.  
Calvin on Job 
 Calvin’s reading of Job, despite Vischer’s and Barth’s indebtedness to Calvin in so 
many other ways, departs from many of the aspects that connect Kierkegaard, Barth, and 
Vischer—aspects that even Medievals and Moderns share. For instance, Calvin eschews 
typological interpretation, particularly Christological interpretations. When he does compare 
Job to another biblical character he goes to David,193 but even to David he seems drawn 
because of his ambivalence towards the righteousness and humility of Job—something with 
which he does not have a problem with respect to David. Calvin’s reading also seems devoid 
of any recognitions of irony—a quality obviously present with Kierkegaard, but also in 
Barth and Vischer in that they recognize the unreliability of the speeches by the three friends 
and Elihu. Calvin’s literal method of interpretation, which holds him back from typology, 
also forces him to take the words of scripture at face value. So even the words of the friends 
he accepts as God’s word without a sense of irony. Of course this is ironic in itself because 
of God’s pronouncement in 42:7 that they did not speak rightly of God, but Calvin 
downplays this ironic aspect. Regarding freedom, Calvin does recognize God’s sovereignty, 
but actually seems to limit God’s freedom in some ways through an a priori understanding 
of God as sovereign but not a tyrant.194 However, Calvin does anticipate Kierkegaard, Barth, 
and Vischer in his reading of Job in other important ways—even in some that contribute to 
the three aspects we are exploring. 
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 Much of Calvin’s particularity in his interpretation of Job stems from his biblical 
hermeneutic. Like most, if not all, exegetes, his understanding of the nature of the Bible 
leads him to interpretations of the text that other assumptions about Scripture might 
preclude. Regarding the Book of Job, however, Calvin’s readers must remember that, unlike 
many of his other works on Scripture, he did not leave us with a commentary on Job. Rather, 
Calvin produced 159 sermons. Though we should not make too many assumptions as to how 
a sermon or a lecture on Job by Calvin might differ from a commentary on Job, one can 
conjecture that the homiletic form might lead to certain difficulties regarding the text that 
might not arise in a full blown commentary. The book of Job seems especially susceptible to 
this since a preacher must preach on large swaths of text that, in the end, prove to be spoken 
by unreliable sources. Since most of Calvin’s sermons are on sections that contain about five 
to ten verses per sermon, sometimes nine sermons in a row might be on the words of one of 
Job’s friends. Calvin, therefore, gives them the benefit of the doubt and preaches on their 
speeches as if they contain God’s word.  
 Calvin’s second sermon on the friends’ speeches presents a very good example of the 
problems that he encounters. In his fifteenth sermon on Job, he covers Job 4:6-11, where 
Eliphaz asks Job “who that was innocent ever perished?” Eliphaz clearly insinuates that Job 
has received suffering from God because he has sinned despite Job’s claims. However, the 
prologue strongly suggests that Job suffers because of his innocence. This problem places 
Eliphaz’s comments in this section into question. Calvin must, therefore, show care when 
commenting on Eliphaz’s ostensibly theologically orthodox comments. The passage quoted 
above from 4:7 would seem to fit well into Calvin’s theology, so preaching on this section 
alone creates a problem that might not arise in a commentary, which could more easily take 
into account the rest of the book. Calvin writes of this verse, “Eliphas… taketh here a good 
sentence, so as the reasons which he bringeth here against Iob are good and holie, not 
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withstanding that the cace bee evill. And surely the principles that are sette downe here, are 
drawne out of Gods pure truth. By reason whereof it is as much as if the holie Ghost had 
pronounced this saying.”195 Thus, Calvin’s belief that Scripture is God’s Word complicates 
his reading of the passages by unreliable sources. Of course a high doctrine of Scripture does 
not preclude a recognition of the ironic element of unreliable sources as in such statements 
by Eliphaz. Nor does a recognition that the statements will seem awfully problematic by the 
time the reader reaches God’s declarations in 42:7 preclude finding truths in the speeches of 
Eliphaz. However, one either must wonder if Calvin’s reading of Eliphaz’s statements as 
partially valid stems from the homiletic medium he employs or the fact that Eliphaz’s 
statement matches so well with Calvin’s theology. The fact that Eliphaz is declared wrong 
by God in the end seems like a call to put his words under a hermeneutic of suspicion. 
 Before delving too deeply into Calvin’s interpretation of the friends, we should 
review some aspects of his general exegetical method to illumine how he might come to 
some of his conclusions about the friends as well as Elihu, Job, and God.  
 Calvin generally desires to mine the plain meaning of Scripture. One might suggest 
that he favours the literal meaning of the text, but this does not appreciate the nuance of his 
interpretation. He does pay attention to genre, rhetoric, historical context, and the author of 
the text, which are part of the literal meaning.196 At the level of the sentence, Calvin takes 
care to recognize certain figures of speech such as metaphor.197 On the whole, however, 
Calvin resists more elaborate interpretations such as allegory. For instance, regarding God’s 
speeches on Leviathan and Behemoth, Calvin rejects the medieval reading that has those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 John Calvin, Sermons on Job, trans. Arthur Golding (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1993), 66. 
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primeval creatures representing Satan.198 Regarding other biblical books in his other works, 
Calvin rejects the notion that Genesis 3:15 refers directly to Christ’s victory over Satan.199 
However, Calvin does not eschew all Christological exegesis, for instance, in some more 
generic prophesies like Isaiah 53, and reads the Bible as having the knowledge of Christ as 
its goal.200 Thus, Calvin employs no hard and fast rules or method in his exegesis, however 
sober he is in his work. He cares, in general, about drawing out a ‘useful teaching’ from 
Scripture, so his sermons on Job should hold to that theory.201 
 Nevertheless, Calvin’s attempt to mine teachings from Scripture, in what qualifies as 
a somewhat objective standpoint for a person who holds the Bible in a high regard, does not 
mean he does not remain susceptible to his own prejudgements regarding the message of 
Scripture. As suggested by his previously quoted comments on Job 4:7, Calvin’s theology 
seems to guide his reading of Job as much as Job forms his theology. Eliphaz’s words, taken 
on their own without knowledge of God’s pronouncements of Job in the prose sections, do 
ring true to Reformed ears. The sinful nature of humanity is the main cause of evil and 
misfortune in the world. Eliphaz, therefore, presents a strong case for why Job experiences 
his own suffering. The cause and effect relationship between well being and relative 
sinfulness presented in Deuteronomy supports this notion. Calvin cannot merely dismiss the 
words of the friends since they adhere so well to his own theology. On the other hand, 
because God rebukes them in the end, Calvin must find them at fault for some reason.202 He 
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concludes that their speeches are, for the most part, right, but in their posture towards Job 
one can find fault.203 
 Calvin has less of a problem justifying the words of Elihu. Since God does not 
rebuke Elihu directly in the epilogue, Calvin views Elihu as presenting the orthodox position 
without reservation. Susan Schreiner refers to Elihu as “Calvin’s mouthpiece” and that 
“Calvin’s interpretation of chapters 32-37 offers a straightforward presentation of his real 
attitude toward Job and his friends.”204 When Elihu claims that God “does not let the wicked 
live; He grants justice to the lowly” (36:6), Calvin reassures his parishioners that God’s 
providence is relatively predictable in that sin has earthly consequences and justice is 
something upon which one can count. One suffers in order to lead one to recognize one’s 
sins and repent.205 Because Elihu plays such a small part in the interpretations of Barth, 
Vischer, and Kierkegaard, we need not explore too much of Calvin’s view of him. It should 
be enough to recognize the importance Elihu figures in Calvin’s sermons and that this stems 
partly from what he says, but also it seems that Calvin’s comprehensive reading of the book 
of Job results in his favouring Elihu over the rebuked friends and the borderline 
blasphemous Job.  
 Lastly, with Elihu, Calvin can safely endorse the view that suffering can chasten or 
teach without having to excuse the words for their eventual rejection by God.206 In summary, 
Elihu, out of all of the characters, poses the fewest problems for Calvin precisely because his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 99. See also Stephen J. Vicchio, Job in the Medieval World, 188. 
One should note here that the book would hardly work without at least somewhat persuasive rhetoric on the 
behalf of the friends. If they spoke in what one could perceive on the surface as fallacious and unorthodox then 
the debate between the friends and Job would not sustain the reader’s interest. The tension that grows as Job 
remains intractable despite his potential heresy and blasphemy only to withstand the scrutiny of God in the end 
makes for a book so compelling that it has remained a classic for millennia. One can hardly fault Calvin for his 
attraction to the friends’ arguments. That he maintains his ambivalent stance towards their speeches is another 
matter. 
204 Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 132. 
205 see Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 133. 
206 Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 133. 
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speeches invite no references outside of themselves. Calvin can take what Elihu says at face 
value since God does not rebuke him or even mention him. Of course, Elihu poses problems 
to later interpreters because of his dubious inclusion in the book itself. The doubt that many 
have regarding Elihu’s origins arises mainly because no other character seems to recognise 
his presence. Other cases can be made disputing his inclusion such as vocabulary and poetic 
style, but his mysterious presence, or lack thereof, in the story triggers suspicion. Calvin’s 
hermeneutic and historical context frees him from having to make a critical assessment that 
might lead to excising Elihu from discussion. On the contrary, Elihu becomes the hero of the 
book.  
Of course, the likely hero is instead the titular character, but Calvin finds that Job’s 
words make him uneasy. Calvin cannot deny that Job is in the right, but must qualify this 
final assessment with some harsh words directed towards Job. He gives less weight to God’s 
approval in 42:7 as do his predecessors like Gregory.207 Regarding Job’s comment in 9:17 
that God multiplies wounds without cause, Calvin writes,  
It seemeth very rude geere. For that God should torment men after a sort without 
cause, it is not only simple uniustice, but such a crueltie as he were not to be taken 
any more for iudge of the worlde, but rather for a tyrant. It seemeth that Iob 
blasphemeth God here in saying that he was smitten and wounded without cause. But 
if we remember what hath bene sayd: we shal know his meening and what he 
speaketh. For the holy Ghost hath guydeth and governed him in his tung, to the intent 
that wee should have an instruction that might be much to our profite. Iob then first 
sayeth here (according to his naturall understanding) that God smiteth him without 
cause. And afterwarde moreover let us marke that these wordes without cause have 
respect to the apparent & open knowledge of men. I have told you heretofore, that 
Gods Iustice is knowne two wayes. For sometimes God punisheth the sinnes that are 
notorious to the worldward. Ye see that God chastizeth such a one.208 
 
Calvin reveals much of his interpretation of Job in this small passage. Rather than allow for 
Job to say that God wounds him without cause, a theme that Vischer will tackle many years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom, 108. 
208 John Calvin, Sermons on Job, 163. 
 77	  
later at great length, Calvin admits that this sounds like blasphemy but that the Holy Spirit 
led Job for our sake. That is, Job’s ostensible blasphemy profits the reader by example. More 
importantly to the ongoing exegesis of Calvin, we can excuse Job because he presents his 
own experiences as he perceives them. Schreiner’s book deals with this idea in great depth 
and though at times seems to overstate her case, one can easily find her thesis about Calvin’s 
interpretation of Job compelling. Her basic thesis as it applies to the above quote argues that 
Calvin does not actually believe that God acts without cause, but only that in our human 
capacity we perceive that God acts without cause. This allows Calvin to maintain a position 
closer to the friends than Job, but excuse Job of blasphemy because from his perspective, Job 
has every right to think that God has hurt him for nought.209 
 Within this idea that Job’s perceptions somewhat excuse his comments lies a 
sentiment by Calvin that suffering can have the purpose of teaching and chastising. Since the 
prologue rules out the possibility that God is punishing Job for sins, Calvin allows for 
another reason for suffering.210 Unlike the Calvinists Vischer and Barth, Calvin does not 
spend much time wrestling with the idea of God inflicting Job for nought. As evident in the 
passage quoted above, he thinks that that idea makes God out to look like a tyrant. While 
Barth will wax rhapsodic on God’s freedom and the importance of it in his theology, Calvin 
takes care to mitigate God’s freedom with God’s other characteristics.211 The overarching 
mitigating characteristic is justice. However, because of Job’s and our human perception, 
God’s justice does not always reveal itself. 
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 The hiddenness of God and its effect on Job’s perceived suffering is a regular theme 
in Calvin’s sermons. Like the later interpreters we will eventually examine, Calvin perceives 
that the suffering that Job experiences results less from the loss of property, family, and 
health described in the prologue but more from the torturous feeling that God is unreliable or 
absent after his losses.212 The friends, so self-assured, do not recognise Job’s suffering to this 
extent because they understand the justice of the world to be visible and palpable. What Job 
begins to reveal is a hidden justice—what Calvin calls God’s double or secret justice. The 
justice that the friends presume active in the world is one upon which humans can 
reasonably rely, but God employs a secret justice that proves imperceptible in our limited 
state. What this implies, and what Calvin discusses explicitly throughout his sermons, is that 
the theme of providence that Aquinas finds so prevalent in the book of Job, Calvin finds too. 
Job’s travails, as torturous as they seem, need not lead one to believe that God is a tyrant or 
unreliable. Rather, one must trust that the doctrine of providence will win out in the end. 
Justice will prevail, but in the meantime, the mystery of God’s providence may confuse and 
lead to the feeling of uncertainty.213 
 To summarise for our purposes, we will look at the prevailing themes of our three 
main interpreters of Job and how Calvin’s interpretation leads to or anticipates the later 
scholars, notably in the aspects of typology and freedom. 
 First, Calvin’s literal approach to the Scriptures resists allegory. As noted above, he 
rejects traditional readings of the Behemoth and Leviathan as representative of Satan. He 
also resists Christological readings of passages that traditionally lead in that direction. 
Consider his sermons that include chapter 19:25. Throughout history, Christians have read 
the “redeemer” in this famous passage as prefiguring Christ and have felt the freedom to 	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embellish on that reading. However, Calvin quotes the passage in his sermon as “I know that 
my God is alive…”214 He does not deny, of course, that God will make himself manifest in 
the person of Jesus, but nor does he hint that Job prophesies the future incarnation. As we 
shall see, despite Barth and Vischer’s juxtaposition of Job and Christ, neither do they see Job 
prophesying in that way.  
 Where they differ more so, especially regarding Vischer, is the character of Job as 
prefiguring Christ. Calvin’s objection towards Job’s words would seem to lead to his 
resistance to this typology. On the other hand, Calvin does not reject all typological readings 
in the book of Job. Rather than the typical Christological readings of the premodern era, 
however, Calvin somehow moves toward a reading that incorporates King David into the 
narrative of Job. Part of this seems to have to do with Calvin’s affinity towards the Psalter. 
In a way, this makes sense because the Psalter, like the Book of Job, is divinely inspired, but 
often out of words from the heart of a suffering human. The difference is that David as 
psalmist and in the narratives in 1 and 2 Samuel consistently confesses to his sins—
something Job rarely if ever does. It is through his comparisons with David that Calvin can 
move to Christ in his sermons. For Calvin, David is a type of Christ. As head of the 
community in Israel, David is an image of Christ.215 So it is through David, not Job, that 
Calvin can talk about Christ. However, all three suffer at the hand of God, so they all have 
something in common. Calvin’s uneasiness toward Job hinders his ability to make a direct 
leap to Christ and so he goes through a more humble character with whom Calvin feels more 
comfortable. 
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 Calvin resists the possibility of granting God the vast freedom that Barth and Vischer 
grant. Calvin seems to have difficulty reconciling God’s freedom with his justice. The laws 
that God sets up seem to limit God’s freedom in some ways for Calvin. Although this is not 
a typical view of Calvin, the freedom of God does seem limited in his interpretation of Job, 
seemingly because of his discomfort with Job’s borderline blasphemous remarks that butt up 
against the comments by Job’s friends, which sound more respectful of God. By favouring 
the friends and Elihu over Job, Calvin opens himself up to the criticism that Barth, Vischer, 
and Kierkegaard level at the friends and their own critics—the friends and those who 
resemble them are putting the system of God’s justice above the person of God, thereby 
subjecting God to his own law. In the end, he has more in common with Barth than not, but 
Barth seems more willing to enter the darker places than Calvin does. Calvin seems 
somewhat timid when it comes to challenging God’s relationship between justice and 
freedom.  
Kant on Job 
 Let us now turn to Immanuel Kant’s interpretation of Job, which takes up a small 
portion of a short essay he wrote in 1791 called “On the Failure of all Attempted 
Philosophical Theodicies.”216 Its size precludes an extended meditation on his discourse, but 
his approach and what he says merits mentioning in the context of our larger programme. 
The conclusions at which he arrives anticipate Kierkegaard, Barth, and Vischer in important 
ways, and it seems likely that Kierkegaard was familiar with the essay. Kant’s approach to 
Job and his theories about Job’s integrity share much in common with Kierkegaard’s 
interpretation in Repetition. Also when one notes the timing of particular remarks by 
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Kierkegaard that mirror Kant’s musings in this essay, one may conjecture, as Ronald Green 
does, a direct link between Kant’s essay and Kierkegaard’s book.217 
 Like many who gravitate towards the Book of Job, Kant seems to have identified 
with Job’s suffering. Unlike Gregory the Great, however, who experienced physical 
suffering, Kant experienced a social suffering at the hands of his critics in a way similar to 
Kierkegaard’s.218 A. L. Loades indicates that Kant’s essay in part takes aim at a pastor and 
minister of justice named J. C. Wöllner, who put out a series of edicts that institutionalised 
certain understandings of Lutheran orthodoxy by the state and made vulnerable some whose 
own interpretations fell into suspicion. Since Kant himself “was unlikely to accommodate 
his thinking so [sic] the prevailing spirit of the State or to ecclesiastical dogmatism in any 
form,” he penned his essay, clearly siding himself with Job, insinuating that Wöllner and his 
followers represent Eliphaz et al.219 He, like Kierkegaard, elevates Job in relation to Job’s 
friends because of the pronouncement made by God in Job 42:6 about their relative virtue. 
 Though his reading of Job shares these similarities with Kierkegaard, the vehicle 
with which he drives his interpretation more resembles Barth’s. After presenting his reasons 
for why philosophical theodicies fail, Kant turns to the story of Job to buttress his thesis. 
 Kant’s essay, which acts as a rebuke of Leibniz’s conviction that we live in the best 
of all possible worlds,220 begins by defining theodicy as “defences of the highest wisdom of 
the Creator against the complaints which reason makes by pointing to the existence of things 
in the world which contradict the wise purpose.” God’s advocate, in order to justify God in 	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the face of these complaints must prove the purpose of “what one deems contrary to 
purposefulness,” that it is “an inevitable consequence of the nature of things,” or that some 
being other than God is the responsible agent.221 His main argument as to why philosophical 
theodicies fail is based on his belief in the unknowableness of God and thus, the 
unknowableness of the truth of the theodicy. This does not mean that the problems need 
remain unresolvable. He merely suggests, like Calvin, that we may never know the solution. 
In a line reminiscent of the spirit of Job 28, Kant states, 
there is a task which our attorney does not need to undertake, that is to prove the 
highest wisdom of God by what is learned from experience in the world. This he 
could not do at all, for it requires omniscience to recognize in any given world (as 
known in experience) such perfection that one could say of it with certainty that there 
could not be any greater in the creation and government of the world.222 
 
Theodicy can only speculate on the justification of the divine. It does not truly defend God 
but rather one’s preconceptions of God—it overreaches reason.223 
 Kant, however, does believe that an authentic theodicy remains a possibility as 
opposed to the doctrinal theodicies that inevitably fail. Kant turns to Job as an example of 
authentic theodicy. Job’s perceptions of his suffering, coming from his honest and 
immediate views of his own personal fate strike Kant as an adequate example of theodicy. 
The ends of it are not to bolster a universal truth at the expense of a suffering individual but 
to bolster the suffering individual.224 
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 The rest of the essay goes through a number of proposals as to how one may justify 
misfortune in the world under the watch of a benevolent Creator. Kant finds each argument 
lacking, invoking at times language reminiscent of Job himself. He discusses the 
incommensurability between crime and punishment in the observable world. Upon the 
observable world, a common theme in biblical Wisdom literature, Kant limits his reasoning. 
This disjunction between empirical data and convincing theodicies is where Kant bases most 
of his conclusions about the failure of theodicy. 
 The main theme running through Kant’s meditations on Job is the importance of a 
free conscience with respect to morality. Kant describes Job as “healthy, rich, free… he lived 
in a happy family, had good friends, and above all… he was at peace with himself and had a 
good conscience. All these blessings, except the last one, were taken away from him by a 
terrible fate sent to try him.”225 Job, Kant surmises from the text, continues to speak his mind 
even after the fate that befell him. This explains his outspokenness throughout the dialogues. 
Job acts not as an iconoclast or with impatience as much as he speaks his mind with 
confidence. His sincerity certainly trumps anything else he might say or do. Thus, Kant 
suggests the eventual failure of all theodicies since the only right thing to say in a situation 
like Job’s is what the sufferer feels at that precise moment.  
 To illustrate this in more detail, Kant contrasts Job’s behaviour with his friends’ 
reactions to Job’s outspokenness. Kant recognises the friends’ belief in retributive justice, 
which mitigates their responses to his sufferings, aggravating Job more because they do not 
perceive his sincerity. The arguments of either side do not impress Kant as much as the 
posture of the individuals making the arguments.226 
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 Though the topic of the conscience does not loom large in Kant’s works, nor in 
perceptions of his work, the importance of the conscience in ethics does arise in his 
important work Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, which he wrote two years later 
in 1793.227 The importance of the conscience in Kantian ethics stems partly from moments 
of doubt—when reason alone may not have the capability of deciding an ethical dilemma. 
The conscience then acts as a guide.228 Kant seems to elevate the conscience, at times, to a 
level higher than faith.229 In Religion, he defines the “future judge” “at life’s close” as “his 
own awakening conscience, together with the empirical knowledge of himself which is 
summoned to its aid.”230 This description corresponds well to the Job in “On the Failure of 
all Attempted Philosophical Theodicies.” One reason Kant views the conscience this way is 
that if a “question is addressed to the judge within a man he will pronounce a severe verdict 
upon himself; for a man cannot bribe his own reason” the way he can attempt to mollify an 
outside judge “with prayers and entreaties, or with formulas and confessions in which he 
claims to believe.”231 Thus, the conscience supersedes even God. Because Job speaks 
honestly about his own perceptions, Kant views him highly. When Job confesses his lack of 
wisdom about unknowable things, Kant views him as a hero.232 
 Kant further breaks down the difference between Job and his friends, saying that Job 
uses practical reason while the friends use speculative reason. Presumably, he means that Job 
bases his arguments on empirical data, though he remains the only observer of the data, 
while the friends ratiocinate based on an a priori understanding of how the moral world 	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operates. Kant’s interpretation displays a keen awareness of the story, but seems not to grasp 
all that is at stake.  
 Glaringly absent is any mention of Job’s devotion to God, but this may stem from 
Kant’s understanding of faith. At the heart of Vischer and Barth’s interpretation, and implied 
in Kierkegaard’s as well through his novelistic style, lies the wager between the Satan and 
God in 1:9. The Satan asks God if Job fears God for nought. This effects Job’s loss of all he 
has. Kant expresses Job’s loss in the passive voice, relegating God’s activity to the 
background and seeming to negate the Satan from the story altogether. Though he does not 
say so, it seems likely that Kant does not consider the folktale element of the book of Job at 
all, referring only to the dialogues between Job, Job’s friends, and God. He also says nothing 
regarding the final scene, referring to the denouement as God’s assurance of Job’s piety 
rather than his restoration. 
 Kant hints at how Job’s devotion to God may play into his reading of the story in the 
final paragraph of his analysis. Kant concludes the section by introducing Job’s faith, but 
faith in what, he remains a bit vague. After God has pronounced Job right as compared to his 
friends, Kant writes: 
The faith which arose out of such unusual answers to his doubts, that is, which arose 
simply out of the conviction of his ignorance, could arise only in the soul of a man 
who in the midst of his most serious doubts could say, “Until the hour of my death, I 
will hold fast to my piety.” (27,5-6) With this resolution Job proved that he did not 
base his morality on his faith but his faith upon his morality. In this case, faith, 
however weak it may become, is a truer and purer one; this kind of faith is not found 
in a religion that cultivates self-interest and seeks favours, but in a religion of good 
behaviour.233 
 
With this chiastic remark, Kant betrays his understanding of the divine and cryptically 
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of Job. Job’s morality, conscience, and faith all act as strands of the same knot. Job’s free 
conscience reflects his piety, which acts as a window to God. Sincerity, Kant claims, is the 
basis of every virtue as well as the main requirement of faith.234 Job, then, in his sincere 
objections to his lowly state, displays a virtue and, in effect, a devotion to God that the 
friends cannot claim because of their unbecoming flattery.  
 Job’s devotion to God seems almost able to exist without need for God at all. Kant 
focuses almost entirely on conscience. However, God does play an important role in his 
analysis. God honours Job “by showing him the wisdom of his creation and its unfathomable 
nature.”235 Note that the nature of creation remains unfathomable even after God tells Job of 
it. God shows “to Job an ordering of the whole which manifests a wise Creator, although his 
ways remain inscrutable for us… even more in the connection between this order and the 
moral one.”236 God’s ways lie beyond our knowledge and so Job’s strategy of honesty and 
sincerity proves the better route than his friends’ attempts to appease the Creator with their 
human reason. 
 In the end, Kant does anticipate Barth, Vischer, and Kierkegaard in various ways. For 
instance, he touches on the freedom of Job and God in the story. Kant’s few quotes of the 
text of Job include 23:13, which declares God “unique,” a reflection of Barth’s visions of 
God’s wholly otherness that match Kant’s musings on the unfathomability of God’s wisdom. 
God “does what he wants,” Job continues, which Kant uses to argue for the doctrine of 
“unconditioned divine decree.”237 Job, likewise, speaks freely of his condition and God’s 
involvement in it. While his friends “spoke as if they were overheard by the Almighty… and 
as if they cared more for winning his favours by passing the right judgement than for saying 	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235 Immanuel Kant, "Theodicies," 294. 
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237 Immanuel Kant, "Theodicies," 292. 
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the truth. The dishonesty… contrasts with Job’s free and sincere outspokenness…”238 Job’s 
freedom and inhibitions in utilizing his freedom in Kant’s assessment anticipate one of the 
angles that Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth approach the book of Job. 
We might also note that his method of approaching Job, as illustration for a larger 
project, reflects Barth’s springboard approach to the text. As noted above, Kant potentially 
shares a formal relationship with Kierkegaard through the latter’s own study. This comes 
through in many respects in Kierkegaard’s work, but regarding Job, both Kant and 
Kierkegaard note the importance of subjectivity in the story. The important aspect of Job’s 
character is his personal conscience and not the objective ratiocinating of the friends. With 
Vischer, Kant also notes the importance of morality in the story, but whereas Vischer notes 
that God’s goodness is a goodness beyond good and evil, goodness for Kant marks the one 
consistent aspect of theology. 
 One must not, however, overstate the analogous relationship between Kant and these 
later thinkers. The differences, in the end, outweigh the similarities. Most of these will 
become clearer in the later chapters, but a few are obvious enough to state here. Regarding 
Barth especially, Kant, though he does not display a strong faith in the powers of human 
reason to locate God compared to others, does elevate reason above that of Barth, who 
eschews all natural revelation. Barth places all initiative for humanity’s faith in God in 
God’s realm. Barth, of course, shows much more interest in Christ than Kant, as does 
Vischer. Kant, in fact, does not mention Christ in his essay.  
 This regard for God’s initiative in the book of Job and beyond relates to the pride of 
place in which the three later writers view the scriptures. One need not explore the finer 
points of Kant’s view of scripture for this project. In fact, he says very little regarding the 	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authority of the Bible in his illustrative use of the book of Job other than that he finds his 
theory on theodicy “expressed allegorically in an old scripture.”239  
 Concerning this last comment, one notes that despite the close identification of 
allegory with medieval biblical interpretation, Kant does not shy away from allegory at all. 
Besides finding his theory on theodicy expressed allegorically, he also finds himself 
represented allegorically in the character of Job and Wöllner and his followers represented 
allegorically in the characters of Job’s friends. He also regards Genesis 2-6 as an allegory of 
the history of humanity in his essay Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte.240 
Thus allegory actually is an important aspect of Kant’s hermeneutics, but it differs much 
from the typological imagination of Barth and Vischer in that he uses biblical stories to 
illustrate abstract concepts or as historical antecedents while Barth and Vischer focus on 
God’s activity in some stories of his special revelation as parallel in others. The vastly 
different theologies separating Kant and Barth and Vischer seem to lie at the root of their 
different incorporations of typology or allegory. 
Conclusion 
 Though these five interpretations of the book of Job bear little resemblance to each 
other, they all remain important contributions to the dialogue of Job in the chronotope. The 
book of Job changes slightly after each interpreter since their influence has impact on the 
dialogue even if the next interpreter seems to approach Job anew. The five approach the text 
differently and come away with different results, but all contribute to the dialogue. Gregory 
begins heavy on the allegory, an element which all but disappears until Kant’s essay during 
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the Age of Enlightenment. When Kierkegaard arrives, he picks up where Kant leaves off 
though he fits much better in Luther’s school. Even though he contributes to this dialogue 
like all those before and after him, his interpretation of the book of Job stands apart in many 
ways as a strikingly unique approach. 
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Chapter 3: Each Time I Come to a Word, It is Again 
Made Original: the Repetition of Job                                 
in Kierkegaard’s Young Man 
 
 Søren Kierkegaard is not a conventional biblical scholar, to say the least.241 Though 
some of his upbuilding discourses can act as small commentaries, he does not share the same 
interests in his interpretation as does one interested in the historical aspects of a biblical text. 
With regard to Job in particular, his method of interpretation often strays quite far from that 
of the conventional scholar. His most extended discourse on Job, one that works with the 
largest portion of the biblical book, is written under a pseudonym in the form of a series of 
letters in the second half of the book Repetition. Though there is much insight into Job from 
this discourse, his interpretation differs in key ways from his upbuilding discourse from the 
same year. The upbuilding discourse, a short, reflective commentary on a single verse, is 
written under the name Søren Kierkegaard. This discrepancy in “authorship” with regard to 
Kierkegaard’s works in this period can be seen as artificial—perhaps what matters is only 
that the different texts are all penned by Kierkegaard. Certainly, the various publishers of 
Kierkegaard’s works feel this way to some end, considering that his short works are rarely 
seen published alone in a single volume despite having different pseudonymous authors. For 
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instance, Princeton publishes Fear and Trembling by “Johannes de Silentio” with Repetition 
by “Constantin Constantius.” However, de Silentio and Constantius are not mentioned on the 
cover or title page. Oxford, likewise, publishes Repetition with Philosophical Crumbs by 
“Johannes Climacus”. By ignoring the pseudonymity of Kierkegaard’s works, one can easily 
mistake the varying works as being meant to be read in the same way. There is reason to 
believe that they can and should be read in conjunction, suggested by Kierkegaard’s decision 
to publish Fear and Trembling and Repetition on the same day.242 However, the difference 
in “authorship” should be taken into account when interpreting the books themselves. The 
use of multiple names by Kierkegaard is a key to understanding his works and is an 
important strategy that he employs in his own interpretation. It also may give insight into his 
feelings on authorship with regard to the biblical text.  
 The following chapter describes Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Job in two works 
published in 1843. Because of his unique style, incorporating Socratic irony, one must learn 
to read between the lines of his assumed characters’ words for his beliefs.243 Also, despite 
the different pseudonyms employed, there is much one can learn about Job in Repetition by 
paying attention to Fear and Trembling. Yet it is also evident that Kierkegaard himself 
continues to see parallels between the characters of Abraham and Job in the respective 
stories upon which he reflects in his 1843 works. In a later volume of discourses, published 
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George B. Connell and C. Stephen Evans (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1992). Taylor argues 
convincingly that both texts are meant to be read in conjunction and that Fear and Trembling sets up 
Repetition. 
243 I use the word "belief" here, as opposed to "intent," because it seems clear that Kierkegaard's "intent" was 
what we have in the words published. However, he likely believed something different than those words 
expressed by Constantius, de Silentio, et. al. 
 92	  
in 1848, Kierkegaard pairs the two Old Testament patriarchs as counter examples to Simon 
Peter in Matthew 19.244 
 Before delving further into Job and his potential relationship to Abraham in 
Kierkegaard’s work, it is necessary to explore briefly how the Bible fits into Kierkegaard’s 
program. The next section of the chapter will examine Job in Kierkegaard’s discourse on Job 
1:20-21. Before highlighting Job in Repetition, the chapter will explore the category of 
repetition. In the book Repetition, the character of the young man “repeats” the character of 
Job by appropriating the life of Job as his own. Thus, an exploration of Kierkegaard’s 
interpretation of Job requires an exploration of this unusual hermeneutical method wherein 
the story of Job is repeated as an allegory of the young man’s own life. As Iben Damgaard 
writes, “The young man is completely absorbed in Job’s words. He surrenders himself to the 
text without reserve.”245 I will show that the young man takes this further than even 
Damgaard suggests by showing that the young man appropriates the lives of others into the 
lives of the characters in the book of Job.246 The chapter finishes with an analysis of 
Kierkegaard’s vision of Job, trying to bridge the ostensible gap between Job in the discourse 
and Job in Repetition. 
The Bible in Kierkegaard 
 The Bible is an unquestionably important document for Kierkegaard’s philosophy. 
Despite his era, champions, and sparring partners, Kierkegaard’s “attitude towards God as 
both Ultimacy and Intimacy,” as T. H. Croxall states in 1956, comes ultimately from his 
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245 Iben Damgaard, "My Dear Reader," 97-98. 
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interpretation of the Bible.247 This is undoubtedly the case, but not many, unfortunately, have 
ventured to explore Kierkegaard’s method of interpretation since Croxall made that 
statement, Croxall included.248 Determining Kierkegaard’s method of exegesis is a difficult 
undertaking. He does not present an explicit hermeneutic and his pseudonyms do not use the 
Bible in the same way as he would promote under his own name. This will become evident 
in the below comparison of “Søren Kierkegaard’s” upbuilding discourse and “the young 
man’s” letters in Repetition. However, what seems to be the driving force of his biblical 
hermeneutic in his autonymous and even many of his pseudonymous works is “a principle of 
imitation through imaginative identification.”249 This, of course, brings subjectivity into the 
foreground of interpretation, such that the various personalities will interpret different texts 
differently because of their own relationship with the texts.  
Nevertheless, there are wrong methods of interpretation according to Kierkegaard. 
The first half of the nineteenth century in Europe presented one with a variety of methods 
and emphases in biblical interpretation.250 One aspect that was gaining headway in the 
mainstream since Eichhorn’s 1780 publication of Einleitung in das Alte Testament was 
historical criticism to which Kierkegaard was not opposed. However, he certainly held 	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Kierkegaard, see Henning Reventlow, "Towards the End." See also John Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism in 
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biblical interpreter.  
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reservations regarding historical criticism. Of the many journal entries that he writes with 
respect to the Bible, one from 1848 illustrates his attitude towards Scripture well: 
A Reformation that removed the Bible would now, basically, have just as much 
validity as Luther’s removal of the pope. All this about the Bible has given rise to a 
scholarly and legalistic type of religiousness, sheer diversion. A sort of ‘learning’ in 
that direction has gradually found its way down to the commonest class and no 
human being reads the Bible humanly any more. If anything it is all too human to 
defer interpretation to human authorities. This causes irreparable harm; it becomes a 
refuge for excuses and evasions, etc. respecting existence, for there will always be 
something to check on first, always this sham that one must have the learning in 
shape before one can begin living—which means one never gets around to the 
latter.251 
Kierkegaard’s vitriolic, perhaps hyperbolic, tone indicates his attitude towards the 
importance of the Bible. If one is to use it wrongly, it is best not to use it at all. The invective 
also hints at a biblical hermeneutic. One should use the Bible for living, or not at all. 
With an understanding of this principle of imitation in mind, one notices another 
curious difference between his autonymous and pseudonymous works, namely his 
pseudonyms’ preferences for the Old Testament. This is perhaps no accident. Just as he does 
not mean for his readers to stop at his pseudonyms’ conclusions on the matters upon which 
they reason, he does not mean to read the Old Testament as the final say on the matters upon 
which it reasons. His pseudonymous writings lead his readers to the truth beyond what the 
narrators are saying. The narrators themselves are not aware, or at least do not understand, 
the actual truth to which Kierkegaard himself is pointing through them. Likewise, Old 
Testament characters point beyond themselves to the ultimate truth revealed in the New 
Testament. In Repetition, Constantin Constantius and the young man fumble their ways 
through ideas concerning the category of repetition. Constantin contradicts himself on 
occasion while the young man seems to develop his idea of the category over the course of 
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nine months. The end product for the reader is a series of wrong answers and dead ends; we 
must recreate the category with what is left. It is repetition through apophasis.252  
Kierkegaard’s stated position on Scripture aligns well with his Socratic rhetoric. He 
writes in his journal, anticipating Barth, “the Holy Scriptures are the highway signs: Christ is 
the way.”253 If the goal of reading Scripture is for it to point one to Christ, the Old 
Testament, which does not mention Christ explicitly, plays a similar role to Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonyms. The characters of the Old Testament act earnestly, but do not hold all of the 
necessary information themselves. Instead, they point the way through their lives to the life 
of Christ. In a Christian discourse of 1848, five years after the publication of Repetition and 
the upbuilding discourse on Job, Kierkegaard suggests that Job and Abraham fell short of the 
Christian ideal despite their admirable qualities. Job and Abraham put up “with an 
unavoidable loss in such a way that [they] not merely [do] not lose faith in God but 
believingly adore… and extol… His glory, that is Jewish piety.”254 The Jewish piety of Job 
and Abraham, despite falling short of the Christian ideal, according to Kierkegaard, 
nevertheless is important in pointing the way to the Christian ideal.255 
If Kierkegaard feels this way about the Bible’s authority, his attitude towards 
historical criticism should come as no surprise. In short, he sees historical criticism as a 
useful tool, but it should not remain the focus of one’s Bible study. The problem that 
historical criticism creates is a dependence on objective scientific evaluation of the text, 
which lacks the reliability it presumes to have, for “even with the most stupendous learning 	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London: University of Virginia Press, 1993). 
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255 It is unclear whether Kierkegaard thought of Job as an ethnic Jew or not, but he did regard him as Jewish.  
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and perseverance, and even if the heads of all the critics were mounted on a single neck, one 
would never arrive at anything more than an approximation.”256 The reliance on this illusory 
objective knowledge is destructive for two reasons. Because it is based on impersonal data, 
the results’ relationship with subjective faith is dubious. This is the case for the person who 
had no faith to begin with and for the person who had faith already. Climacus writes, “faith 
does not result from straightforward scholarly deliberation, nor does it come directly; on the 
contrary, in this objectivity [of historical critical inquiry] one loses that infinite, personal, 
impassioned interestedness, which is the condition of faith.”257 On the other hand, for the 
person who had faith already, “he is rather in such a precarious position that much effort, 
much fear and trembling will be needed lest he fall into temptation and confuse knowledge 
with faith.”258 He takes issue with a method of interpretation that presumes that truth comes 
through objective knowledge rather than through subjectivity. 
Kierkegaard responds to the dispassionate, scientifically-minded criticism with what 
seems like a polar opposite method that comes across in his pseudonyms as well as his own 
autonymous interpretation of Holy Scripture. Rather than remove oneself from the equation, 
he proposes reading the Bible as if it were a personal letter from God to the reader.259 He 
writes in one of his journal entries, “Above all things read the New Testament without a 
commentary. Would a lover dream of reading a letter from his beloved with a 
commentary!...” [sic].260 Kallas calls this a “passionate” hermeneutic—one which calls for 
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action upon reading the love letter from the beloved.261 Rosas compares Kierkegaard’s 
hermeneutic to reader-response theory and points to Kierkegaard’s “various hermeneutical 
models” as a reminder of the “variety of possible readings of the Bible.”262 Kierkegaard 
likely does not limit this hermeneutic to the Bible, however. In the preface to 1843’s Two 
Upbuilding Discourses, he writes of “that single individual whom I with joy and gratitude 
call my reader.”263 It is the individual who must interpret any text. 
If there is any single method that Kierkegaard does promote and that is consistent 
with his claims of finding truth through subjectivity, it is the principle of identifying with the 
characters of the biblical texts. This is especially the case with the New Testament character 
of Jesus, but it is also the case with Old Testament characters, notably Abraham and Job. By 
identifying with the characters, the Old Testament changes for the reader from being an 
intractable legal document to a living guide. When the reader places herself in the sandals of 
Abraham, she puts herself into a position to meet God as the patriarch did. This is insinuated 
in Fear and Trembling by de Silentio.264 Yet, in the end, the Imitatio Christi is the desired 
climax of this journey through the Scriptures. It is a logical progression, as suggested above, 
to move from the pseudonyms’ preference for the Old Testament to the autonyms’ 
preference for the New, because the pseudonyms exist in order to point the way to the truth.  
One should also note the potential problem that arises in Kierkegaard’s literary 
evolution. Five years after the publication of Repetition and Four Upbuilding Discourses, 
Kierkegaard published Thoughts Which Wound from Behind—for Edification: Christian 
Addresses.265 In the second of these addresses, he attends to Matthew 19:27 in a similar 	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fashion to his earlier discourses. In discussing the line, “Behold, we have forsaken all and 
followed thee,” Kierkegaard brings up Job who says, “The Lord hath taken away,” 
contrasting Job’s passive loss to the voluntary forsaking of the Christian.266 Job, therefore, 
like Abraham, displays a Jewish piety and not a Christian piety. Kierkegaard’s negative 
opinion of Job does not emerge in the publications of 1843, so this paragraph of 1848 
surprises the reader. It is not my intention to ignore this seeming anomaly in Kierkegaard’s 
discussions of Job, but since this passage comes after Repetition and the earlier discourse, 
and since it does not play into later discussions of Job by Barth as do the earlier publications, 
I do not want to dwell much on the passage. Tadayoshi Hayashi attributes the discrepancy 
between the later vision of Job and the earlier ones to an evolution in thought regarding 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of the Old and New Testaments and, likewise, his 
understanding of the distinctions between Christianity and Judaism.267 Lori Brandt, however, 
does note that “though Old Testament references taper off in his later works, [Kierkegaard] 
continues to draw on the stories and paradigms contained in the Old Testament for 
inspiration and direction for human life, from Job to Abraham to David.”268 Nevertheless, he 
does favour the New Testament over the Old because he naturally, as a Christian, views 
“Christ as the ultimate paradigm for Christian living.”269 With these principles in mind, we 
move to the text and character of Job in Kierkegaard’s work. Before proceeding to the 
pseudonymous Repetition, however, it is prudent to look first at the brief discourse that 
Kierkegaard published in the same year. 
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Job in “The Lord Gave, and the Lord Took Away;  
Blessed be the Name of the Lord” 
 Roughly two months after publishing Repetition, Kierkegaard published a book of 
four “upbuilding discourses.” The first of these four discourses is a brief commentary on Job 
1:20-21. Despite its later publication date and its smaller scope, it may be wise to examine 
this discourse before moving to Job in Repetition. The reason for this is that Kierkegaard’s 
purpose in this later text is much more direct than in the pseudonymous Repetition. The 
discourses in general also give a better indication of his hermeneutical method for written 
texts.270 Beyond this, it is also an important document because, like Fear and Trembling, it 
intends to give hope to the inconsolable, again showing a connection that Kierkegaard sees 
between Abraham and Job.271 This discourse was published under his own name and, 
according to his preface, has a homiletic thrust.272 However, his populist intentions do not 
stop him from inserting his more complex ideas concerning subjective reflection and 
recollection. They are more hidden, seeming more like part of the background rather than the 
focus. The focus of the discourse is the text itself and what it can do to edify the readers.  
 The discourse, despite opening with all of Job 1:20-21 as an epigraph,273 focuses 
mainly on the last proverb that Job pronounces (1:21b). What results is a very close reading 
with which Kierkegaard wants his readers to identify in order to understand their own faith 
in God. The first verse and a half are somewhat peculiar to Job’s condition at that stage of 
the narrative and not easily applied to the common nature of Kierkegaard’s probable 
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readership. The last proverb, however, has a much more universal thrust and Kierkegaard 
shows how it is applicable to anyone who reads them.  
 The applicability of the phrases and one’s ability to identify with Job’s condition may 
not seem likely to Kierkegaard’s readers at first. But Kierkegaard, through typical irony, 
shows just how universal this phrase is. He begins by discussing Job as a teacher, but also as 
one whose actions correspond to what he says.274 Through this activity Job can encourage 
people who now experience trials. The record of Job’s life is not just an interesting story. It 
rather allows the character of Job to live on as a pedagogue to those who are experiencing 
trials.  
 At this point, Kierkegaard makes a surprising move, suggesting that this phrase may 
not be so universal. Reflecting his dependence on Martin Luther, he writes, “Only the person 
who has been tried and who tested the saying in being tested himself, only he rightly 
interprets the saying.”275 While this at first seems preposterous, it is merely a rhetorical 
move by Kierkegaard, who, by the end of the discourse, suggests that all of us have indeed 
experienced trials analogous to Job’s. Thus, when seen through these tried eyes, we are all 
capable of interpreting this hard phrase; all of us have been tried, so we are all capable 
interpreters. 
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 Besides being a rhetorical strategy of Kierkegaard, positing a universality onto the 
text also reveals an important hermeneutical strategy that he upholds throughout the 
discourse and, indeed, throughout much of his interpretation of Job in Repetition as well.276 
The proper way to interpret Job, according to Kierkegaard, is to identify with the character 
of Job. This goes beyond Job as well. The way to interpret Abraham is to identify with 
Abraham. That the method of interpreting Job is akin to the method of interpreting Abraham 
should not be surprising since, as stated above, this is a companion piece to Fear and 
Trembling more than it is to Repetition. This is evident in its main themes—faith and 
worship. 
 Kierkegaard does not discuss faith and worship alone, but in relation to those topics 
that arise in the phrase under discussion. He sees this phrase revealing Job’s faith in the 
sovereignty of God and his worship through thankfulness for God’s gifts. Considering Job’s 
fate at the hands of natural and human antagonists, his speech strikes Kierkegaard as 
noteworthy. 
 Before exegeting the passage in question, Kierkegaard briefly sets the scene, 
recounting the moment Job hears about the fate that befell his children and property. Job’s 
responds, “Naked I came from my mother’s womb, and naked shall I return,” putting no 
blame on God for his own misfortune. Despite his sorrow, Job responds with faith in God’s 
plan. 
 The next brief section deals with the phrase “the Lord gave, and the Lord took 
away,” which Kierkegaard claims focuses on thanksgiving for the gifts that God gave him. 
The key to the thanksgiving is the fact that Job not only forgets but is able to remember the 
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gifts with which God has blessed him. This allows Job to detach himself from his loss but 
not from the memory of his loss. The honesty keeps a transparency between him and God, 
and the faith he has is for the true God; “the Lord, who had taken [his possessions] away, 
remained in his upright soul.”277 Kierkegaard presents two hypothetical situations that lead 
to pain or deceit and contrast with Job’s reaction. 
 Kierkegaard next isolates the clause “the Lord took away” to show that Job is fully 
confident of the sovereignty of God rather than the mediating forces that he believes God 
uses to take away Job’s family and possessions. The hypothetical person that Kierkegaard 
uses to illustrate what Job is not is hesitant about where to put the blame for his misfortune. 
Job has no room for the doubt displayed in the other potential responses because of his faith 
in the sovereignty of God, but it is also evident that Job is not concerned about the lost 
possessions if the alternative is a loss of God—that is, the true God who Job is sure is the 
agent of his current situation. When all material things are stripped from the situation, 
however important those things are, Job is able to be aware of God and cannot give God up. 
Though Kierkegaard does not mention Abraham in this section, it is very difficult not to 
notice the similarities between Job in this discourse and Abraham in Fear and Trembling, 
since both characters experience loss at the hands of God yet do not show anger but 
acceptance of their loss. 
 Though Job loses his material belongings, “the Lord did not take everything away, 
for he did not take praise away from him, and he did not take away peace in the heart, the 
bold confidence in faith from which it proceeded, but intimacy with the Lord was still his as 
before… and only praise was left and in it his heart’s incorruptible joy.”278 Though Job 
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experiences sorrow, he also experiences joy, for the source of Job’s joy is God and God 
remains with him despite his losses.  
This is what Kierkegaard seems to want to emphasise the most since he is most 
concerned with the pastoral application of the verse. He intends to build up his audience with 
Job as an exemplar. The finale of his discourse counters any hypothetical objection to Job as 
teacher. Kierkegaard lists many such hypothetical objections and follows them up 
immediately with ways in which Job is similar to these people: “Are you wise and sensible, 
and is this your comfort? Job was the teacher of many people. Are you young, and is youth 
your security? Job, too, was once young. Are you old, on the edge of the grave? Job was an 
old man when sorrow caught up with him.”279 In the end, Job’s example is one that covers 
much ground. Most people, if not all, can identify with him and with his trials. In fact, 
freedom from trials is not something that one should desire since the fact of the universality 
of trials will loom over the one not tested. The psychological damage done to the one 
dreading future trials is worse than the damage incurred in the actuality of trials. 
As far as a homily, Kierkegaard has done a fine job with this discourse. His rhetoric 
is typical of his ability to seize the reader’s attention and, despite the discourse’s autonymous 
authorship, he uses Socratic irony to allow the reader to arrive at the desired conclusion 
regarding the interpretation of the text. This does not specify his method of interpretation, 
however, which remains difficult because of its genre as homily. What one can do is 
evaluate the conclusions and decide how accurate they are with respect to the text. It is safe 
to say that an evaluation of Kierkegaard’s exegesis of Job 1:20-21 shows that he has 
contributed an important interpretation of this small section of Job. Kierkegaard’s reading of 
Job’s first pronouncement after Job’s hearing of his tragedy does show much insight and 
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creativity. By showing what Job does not say—“The moment the Lord took everything 
away, he did not first say, ‘The Lord took away,’ but first of all he said, ‘The Lord 
gave”280—Kierkegaard focuses on the significance of what he does say. By isolating the 
phrase from the rest of the text, he is able to focus on the piety of Job in that particular 
moment, which becomes an important teaching tool for Kierkegaard. When placed back in 
the context of the book as a whole, a new vision of Job emerges. This holistic Job is the one 
with whom the Young Man is able to identify in Repetition, and some of the themes of that 
book do present themselves in this later work. 
Kierkegaard does not spend much space on verse 20 at all. His exegesis begins in 
earnest at verse 21b, first focussing on “the Lord gave.” He sees Job’s words at this juncture 
as referring to his thankfulness in this surprising time of loss. Rather than shrink from the 
shock of losing everything that he had, he recalls everything that the Lord had given him 
with enough gratitude that “it was as if it were not the Lord who took it away but Job who 
gave it back to him.”281 The key word, repeated several times throughout the section is 
“recall.” He recalled God’s goodness, his own prosperity, those who recollected him, his 
days of glory, and his own righteousness.282 He has a long memory which leads to a farewell 
in which he lets everything go and the memory vanishes “like a beautiful recollection.”283 
Recollection and memory emerge as very important concepts throughout Kierkegaard’s 
works, and in Repetition, Constantin Contantius contrasts the categories of recollection and 
repetition. Constantin describes repetition as a recollection forward and calls it the Christian 
answer to the pagan recollection, so it is a little jarring to see this most righteous of all men, 
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bar Jesus, being described by a concept that seems to carry less than positive overtones 
throughout the Kierkegaardian corpus.  
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym William Afham actually uses various terms to describe 
recollection and distinguishes between memory (Huskommelsen) and recollection 
(Erindringen) in Stages on Life’s Way.284 In this work, “to remember” (at huske) is an 
indiscriminate act “in that it merely provides ‘a mass of details’” while “to recollect” (at 
erindre) is “a cognitive act involv[ing] a reflexive relationship to the person doing the 
recollecting.”285 Recollection, thus, concerns itself with a specific task while memory is 
more general. Constantin contrasts recollection (Erindring) with repetition (Gjentagelsen), a 
subject upon which we will touch presently. 
Note, however, that in the discourse, Kierkegaard uses a third term to describe Job’s 
remembering (mindes). Kierkegaard uses mindes, likely, because the other two terms would 
sound out of place in a religious discourse.286 In everyday Danish, the three terms are largely 
interchangeable. 
 Bearing in mind the lack of distinction between the various synonyms of memory, let 
us note another passage broaching the topic in another of Kierkegaard’s publications from 
1843, Either/Or. The section in this large work entitled “The Unhappiest One” discusses 
recollection fairly clearly.287 The essay also makes implicit and explicit references to Job, 
suggesting that the topics discussed are not merely linguistically related, but also 
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thematically.288 The general idea of recollection in “The Unhappiest One” is that recollection 
leads to unhappiness because it focuses on the unreality of what has already past. One who 
recalls cannot be present to himself since his physical self exists in the present while the self 
is focussing on the past. This disconnect is the actual cause of unhappiness, but recollection 
and hope can lead to this absence from oneself. While hope in the future can also lead to 
unhappiness, recollection has a greater chance of doing so because the past has no chance of 
becoming present, while what one hopes for in the future can possibly become present. 
So why is Job, who recollects so many things in the past, such an exemplar to 
Kierkegaard’s edifying discourses if recollection is put in such a bad light? In the author’s 
own words: 
If, generally, only the person who is present to himself is happy, then these people, 
insofar as they are only hoping or only recollecting, are in a sense certainly unhappy 
individualities. But, strictly speaking, one cannot call an individuality unhappy who 
is present in hope or in recollection. The point to stress here is that he is present in 
it.289 
 
Job, in the moment that Kierkegaard sees as so important to build his audience up, is 
apparently present in his recollection. The author of “The Unhappiest One” goes on to 
describe the unhappiest one as 
…one in which it is recollection that prevents him from becoming present in his 
hope and it is hope that prevents him from becoming present in his recollection. This 
is due, on the one hand, to his continually hoping for that which should be 
recollected; his hope is continually being disappointed, but he discovers that this 
disappointment occurs not because his objective is pushed further ahead but because 
he is past his goal, because it has already been experienced or should have been 
experienced and thus has passed over into recollection.290 
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It is no surprise, nor likely no problem, that Job is unhappy at that moment. It would be 
ethically and psychologically problematic if he were not. However, Job shows himself as an 
example by not hoping for what he recollects. Instead, he moves from recollection of the 
things the Lord has given him to acceptance that they are gone. Even in the dialogues, he 
does not hope for that which he recollects despite all of his complaints. He deals with the 
past in the present rather than hoping for it in the future. 
 These problems with recollection are discussed in the upbuilding discourse as well in 
the hypothetical situations that Kierkegaard uses as foils to Job’s action. One person may 
recall the happy days but becomes impatient because that previous joy has “educated and 
developed him to perceive pain.” This, according to Kierkegaard, is a problem with 
ingratitude and the mis-recollection of the past. He either felt he never appreciated what he 
had when he had it, or he recollected a distortion of the real past. Another person acts as if he 
did not lose anything. He avoids dealing with the loss. These two positions reflect the 
unhappy ones in “The Unhappiest One”: the first is absent from himself through 
recollection, the second is absent from himself through hope. Job, by contrast, sees God as 
the agent of his past prosperity and gives thanks so that it is not a “restless memory” that 
runs out of control.291 That is, he does not recollect or hope to the point of being absent from 
himself.  
This explanation of Job’s edifying activity comes from the mind of Kierkegaard, but 
it does encounter some problems. It does seem as though Job in the dialogues acts a bit 
differently than the Job of the prologue. Kierkegaard does incorporate the Job of the 
dialogue into his exposition but elides some important aspects of the dialogues. For instance, 
when discussing all of what Job recollects in his speech, Kierkegaard quotes from 29:8 and 
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29:13—“when the young withdrew out of respect for him, when the old rose and remained 
standing” and “the blessing of the abandoned was upon him.”292 This suggests that after 
recollecting these blessings and gifts from God he lets them go as explained above. 
However, in the book of Job, the character of Job follows up these memories with a speech 
that would suggest that he is focused on the recollection of or perhaps hoping for the past. 
Job 30:1 states, “But now they mock me, men younger than I, whose fathers I would have 
disdained to put with my sheep dogs.” There is a sense of despair in Job’s comments, 
comments that show how far he has fallen. Perhaps he does not pine for his former days of 
glory, but it seems questionable as to whether or not he has truly let go of the past. The 
majority of the dialogues present Job as less than accepting of his loss. He demands an 
explanation from God for his suffering, and one may wonder how much attention 
Kierkegaard pays to the whole book. However, this view of Kierkegaard’s reading fails, for 
the most part, when one considers his other mentions of Job. The young man in Repetition is 
very aware of Job’s speeches, and he paraphrases parts of Job’s first speech in “The 
Unhappiest One.”293 Concerning the truly unhappy persons, he writes: 
…we know a worse calamity [than death], and first and last, above all—it is to live… 
the unhappiest one of all would be the person who could not die, the happy one the 
person who could. Happy is the one who died in old age; happier is the one who died 
in youth; happiest is the one who died at birth; happiest of all the one who was never 
born.294 
 
 In the end, the question of whether Kierkegaard misrepresents the dialoguing Job is 
debatable, but the impression he gives is, for the most part, an insightful and important 
consideration when evaluating the character of Job. Job never asks explicitly for everything 
back that he once had, though he is not nearly as reserved in his expression of loss as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Søren Kierkegaard, Discourses, 116. 
293 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 221. 
294 Cf. Job 3:3, 11-13 for the same sentiment from Job himself. 
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Kierkegaard seems to imply. A discussion of a key aspect in Repetition follows—Job’s lack 
of pining for his lost possessions. 
 The next section of the discourse is, frankly, less fraught with difficulty. Kierkegaard 
discusses the significance of the phrase “the Lord took away” in isolation from the rest of the 
proverb, which is that Job, despite hearing about the mediating agents of Job’s loss from the 
servants—Sabeans, lightning,295 Chaldeans, a great wind—interprets the true agent as the 
Lord himself. The effect of this is two-fold. The first is the psychological effect on Job 
himself. His pronouncement is not a despairing one, but one that sees God. Job’s faith in the 
wisdom of God is great. Rather than being impotent towards his well-being, hoping for what 
he used to have, he puts his trust in the Creator who bestowed the gifts to him in the first 
place. The result is that the gifts in which he found so much pleasure do not control him, but 
direct him to the one who gave them. Once they are gone, his focus is still on the giver of 
those gifts. 
 The second effect of this interpretation is political. By ignoring the Sabeans, the 
Chaldeans, and meteorological powers, he declares them impotent. They are not the 
controlling influences in the world, they are powerless; they would not have any power had 
the Lord not given them that power. Just as Job received freely from the Lord, these entities 
received all their power from the Lord. Thus, Job’s faith in God’s sovereignty is evident in 
his speech. 
 The last section of Job’s proverb is about joy in the midst of trials. Kierkegaard does 
not deny the sorrow that Job must certainly experience, but he finds it noteworthy that Job 
praises the Lord’s name. Though it seems as though God has taken everything from Job, he 
does leave him praise. Job displays an intimacy with the Lord that is not merely mediated by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Literally “fire of God/gods.” 
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his possessions but is independent of what God had bestowed on him. In some ways, 
perhaps it is actually dependent upon what God had taken away from him. 
 What Kierkegaard has vaguely described in the person of Job at this moment is a 
repetition. Job’s letting go of the past and relying on God for an undefined future is a key 
aspect of the religious movement of repetition. The next section will highlight these aspects 
of the category of repetition, a very difficult concept that seems open to many different 
interpretations. However, this seems par for the course on a concept that is dependent on 
“freedom.” 
Repetition and the Category of Repetition 
 After the publication of Repetition in 1843, a Professor Johan Ludvig Heiberg 
published a treatise “with primary emphasis upon the orderly repetitions of the movements 
of heavenly bodies.”296 In the treatise, Heiberg refers several times to Kierkegaard’s 
previously published work. With characteristic exasperation, Kierkegaard wrote a reply 
explaining Heiberg’s misunderstandings of repetition and accusing Heiberg of reading only 
half of Repetition. Kierkegaard never published his response to Heiberg, which may have 
something to do with his desire to remain invisible behind his pseudonyms. Though he wrote 
the open letter under the name Constantin Constantius, his own voice seems to come to the 
surface more often than his independently published pseudonymous works most often allow. 
He even points out the fact that his rhetorical style is maieutic and that the first half of the 
book “is always either a jest or only relatively true,” which certainly disrupts the rhetoric 
itself.297 Nevertheless, by revealing the man behind the curtain, Kierkegaard allows for a less 
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297 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 303, 305. Note also the way he describes, in the body of Repetition, the 
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 111	  
speculative hypothesis of this notoriously difficult and elusive work. Before moving on to 
the meat of Repetition, it will help to point out some clarifications that Constantin lays out 
for Heiberg in this rather direct letter. 
 “Constantin” is quick to clarify that Heiberg’s treatment of repetition in discussing 
the natural world is quite far off the mark. In fact, it seems quite opposite to the point that 
Constantin is trying to illustrate. Constantin never discusses repetition in nature, but “about 
repetition in the issues of freedom.”298 He repeats this in the second part of the open letter 
and explains the “history” of the concept of repetition. In this illustrative section, he 
anthropomorphises the concepts of freedom and repetition to go through the stages of 
freedom in order to show that freedom will paradoxically seek out repetition. These three 
stages of freedom mimic the “three stages on life’s way” that define much of Kierkegaard’s 
work—the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.299 Thus freedom, in the first stage (a), 
fears repetition “for it seems as if repetition has a magic power to keep freedom captive once 
it has tricked it into its power.”300 It is in a state of desire which longs for the new. 
Repetition, however, appears in this stage and sends freedom into a state of despair, this 
equalling the aesthetic stage. The second stage (b) is freedom qualified as sagacity, which 
corresponds to the ethical. In this stage, “repetition is assumed to exist, but freedom’s task in 
sagacity is continually to gain a new aspect of repetition.”301 This also proves difficult as 
repetition’s relentless nature is not fooled by sagacity’s ingenuity. This leads to the third 
stage (c), the religious stage, in which “freedom breaks forth in its highest form, in which it 
is qualified in relation to itself.”302 In this stage, “freedom’s supreme interest is precisely to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
another but in the sense that he pushes the thought to extremes, so that if it is not grasped with the same energy, 
it reveals itself the next instant as something else” (Fear and Trembling/Repetition, 133). 
298 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 297. 
299 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 301-02. 
300 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 301. 
301 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 301. 
302 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 302. 
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bring about repetition… freedom itself is now the repetition.”303 Freedom, in a sense, needs 
repetition and will, despite all that is available to it, choose repetition. Thus, repetition in his 
book is “transcendent, a religious movement by virtue of the absurd” and different from the 
repetition in the natural world.304   
Constantin also notes that repetition is a breaking of the past to infinite possibilities 
and that “eternity is the true repetition.”305 Mooney describes it as “getting our cognitive and 
moral bearings not through prompted remembering, but quite unexpectedly as a gift from the 
unknown, as a revelation from the future.”306 Repetition in the natural world is irrelevant to 
the philosophical category of repetition and distracts from it since one can predict with some 
certainty when something might repeat. The reader of Repetition concludes that the category 
of repetition only comes “when all human certainty is let go.”307 
 I say “the reader of Repetition” with some trepidation since the meaning of the book 
has eluded many, while some commentators, like Bigelow have concluded that “it is 
essentially undecidable whether or not we can understand repetition.”308 Poole is even less 
sure of repetition’s graspability, determining after a lengthy interpretation of the book 
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306 Edward F. Mooney, “Introduction,” in Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), viii. 
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Repetition that “there is… no Kierkegaardian doctrine of repetition.”309 Poole’s 
deconstruction of Repetition contains many important and compelling points and is 
instructive on the ironic hermeneutic of Kierkegaard, but strikes me as fallacious on two 
accounts. The first is that, though he rightly notes the shifting definitions of repetition 
throughout the book which make settling on its true meaning difficult,310 he does not seem to 
take seriously that the book refers to itself as a “venture in experimenting psychology.” That 
is, the book progresses to a conclusion after various hypotheses and theories regarding 
repetition are eliminated or debunked with evidence. The second is that, though Poole relies 
on postmodern theories regarding the text throughout his book, he seems fixated on how 
Kierkegaard’s biography may have influenced the published form of the book. He calls the 
young man’s eighth letter “inauthentic” since Kierkegaard manipulated the text after he had 
submitted the manuscript.311 However, as I intend to show when we arrive at the eighth 
letter, this reveals the spiritual nature of repetition and effects how one reads the finale of 
Job as well. To raise questions of Kierkegaard’s intention as an author bears some weight, 
perhaps, but his intention was clearly to publish the book in its final form. So despite Poole’s 
certainty, a doctrine of repetition seems evident if ambiguous. One place to begin to 
understand it is to note how Constantin contrasts it with the Socratic category of recollection. 
 Note above how recollection and memory figure into Kierkegaard’s interpretation of 
Job in the upbuilding discourse. Recall that Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms refer to 
recollection as pagan, pointing to Socrates’ claim that truth exists inside everyone. For one 
to gain truth or learn truth, one must recollect what one already possesses.312 Kierkegaard 	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310 Roger Poole, Communication, 63. 
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through a series of syllogisms how the immortality of the soul, the continuity of opposites, and knowledge as 
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notes that the Danish word Erindring literally means “internalizing,” thus it does not exist 
externally.313  
 Repetition, by contrast, is external. It is also something that has not yet happened; it 
is future directed. Rather than looking inward toward what one already possesses, it requires 
external revelation.314 The English word “repetition” does not contain this idea 
etymologically like the Danish word Gjentagelsen, which is why some scholars prefer a 
different English translation, like “resumption,”315 or “retaking,”316 and describing it as self-
reception rather than self-choice.317 Thus, the freedom that Constantin discusses in his 
response to Professor Heiberg is not so much a freedom of choice as it is a freedom from 
having to choose. The transcendence of repetition points outside oneself to something only a 
deity can provide, but it results in a wholeness of oneself. 
 Constantin in the book does not seem to grasp the externality of repetition through 
the course of his narrative. He wants to control repetition, but control exemplifies 
recollection. He recognizes that recollection and repetition are functional opposites, but does 
not discover that they are also opposites methodologically. Ironically, the one who 
eventually discovers repetition’s actuality is the young man Constantin mentors. The young 
man’s exemplar of repetition is the character of Job. 
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 The Job discourses of the young man appear in the second section of the book. As 
Constantin suggests in his open letter to Professor Heiberg, the first half of the book is only 
“relatively true.” It is a lengthy discussion of the concept of repetition, the situation in which 
the young man finds himself, and an attempt at repetition by Constantin that ends in failure. 
The themes that creep up throughout the first half have to do with motion, recollection, hope, 
Hegelian dialectic, infinite possibility and other motifs that are present throughout the works 
of Kierkegaard in that era of his writing. It would go way beyond the scope of this thesis to 
discuss all of these issues, but they are all related to Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
freedom. 
 The first section of Repetition begins with Constantin Constantius recalling an 
anecdote where Diogenes refutes the Eleatics’ denial of motion by walking. This leads 
Constantin into a discussion of the possibility of repetition. The connections are not obvious 
between these two topics, but it becomes clear that motion is a key component to repetition 
in the mind of Constantin. In fact, the question of whether repetition is possible “practically 
immobilized” him, so he decides to experiment on the possibility himself by taking a trip.318 
At the end of the section, after conceding failure, the despairing Constantin announces that 
his new symbol is the coach horn. “A coach horn has infinite possibilities, and the person 
who puts it to his mouth and puts his wisdom into it can never be guilty of a repetition,” he 
writes.319 But a coach horn is also a symbol of motion. Repetition has paralyzed him and he 
desires freedom. “Farewell!” he exclaims to the “hope of youth” and, presumably, to the 
concept of repetition.320 This, of course, drips with the irony that Kierkegaard loved, as he 
explains in the open letter that he must have resisted publishing because the irony would die 
with the public’s knowledge of the letter. Constantin fears repetition almost as much as he 	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does not believe in it. Though he searches it out, it seems that he never truly desires 
repetition in its religious sense. Perhaps he undertakes his experiment in order to prove it 
does not exist, for he seems desperately unaware of repetitions all around him throughout.  
 His experiment is to travel to Berlin for a second time, which will seem fraught with 
problems as a scientific experiment, the first indication of which is on the coach ride to 
Berlin. After a brief complaint about the discomfort one experiences riding on a coach, he 
recounts his last trip on the “end seat forward inside the carriage.” It was an unpleasant ride, 
so “hoping at least to remain a limb on a lesser body, [he] chose a seat in the forward 
compartment. That was a change. Everything, however, repeated itself.”321 This last 
statement is difficult to take seriously. If there were a change, then there would have been no 
repetition. Thus, the experiment fails before it begins. Nevertheless, Constantin carries 
through and includes other dubious episodes that suggest that he is perhaps even oblivious to 
repetition. Consider that the time of year is not the same and thus the city of Berlin is acting 
in a different way than they had previously. He arrives in Berlin on the allgemeine Busz und 
Bettag,322 so the general ethos of the town was different than before. This would seem to 
prohibit repetition, “but this is of little concern to [his] project. This discovery had no 
connection with ‘repetition,’ for the last time [he] was in Berlin [he] had not noticed this 
phenomenon.”323 At this early point in the narrative, the reader should be aware of the 
flippancy of Constantin’s experiment. He seems to dismiss certain aspects that might have 
been important. 
 The almost farcical attempts at his repetition continue even as he appropriately 
attends a farce at the theatre. As time proceeds his desire for repetition grows, but he is 
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unable to make a religious movement. The repetition he desires is not the repetition that 
Kierkegaard promotes, but one that cannot be actualized. Constantin’s understanding of 
repetition is false because it focuses too much on the ideal of the past—and in that Hegelian 
sense it is internalised as idealised. As Holm writes, “The backward direction [of 
recollection]... goes from real to ideal, from reality to language, or as Goethe terms it, from 
the particular to the universal. Conversely, the divine repetition and allegory share the 
foreward-going [sic] pace from respectively, the ideal to the real, and from language’s ‘base’ 
to the reality.”324 In the end, Constantin will deem repetition impossible, but not before 
despairing once more of repetition itself. He does experience repetition at his home, but “of 
the wrong kind.”325   
Constantin’s words contradict each other. There is no repetition, but there is 
repetition of the wrong kind. The words and actions of Constantin Constantius mean to point 
us ironically beyond him to the thoughts of Kierkegaard himself. The entire first half of the 
book is somewhat absurd. Even the play that Constantin attends is a farce, which is hardly an 
accident.  
A farce is not repetitive but free. It inspires multiple interpretations by different 
individual audiences and different individuals within the audience. It follows no repetitive 
formula like a comedy or tragedy.326 In short, it is absurd. And it is absurdity that is the 
vehicle for the true, divine repetition. The prototype of repetition by virtue of the absurd is 
Job, who receives everything back double despite his stance against God. The young man is 
aware of this in the character of Job. And the second half of Repetition contains the letters of 
the young man on this topic.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Isak Winkel Holm, "Rhetorical Reading," 26. 
325 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 169. 
326 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 160. 
 118	  
 The young man’s story begins in the first section of Repetition, but in some ways it 
precedes the book altogether. The young man and Kierkegaard have much in common, 
particularly in their romantic lives. Constantin meets the young man and learns that he has 
fallen in love with an unnamed woman. His love is overwhelming, but it soon becomes 
evident that the young man is in love with an idea and not an actuality. He still longs for the 
woman, but goes through suffering beyond that of ordinary heartbreak. 
 Constantin’s advice is for the young man to transform himself into “a contemptible 
person whose only delight is to trick and deceive.” He also tells him to be “inconstant” and 
“nonsensical.”327 Constantin, however, is the one who is inconstant in his understanding of 
repetition, as shown above. But Constantin accuses the young man of not believing in 
repetition at this point and wonders if he did, “what great things might have come from 
him.”328 Eventually the tables turn and Constantin is the one who denies that repetition exists 
while the young man is on the cusp of grasping it. 
 This table-turning occurs in the second half of Repetition. The section begins with 
Constantin describing the aftermath of his previous advice in the time elapsed. The young 
man had left the country in order to escape his troubles, but Constantin had feared him dead. 
One day, though, the young man sends Constantin a letter and follows that one up with 
several more, spaced about a month apart from each other. The letters do not invite 
correspondence, but are only one sided. The young man gives no return address and seems 
only to want to speak with no interruptions or advice. Constantin prints the letters and adds 
no editorial comments until after the last one. These letters contain the young man’s 
interpretation of Job. 
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 Though the young man’s situation regarding the girl may seem trivial to the reader 
compared to Job’s situation, the discrepancy does not stop the young man from identifying 
with Job. One will recall that this is in line with Kierkegaard’s discourse published a few 
months afterward. Anyone can identify with Job, because everyone has gained and lost 
possessions. Burgess, in fact, views the young man as a good example of a Joban pupil as 
described in the discourse.329 However, the young man goes beyond the prologue of Job and 
can compare himself with Job throughout the biblical book. His main desire is a repetition, 
something Constantin accuses him of not believing in. It is not altogether clear if the young 
man does believe in repetition, but it is what he desires. Just as Job receives everything back 
double at the end of his eponymous book, the young man desires his life back at the end of 
his anonymous letters. 
The young man’s letters 
 Constantin Constantius introduces the second section by analysing the young man’s 
main problem with the woman. Constantin does not think that the young man can win the 
girl back, thus only absurdity can accomplish this “repetition.” The woman herself is not an 
actuality but has become an ideal in the mind of the young man, a “reflexion of motions 
within him.”330 Thus, the problem that must be reconciled is the split within the young man 
himself. Repetition is a re-taking of himself and this, it turns out, is too transcendent for 
Constantin.331 At this point, Constantin compares himself and his mindset to that of 
philosophers and professors who think only in the immanent. The young man does not seek 
counsel from Constantin or other worldly thinkers, but from Job, “an unprofessional 
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thinker.”332 Here is the first instance that Constantin and the young man will play roles in the 
Job narrative. Constantin, so the young man seems to think, shares much in common with 
Job’s friends. He is earnest in his advice, but the advice does not meet the particularity of the 
young man. It is based too much on the universality of scientific thinkers. What Job 
experiences is absurd and the young man feels the same about his own experience.  
 This role-play will work itself out in the young man’s letters. He sends a letter every 
month for about a half a year and each letter exemplifies a stage in the narrative of Job. The 
epistolary medium allows the young man to express himself through each stage using the 
emotion he is experiencing at that particular moment, rather than a long explanation from a 
singular point of view. That is, each letter has a different tone, which is important in 
understanding Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Job. As the letters progress from one month to 
the next, one witnesses the slow transformation of the young man from aesthete to the 
beginning stages of the religious. There is trepidatious confusion at the beginning (prologue 
of Job) followed by rage (chapters 3-27) followed by a movement of faith at the end 
(chapters 29-31, where Job withdraws from dialoguing with his friends to plead his final 
defence to God) to wait for God to meet him in the thunderstorm (chapters 38-42). 
Kierkegaard’s Job becomes evident throughout the series of letters and the young man 
exemplifies Kierkegaard’s hermeneutic in a rather extreme way. 
Delecroix argues, in fact, that the young man “fournit le texte kierkegaardien d’un 
authentique procès de lecture.”333 Delecroix lays out three principles of a Kierkegaardian 
understanding of a text through reading: 1) “Rejet d’une compréhension explicative… au 
profit d’une relation interne et ambivalente entre le lecteur singulier et le texte.” Thus, one 
determines meaning through the rhetoric of a text rather than the elements. 2) “L’incertitude 	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objective qui caractérise le sens du texte est en réalité l’avantage donné à l’émergence d’une 
véritable subjectivité qui, dans l’acte de trancher (du sens), se révèle à elle-même en même 
temps qu’elle choisit, par le biais de propositions le monde qu’elle comprend, la forme de 
son existence.” 3) “Il y a… un moment où, dans l’opération de lecture, le sujet qui lit est ce 
qui est lu (le texte est, littéralement, approprié).”334 The young man clearly follows these 
principles Delecroix proposes, particularly the third, when the young man is appropriated by 
the text of Job, as will be explained below. He will identify with the posture of Job rather 
than his literal message; he will appropriate those around him into the text’s antagonists; and 
he will allow the text of Job to read him.  
15 August  
 The first letter by the young man does not reference Job explicitly despite being the 
longest of his missives. Addressed to “My Silent Confidant,” it works mainly as an 
explanation of his current situation. He has left Copenhagen, symbolic of his absence to 
himself, and has forced Constantin into being silent by including no return address. The 
reader also begins to see the young man’s displeasure in Constantin’s friendship. 
Constantin’s advice cannot relate to his current predicament. 
 Though the letter has no explicit reference to Job, it foreshadows the young man’s 
imminent identification with the biblical character. It also alludes to Kierkegaard’s 
comparison of Job and Abraham. At around the third page, while questioning Constantin’s 
advice to sacrifice himself for the sake of the girl, the young man alludes to the trial upon 
which Job puts God while playing with the idea of becoming an unusual hero—“not in the 
eyes of the world but to oneself—to be able to appeal to nothing in defence against men but 
to live imprisoned within one’s own personality, to have in oneself one’s own witness, one’s 	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own judge, one’s own prosecuting attorney, and in oneself the only one.”335  Just as 
Abraham in Fear and Trembling, Job is a solitary figure. The crowd does not understand 
him. Thus the young man will eventually identify with Job. Unlike Abraham, Job tries to 
contend with his friends, who do not understand him. Abraham tells no one of his plans. Job 
must eventually lay everything into God’s hands after his exasperating conversations while 
Abraham seems all too aware of the world’s opinion before his trial begins. So the young 
man will identify with Job, not Abraham, since he has an analogue to Job’s friends in 
Constantin Constantius.  
 The young man, in response to Constantin’s advice remarks, “It is true, every word is 
true, but it is a truth so very cold and logical, as if the world were dead. It does not convince 
me, it moves me not.”336 Just as the friends rely on cold logic with Job’s complaints, the 
young man sees Constantin doing the same with him. In both cases, the friends cannot see 
beyond their own knowledge. They have no imagination to see beyond the general 
consensus. The friends of Job cannot imagine that Job has done nothing wrong and yet still 
felt what they perceive is the wrath of God. Thus Job is all alone and must plead his case to 
God alone, the only one with the vantage point to rule in favour of such an absurd 
possibility. It is only a matter of time before the young man identifies with Job. Once he 
does so, he does not hold back. 
19 September  
 The second letter is an extended identification with Job. In fact, though it is 
addressed to the same “My Silent Confidant,” Constantin plays no part in it. Throughout the 
letter, the second person is played only by Job himself. The young man’s emotion comes to 
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the fore right away as he repeats the name of Job three times: “Job! Job! O Job! Is that really 
all you said, those beautiful words: The Lord gave, and the Lord took away blessed be the 
name of the Lord?”337 Perhaps Job repeated those words as a mantra. Perhaps he remained 
silent for seven days. The young man seems to be picking Job’s brain so that he can enter it 
himself. Job’s method of repetition becomes the young man’s and faith becomes a 
possibility for the young man. 
 The young man is enraptured by Job’s bravery in the face of God. Certainly this is 
more effective than comforting oneself with words one knows are not true. Thus the friends 
do not fear God so much as they are cowards before him. Job, on the other hand, truly fears 
God even while complaining, for he treats God as if he had his own personality rather than 
as an impersonal force. The young man desires the same of himself and encourages Job to 
continue his complaints so that he may follow suit. He understands that his trial seems trivial 
compared to that of Job, but suggests, as does Kierkegaard in the upbuilding discourse, that 
“one who owned very little may indeed also have lost everything… he, too, has in a sense 
been stricken with malignant sores.”338 
 This letter contains several explicit references to the dialogues of Job as well as Job’s 
first words. The young man refers to Job’s final defence of his ethical behaviour in chapter 
29, in particular: “You who in your prime were the sword of the oppressed.”339 He also 
references chapters 7 and 9, which are early defences of Job. The sentiments of chapter 7 are 
evident in the young man’s complaints. Job responds to his friends’ explanations in chapter 6 
with his own side of the story, but eventually changes his focus to God. His friends become 
invisible in the second half of the speech and his addressee becomes God. The young man 
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has yet to reach this stage, but he has alternated from speaking to Constantin in the first letter 
to speaking directly to Job in the second, imitating Job’s rhetorical technique. In the 
following letters, I contend that the young man will take over the personality of Job and 
instead of addressing him, address God as Job would have done. 
11 October 
 Roughly one month after addressing Job directly, the young man begins to identify 
with him in a different way. The October letter is, like the others, addressed to “My Silent 
Confidant,” but the addressee in this letter does not seem to be Job and does not seem to be 
Constantin Constantius either. Taking his cue from Job, he addresses God. The “Silent 
Confidant” is the God who waits for 37 chapters to speak to Job. It is when Job is at the end 
of his rope, yet still maintains his innocence, that God speaks. Job pleads his case and sits 
and waits for God to speak and so the young man does the same.  
 The young man begins the letter with a series of questions that only God can answer. 
He asks, “How did I get into the world?”340 Later he asks, “How did it happen that I became 
guilty? Or am I not guilty?”341 He even seems to wonder if there is a God who can answer 
him. He writes, “And if I am compelled to be involved, where is the manager—I have 
something to say about this. Is there no manager? To whom shall I make my complaint?”342 
In any case, the “manager,” even in questioning his existence, displays his desire to speak to 
a superior in the way that Job does. He does not mention Job explicitly in the letter and one 
wonders if that is because he has become Job. Many of the questions he asks could have 
been from the mouth of Job and he concludes that he is “still in the right.”343 His situation, 
he reminds us, is that he has broken off his engagement with the girl for a reason that he 	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seems unable to explain. Nevertheless, despite the limits of language and its ability to 
express these inner feelings, he maintains that he is still in the right. Others may disagree 
with him, but they do not have the perspective that he has on the situation. In much the same 
way, the friends of Job cannot see how Job can be in the right. They cannot reconcile what 
has happened to Job with what Job claims he has done or has not done. But they do not have 
Job’s perspective on his own life. So the young man, seeing this dilemma, can identify with 
Job and enters into Job, appropriating Job’s stance as his own.344 
 The young man also makes a veiled reference to Job’s parody of Psalm 8. Job 7:17, 
18 reads, “What are human beings that you make so much of them, that you give them so 
much attention, that you examine them every morning and test them every moment?” The 
young man, who will admit later that he does not quote Job directly, asks, “Must I perhaps 
repent that the world plays with me as a child plays with a beetle?”345 So the young man has 
appropriated Job into himself in more than just attitude. 
 The young man signs this letter, not as he has in the past with “your nameless 
friend,” but with “your devoted.” If the addressee is God, here, the relationship would be 
different than it would have been between the young man and Constantin or Job. If the 
young man is to appropriate Job’s attitude, he must also place himself under God’s trust by 
trusting in God. Despite his exasperation and confusion in the matter at hand, he recognizes 
that Job never lessens his devotion to God. Thus the young man devotes himself to his silent 
confidant, God. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 One might note a discrepancy between Job and the young man in that Job is a passive recipient of 
misfortune while the young man actively engages in the life of Job. By the end of the letters, the young man 
seems to have realized the discrepancy on his own and chooses to let go. Of course, even here, the young man 
cannot escape the dilemma if the key to his hermeneutic is to actively appropriate a character. 
345 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 202. 
 126	  
15 November 
 Constantin Constantius seems the likeliest of addressees of the November letter. The 
young man discusses Job and God in the third person, but curiously, the letter ends without 
salutations or a signature. The nameless young man even lacks a title. One must wonder if 
this gives rise to a text-critical issue in the manuscripts of Kierkegaard. On the other hand, 
the tone and message of the letter are quite unique and so the missing finale signifies that the 
young man is perhaps identifying with Job in another way. The young man spends the 
majority of this significantly less harried letter laying out his hermeneutical method of 
reading Job. The young man is not interested in scientific analysis of an ancient document. 
Rather, he is wholly subjective in his analysis, reading Job “with the eyes of the heart, in a 
clairvoyance.”346 
 What is also noteworthy in the letter is that the young man claims to refuse to speak 
the words of Job with anyone else present. Mackey contends that this is because “as the 
language of God, Job cannot be quoted.”347 But that does not stop the young man from 
quoting Job while he is alone. His problem does not seem to be with Job but with 
Constantin. He writes, “I do not even have the heart to write one single outcry from him in a 
letter to you, even though I find my joy in transcribing over and over everything he has 
said.”348 Later, he states, “I stand up and read in a loud voice, almost shouting, some passage 
by him.”349 At this point in his journey, the multitude has replaced his life as the meaningless 
one. The crowd cannot handle the words of Job.  
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 The young man, on the other hand, experiences freedom in the words. They are 
always fresh to him. He can and does repeat the words of Job because there is freedom in the 
repetition. Repetition is now something that the young man believes in and desires. He still 
experiences anxiety when thinking of the infinite possibilities of eternity, but he can identify 
with Job’s words in a way that he could not before. He goes back and reads through them 
again, beginning with the silence before Job’s outburst. He senses the absurdity of them, the 
crowd cannot understand, but the young man has exhausted all other possibilities and one 
arrives at repetition when all other possibilities have been exhausted. 
14 December 
 The tone of the December letter is markedly subdued compared to the previous ones. 
The young man writes with confidence and reservation and, like Job, “trusts that God can” 
solve his problems.350 Job is confident that he is in the right and, despite the conclusions 
drawn by his friends, upholds his convictions. His friends give suggestions that could relieve 
his suffering, but Job recognizes that pleading guilty for a lighter sentence is beyond wrong, 
it is demonic. The friends focus on the result and work from there. Job, however, focuses on 
God. He does not place him under “ethical determinants,” but loves and trusts him as an 
independent and subjective personality.351 For the friends, everything is established, while 
Job treats everything as free, with infinite possibilities.  
 This conclusion is absurd, of course.352 And so the young man introduces another 
category to explain Job’s situation. “The whole thing is an ordeal.”353 The young man 
explains later, “Job’s significance is that the disputes at the boundaries of faith are fought out 
in him, that the colossal revolt of the wild and aggressive powers of passion is presented 	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here.”354 Job’s ordeal is transcendent—it cannot be explained by science or ethics or even 
dogmatics because these are too objective. The situation in which Job finds himself relates 
him directly to God with no mediator. These other areas cannot give birth to repetition, as 
Constantin found. Rather, repetition can only come by God. This puts Job in direct conflict 
with his friends who view Job’s situation under ethical determinants.355 However, Job’s 
friends seem incapable of viewing Job’s situation as “religious” because to them it actually 
looks like godlessness, isolating Job even further from his friends who, despite working 
from the ethical stage, do so in the guise of the religious stage.356 The ordeal, therefore, acts 
as a sign of Job’s intense God-relationship in that no one else participates in that particular 
ordeal other than Job and God. 
 The young man ends the letter with “your devoted” again, but the addressee is clearly 
Constantin. The frustrations that Constantin has brought upon the young man do not change 
their relationship. Job’s friends remain his friends, despite their wrong-headedness. In fact, 
the young man will sign the last three letters this way before experiencing his own storm. 
 Note that at this point, the young man still lacks much similarity with Job despite 
imitating the biblical character. Like Constantin, the young man is still interested in 
results.357 He wants what Job received and so follows Job’s lead. Job, on the other hand, did 
not know what he would receive. He bases his posture on his principles rather than on any 
expectation of what might happen because of his stance. He is confident that God would 
declare him in the right, but does not betray any knowledge that God might reward him with 
material goods. The young man will begin to learn this in the later letters.  
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13 January 
 The January letter is short and acts mainly as a conclusion of the young man’s 
exegesis of Job. The thunderstorm is over in the Job narrative and the young man uses the 
conclusion of the biblical story to anticipate his own repetition. Job remains friends with 
Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar and God has given him everything double. Job has stood up to 
God and God has rebuked him. But he is blessed because of it. The young man foreshadows 
this in the November letter when he writes that every word of Job “is laid upon my sick heart 
as a God’s-hand-plaster. Indeed, on whom did God lay his hand as on Job!”358 The hand of 
God can hurt and heal and either is preferable to nothing. And yet it is difficult to determine 
the difference between punishment and praise by God in this absurd world. In January, the 
young man writes, “Was Job proved to be in the wrong?  Yes, eternally, for there is no 
higher court that the one that judged him. Was Job proved to be in the right?  Yes, eternally, 
by being proved to be in the wrong before God.”359 After reading the book of Job, the young 
man can believe in repetition, but admits that it is elusive. Repetition occurs “when every 
thinkable human certainty and probability were impossible.”360 The friends believed that 
repetition occurred at the submission to punishment, but Job knew that he did not deserve it 
so the perceived punishment was not actually punishment at all. 
 But the repetition for Job is not that he received everything material back. Rather, 
Job received himself back. He was proved to be in the right by God, just as he was in the 
right before the wager between God and the Satan. Thus his person was no longer split. He 
became present to himself again. The young man wants the girl back, but his real desire is to 
be present to himself. Whether the young man was ever present to himself in the past as Job 
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might have been is beside the point. True repetition is transcendent. Job’s material items are 
merely a symbol of the repetition if they are even that. The young man may not fully 
understand this at this point. It is only after his own storm that this will become evident to 
him. 
17 February 
 Whereas Constantin Constantius chooses the coach horn as his symbol and desires 
mobility at the end of the first section, the young man chooses immobility in order to bring 
on repetition. This recount of the young man’s position, his “standing suspenso gradu,” acts 
as an inclusio to Constantin’s announcement at the beginning of the book that the idea of 
repetition immobilised him.361 The young man has decided to let go and wait for a 
thunderstorm like Job in chapter 31 who had nothing more to say and so stopped speaking. 
His friends stopped speaking as well because Job was righteous in his own eyes (32:1). The 
young man mimics Job, but with the benefit of hindsight. Job was not aware of what would 
happen to him, the young man is hoping for the same thing that happened to Job.  
 To be fair, the young man is open to the possibility of the impossibility of repetition, 
but it is repetition he desires. What he believes repetition will mean for him is that it will 
make him fit to be a husband. He will receive the girl again without the anxiety that kept him 
from following through with that relationship. But this will require him to change drastically, 
so much so that he will not even recognize himself. 
 It is clear that he is not sure that this is what he wants. However, he has exhausted all 
other possibilities. There is nothing else for him to do but wait and have faith that he is in the 
right and the thunderstorm will come. It should be noted that he does not name the 
thunderstorm as God or as coming from God. The young man makes a religious move, as 	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Constantin suggests, but he comes across as an agnostic in several of his letters. Damgaard 
astutely notes that in the October letter, the young man asks for a “manager” [Dirigent] and 
even wonders if there is no manager, whereas in the book of Job, no one even questions the 
existence of God despite the inability to answer to God’s seeming inactivity.362 Even in the 
letter addressed to God, God is not explicitly mentioned and, if it is God, God is “silent.” So 
the young man is still far from Job in this sense.  
 However, the young man is aware of the concept of God as presented in the book of 
Job and his desire is for God to meet him in a thunderstorm however impossible that seems. 
The young man waits, and does not write Constantin again for three months. 
31 May 
 Before the last letter arrives, Constantin Constantius interjects with some incidental 
observations. Constantin has no confidence in the storm for which the young man awaits. He 
believes the young man must be delusional to make a religious move. The objective truth, 
what he calls sagacity, would have been the only true option the young man would have had, 
according to Constantin. Constantin is confident enough in his own advice that he believes 
that the young man made a mistake in not taking it.  
 Constantin represents at least two people outside of the narrative in Repetition. The 
first is the Hegelian who believes that “the idea… is the most reliable in the world.”363 The 
Hegelian is, of course, a common foil for Kierkegaard, so this is no surprise, but Constantin 
also represents Elihu here. The young man places Elihu alongside the friends of Job in the 
December letter. Elihu, the patient observer who has heard the debate on both sides, rises up 
after Job has finished speaking to explain one more time that Job is receiving punishment for 	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his sins.364 Here, after having heard all that the young man has said, Constantin still denies 
the existence of repetition. However, he does not view the young man as being punished in 
an archaic religious system, but rather he is not capitulating to the dominant system of the 
day—Hegelianism. Kierkegaard seems to see Hegelianism as a new manifestation of 
retributive theology, a system in its own right, detaching itself from human experience in 
order to gain an objective perspective of it.365 As Stephen Crites notes, Kierkegaard views 
Hegel as a continuation of the Greek concept of recollection versus the Christian repetition. 
The world-historical system that makes up Hegel’s philosophy of history does not allow for 
the individual’s decisive moment that brings the past Christ event to the present, disrupting 
the organic temporal. The “simple continuity” of Hegelian history is an offense to the 
freedom of repetition.366 The religious stage for Kierkegaard, by contrast, works not within a 
fixed, deterministic order, but with and against a personality. 
 When the young man writes Constantin, he announces that the girl has married. And 
despite his desires in the previous letter, he has experienced a repetition. He thought that a 
repetition was that he would receive the girl back, but it is really that he receives himself 
back. He revises his thesis on Job’s repetition after his own subjective experience counters 
his previous hypothesis. “I am unified again,” he writes.  
Compared with such a repetition, what is a repetition of worldly possessions, which 
is indifferent toward the qualification of the spirit? Only his children did Job not 
receive double again, for a human life cannot be redoubled that way. Here only 
repetition of the spirit is possible, even though it is never so perfect in time as in 
eternity, which is the true repetition.367 
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What the young man discovers is that the epilogue to the book of Job has deceived him. 
When Job receives everything back double, it is only a bonus. The true repetition comes 
when God declares Job in the right. It comes when Job receives a “double sense of [his 
life’s] meaning.”368 What he knows about the world had been validated. The truth comes not 
from a system akin to mathematics, but by virtue of the absurd. The young man becomes 
himself again when he finds out that the girl had married. Even acknowledging the storm 
does not prepare him for it. 
 He finishes his letter with jubilation. He praises feminine generosity, the freedom of 
which symbolises the freedom of eternity and the freedom of repetition. The praise 
overwhelms the last lines. There is no salutation, suggesting that the praise continues on to 
eternity. The finale is free, the goal of repetition. 
Conclusion 
The letters of the young man present the reader with a gradual unveiling of an 
interpretation of the book of Job. The young man clearly knows the Book of Job well before 
he even sends the letters since he admits to having read it repeatedly. But he does not fully 
understand the book until he experiences something similar to Job. The two characters’ 
experiences do not resemble each other much physically, but spiritually. The young man 
reflects the character of Job a great deal, at least to himself. 
At the conclusion of the letters, the young man claims both he and Job have 
experienced repetitions. On the surface, however, this would not seem to be the case. Job 
receives everything he lost back times two except for his children. The young man, though, 
does not receive any physical remuneration for the ordeal he underwent. The young man, at 
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that point in his own narrative, claims that Job’s belongings must be irrelevant to his 
repetition. The young man receives himself back “and in such a way that [he has] a double 
appreciation of what this means.”369 The worldly goods have little relevance in this spiritual 
repetition.  
This revelation of the young man bears general hermeneutical import as well as 
significance in Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Job in particular. Job’s singular experience, 
where a blameless person loses everything he owns and receives it back again, can still be 
appropriated spiritually by someone like the young man. 
The transcendence of a true repetition means that one receives oneself back, not 
people or things outside of oneself. Job proves himself to be in the right by God, thus his 
person is no longer split. The young man wants his betrothed back, but he finds that his real 
desire is to become present to himself. 
The key to understanding Job to the young man lies in Job’s bravery in the face of 
God. Certainly this is more effective than comforting oneself with words one knows are not 
true. Thus the friends do not fear God so much as they are cowards before him. Job, on the 
other hand, truly fears God even while complaining, for he treats God as a free agent rather 
than as if God is an impersonal force. 
The hand of God can hurt and heal and either is preferable to nothing according to 
both Job and the young man. However, it is difficult to determine the difference between 
punishment and praise by God in this absurd world. In January, the young man writes, “Was 
Job proved to be in the wrong? Yes, eternally, for there is no higher court than the one that 
judged him. Was Job proved to be in the right? Yes, eternally, by being proved to be in the 	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wrong before God.”370 The November letter presents God’s touch as ambiguous. It is 
violent, but it is also benevolent because it comes from God. 
 Looking at Kierkegaard’s two works on Job, published within a few short months 
from each other, one might struggle to notice any similarities. In one, Job remembers, in the 
other, he repeats. One is a very close reading and earnest portrayal of the Job of the prologue 
while the other is an artistic portrayal of the poetic sections. The Job of the discourse 
epitomises the “patient Job” of the Christian tradition while the Job of Repetition is 
contentious, intransigent, and even seems to flounder about while searching for the correct 
response to his loss. 
 One might be tempted to argue that Kierkegaard has chosen to separate the two 
different tales of Job in the canonical book as a type of form-critical reading. The earnest and 
prosaic style of the discourses matches well the prose narrative of the pious Job. Likewise, 
the poetic young man matches the Job of the poetic section—Constantin after all does 
proclaim the young man a poet.371 Perhaps Kierkegaard found the two sections of the book 
of Job irreconcilable for a critic and chose to interpret them separately. We cannot know for 
sure what his motives were, but there is some sense to this logic. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 212. The young man’s assertion that Job is in the wrong before God relates to 
Kierkegaard’s theology, which stems from his Lutheran background. Gerhard Ebeling outlines well Luther’s 
theological anthropology as based on what he calls “coram-relationship”. (Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: An 
Introduction to His Thought, trans. R. A. Wilson (London: Collins, 1972), 192-202.) Luther describes one 
“becoming a sinner” as “referring not merely to the falling into sin of a sinless person, but of the recognition by 
a sinner that he is a sinner, whereby he first becomes a sinner in the strict sense.” (page 197.) In Luther’s 
thought, one becomes present to another through a face-to-face relationship. Coram corresponds well with the 
Hebrew word ־ינפל where the presence of one implies the presence of two people face-to-face. (see page 193.) 
Ebeling continues: “… the essential object of Luther’s thought when he considers this coram-relationship is 
presence in the strict sense, the presence which makes its object present. And the presence which makes its 
object present is God alone. Thus the fundamental situation of the coram-relationship is existence coram Deo, 
existence in the sight of God, in the presence of God, under the eyes of God, in the judgement of God, and in 
the word of God.” (page 199.) 
371 Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, 79. Constantin describes a poet as an exception, 
comparing the young man to Job in this regard, while drawing attention to the poetry of Job. 
 136	  
 On the other hand, while Kierkegaard focuses sharply on the prosaic Job in the 
discourse and the young man spends the majority of his letters in the poetic Job, both 
narrators use both sections of the book of Job to support their points. In the discourse, 
Kierkegaard elaborates on all that Job lost using Job’s descriptions in chapters 4 and 29.372 
In the September letter of Repetition, the young man briefly discusses Job 1:21.373 
 More importantly, Kierkegaard’s two different works on the book of Job act as 
complementary readings. By focusing in the discourse on the proverb of 1:20-21, showing 
Job at, ostensibly, his most pious, Kierkegaard reminds his readers that Job is radically 
monist. The Job of the prologue refuses to give the Sabeans credit for his loss, laying all of 
the “blame” on God. The flip side of Job’s pious belief in God’s sovereignty is that when he 
feels he does not deserve his misfortune, he can only look to God. Not so his friends, who 
place the blame on Job for not participating in the system they perceive at work in the world. 
Job, to be sure, is a believer in a version of this system as well during the early stages, but 
seems to feel it has been short-circuited in some way, hence his forensic challenge to God. 
The young man, like Job, has a vision of what a repetition consists in, which differs from 
Constantin’s vision. The young man seeks his repetition by following a system akin to his 
interpretation of the book of Job. What he realizes at the end, however, is that he cannot 
control the repetition since it occurs outside of a defined system. He comes to this realization 
and indirectly presents his reader with an interpretation of Job that views God as a 
personality not beholden to rules but as a free agent who sometimes acts in what a human 
might perceive as absurd.  
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Chapter 4: The Goodness of God Beyond Good and Evil: 
Wilhelm Vischer on Job as a                                                     
Witness to Jesus Christ 
 
 “Does Job fear God for nought?” The words of the Satan are the driving force behind 
Wilhelm Vischer’s exposition of the Book of Job, called, “Hiob, Ein Zeuge Jesu Christi.”374 
Many commentators find this an important verse, but do not imbue it with the same 
importance as Vischer. Throughout his exposition, this “for nought” is the one line he 
returns to over and over. It is the question the book intends to answer, he argues, and so he 
traces the idea through all 42 chapters to see how the book does answer the question. What 
he discovers, or at least intends to uncover for the reader, is that the question changes. A 
book that begins with a question about theological anthropology turns to a question about 
theology proper. It becomes evident to Vischer through the discourse that Job answers the 
first question in the affirmative. Job remains steadfast in his insistence that he is innocent, 
but not only that, he also remains steadfast in his devotion to God. Despite his feelings of 
betrayal by God, he continues to fear God. Vischer sees chapter 19 as the turning point in the 
book of Job, for though Job feels abandoned by God, he firmly believes that he will see God 
with his own eyes. Once Job affirms his devotion to God, Vischer argues that the question of 
the book changes to one on the nature of God’s righteousness.  
The means by which the Satan and God attempt to answer the question raises another 
question for Job and his friends. Vischer writes, “The original question whether God’s 
confidence is Job’s piety was justified has been changed more and more clearly in the 
speeches into the question whether Job’s trust in God’s goodness is justified.”375 Job’s 
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arguments with his friends deal mainly with the question of God’s righteousness and what it 
entails. Can one determine the nature of God’s goodness and righteousness based on the 
laws passed down from tradition or is God’s goodness a “goodness that lies beyond good 
and evil”?376  
 The conclusions at which Vischer arrives show how he fits into and contributes to the 
moral imagination that both Kierkegaard and Barth embody as well. The ethical world that 
the friends describe through the book is one of give and take. The economy of retribution is 
a universal code that anyone can parse with keen logic. Job knows that this is not the case 
and that code must not be above God. Echoing both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the God of 
Job suspends the ethical, for the goodness of God is beyond good and evil. This supersession 
of the ethical also relates to Barth’s insistence on seeing the book of Job as a discourse on 
the freedom of God. Vischer contends that not even the law that God lays forth can be over 
God himself. 
 What follows exposits Vischer’s exposition of the book of Job paying attention to his 
historical and cultural context, his method of interpretation, exegetical techniques, and 
theological presuppositions. The first section will examine his historical context, which I 
argue directly contributes to his unique interpretation of Job. As a Swiss outsider in 
interbellum Germany, his work on Job along with his similarly styled commentary on 
Esther, was a subversive comment on the political situation that gave rise to the Third Reich. 
The second section will follow his line of argument on the book of Job from the prologue 
through the dialogues and to the epilogue. His general method of interpretation will be 
evident through this exposition, but the third section will look at details of his discourse that 
betray his method of exegesis and attention to historical critical matters. The question will 
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arise as to how these details contribute to his overall argument as well as if some of his 
arguments require omissions of other important data. The final section will then examine his 
Christological interpretation and the theological and exegetical presuppositions that 
contribute to this typology or allow for it.  
Wilhelm Vischer, The Book of Job, and the so-called Judenfrage 
An Old Testament scholar during the height of the neo-Marcionite movement in the 
first half of the twentieth century, Vischer spent much of the early part of his career battling 
the hostile preconceptions concerning the Hebrew Scriptures. In retrospect, many find his 
approach overshoots his goal. His most famous work, an unfinished three volume 
commentary of the Hebrew Scriptures titled Das Christuszeugnis des Alten Testaments, 
roughly the Witness of the Old Testament to Christ, posits a typological and, some would 
argue, anachronistic approach to reading the Old Testament. But criticisms of his work tend 
toward anachronism themselves, failing to take into account Vischer’s own context and 
goals during this period. 
Throughout his works, Vischer engages in traditional Old Testament interpretation 
including historical criticism as well as more rhetorical approaches. However, Vischer never 
stops with exegesis. He was an ordained minister and felt compelled to write most of his 
works in order to edify the Church. Because he believed Christ to be the Word of God, he 
argued that the Bible, both Old and New Testaments, focus on Christ as well.377 
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Vischer delivered his lecture “Hiob, ein Zeuge Jesu Christi” in October of 1932,378 
just before Hitler claimed power in January of 1933 and about a year before the Nazis forced 
Vischer to step down from his teaching post at Bethel seminary. At that time he would move 
back to his home country of Switzerland. Though Hitler was not yet in control at the time 
Vischer presented his lecture, the political climate was ripe in Central Europe for official 
anti-Semitic policies. The Nazis did not transform Germany as much as they reflected the 
sentiments already present.  
 The timing of his mini-commentary on the Book of Job and its subsequent 
republications in journals such as Karl Barth’s Zwischen den Zeiten in late 1933 and in 
Bonhoeffer’s Bekennende Kirche in 1934, 1938, and 1942 and as “The Witness of Job to 
Jesus Christ” in The Evangelical Quarterly in early 1934 and in The Churchman in 1934379 
suggest a timely impact among Christians concerned with the political tenor of Germany in 
the mid 1930s. Indeed, the Evangelical Quarterly piece comes attached with a note from the 
translator Allan Ellison on the tenuous state of Bethel Seminary during the tumultuous times 
of the era. 
 After examining the general situation in the German Church during this dark period 
in Europe, I will examine Vischer’s role in the Confessing Church, specifically examining 
his essay on the book of Job as indicative of his prescient attitudes toward the Church, the 
state and, perhaps, the Jews. 
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The general situation in the German Church 
 Looking back at the relationship between the church, the Third Reich, and the Jews 
during the early 1930’s, one tends to dichotomize the church into one of two camps—the 
German Christian camp and the Confessing Church. Reality, of course, points to a much 
more complicated situation. The Christians who criticized or opposed the Nazis did not 
make up a monolithic consciousness but displayed a series of complex attitudes toward the 
state and the Jews. Stephen Haynes discusses this in an article on “Jews and Judaism in Anti-
Nazi Religious Discourse” arguing that the Confessing Church, despite its quasi-heroic 
status among many in retrospect, perhaps seemed so ineffective in quelling Nazi aggression 
toward the Jews because it actively did very little to stop it. Haynes points out that the 
Confessing Church “never officially protested the Nuremberg Laws… the Barmen 
Declaration of 1934 avoided a direct encounter with the ‘Jewish Question,’ …Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer decided early on that prospects of effective resistance to Nazism did not exist in 
the ecclesiastical realm, and… after Kristallnacht, the confessors responded to Nazi anti-
Jewish actions only when they affected church members.”380 This list, sadly, describes some 
of the more benign responses to the oppression of the Church by the state. All too 
commonly, the church’s defence of itself from the Nazis merely deferred persecution toward 
the Jews.381  
 Other attitudes did, however, emerge that expressed more tolerance for the Jews, 
including attempts to protect the Jewish people from further persecution, but these had their 
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Jewish people by virtue of their genetic relationship to Jesus and Christianity. The most 
well-known practitioner of this theory is Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer, early in the Nazi 
takeover, described the Jews as mysterious wanderers, tossed to and fro by the course of 
history, and in some ways paints them as passive characters not in control of their own 
destiny to the point that their suffering came from divine necessity.382  
 What hovers over these attitudes and actions of Christians and neo-Pagans between 
the wars is the so-called Judenfrage or “Jewish Question.” Broadly stated, what must one do 
with the Jews who seem reluctant to assimilate into the European or German cultures? What 
began as a cultural and religious issue, though, increasingly led to questions of race. If the 
Jews are a cultural or religious problem, assimilation always seems possible, but if one 
perceives race to be at the root of the problem, the desire for assimilation increasingly leads 
to the necessity of extermination. 
 Wilhelm Vischer distinguishes himself from his contemporaries throughout this 
period, eventually leading to his ouster from Germany because of his views on the Jews and 
the Old Testament. By way of explanation, let us look briefly at some of his other works 
written around the same period as his Job essay. The three versions of the Bethel Confession 
illustrate the political and theological situation of the time well. Though many scholars 
contributed to the 1933 Lutheran creed, Vischer only worked on the second draft, called the 
August Version. Vischer specifically penned the section titled “The Church and the Jews,” 
much of which finds its way into his interpretation of Esther several years later, perhaps 
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NSDAP, Gerhard Kittel wrote a famous tract Die Judenfrage, which encourages the assimilated Jew to accept 
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because the final editors omitted much of his most pointed comments.383 The final version, 
“the November Version,” flattens the most pro-Jewish comments and even inserts some that 
one could perceive as pejorative, including a line concerning the  “Judaistic enthusiasm” that 
distinguishes the faith of the Jewish Christian from the Gentile Christian by blood.384 This 
line aside, the November Version’s section on the Church and the Jews mainly argues that 
the anti-Semitism of the state interferes with the Church’s job in converting and baptizing 
the Jews. 
 Both versions emphasize the importance of the church’s mission to the Jews. 
However, Vischer’s August version contains several references to the Jewish people’s 
chosen status with God. Vischer calls them a “sacred remnant” and “the chosen people” and 
contends that God remains “faithful to Israel.” This clearly coincides with Bonhoeffer’s 
“mystery people” thesis and indeed Bonhoeffer preferred the August version to the 
subsequent final draft from November. But along with the mythic status that Vischer seems 
to grant to the Jews, he also writes that “it can never in any case be the mission of any nation 
to take revenge on the Jews for the murder committed at Golgotha,”385 thus anticipating and 
attempting to diffuse any violence committed upon the Jews in the future. Significantly, the 
later editors of the November version omit this line. They also omit a line that strikes an 
eerily foreboding note years before Kristallnacht. In the August Version Vischer writes,       
“ ‘Gentile’ Christians should be ready to expose themselves to persecution before they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Charles Ford, “Bonhoeffer, Luther, and the German Resistance,” Dietrich Bonhoeffer Conference (2006), 
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384 November version of Bethel Confession acquired from www.lutheranwiki.org. 
385 “The Bethel Confession: August Version,” 
www.lutheranwiki.org/The_Bethel_Confession:_August_Version#The_Church_and_the_Jews (accessed 20 
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ready to betray in even a single case, voluntarily or under compulsion, the church’s 
fellowship with Jewish Christians that is instituted in the Word and sacrament.”386  
 Another of Vischer’s works at the time was his essay “Esther,”387 which shares 
much in common with his interpretation of Job, in that it finishes a brief commentary on the 
book with a series of parallels between the story of Esther and the story of Jesus. Without 
going too deeply into his interpretation of Esther, I should point out that Vischer makes it 
very clear, by examining the agents of Jesus’ crucifixion, that both Jews and Gentiles, that is 
the entire human race, share the guilt in the death of Christ. He does not excuse Pilate since 
Pilate was the ultimate agent of the crucifixion, a method of execution that the Jews would 
not allow themselves to use. More importantly, Vischer claims that God “vindicates His 
election and conservation of Israel, and fulfils all His promises to His chosen people” 
because Jesus died as the King of the Jews.388 He even argues that the crucifixion and 
resurrection atones, not only for the sins between people and God but between Jew and non-
Jew. In their collusion against Jesus, they “both live solely by His grace, which is proffered 
to them in the message that God has made One to be a curse and gloriously raised Him up 
again because He has mercy on all.”389  
 Vischer claims God answers the Jewish Question in Christ since Christ, as the King 
of the Jews, dies by the hand of Jews and Gentiles alike and rises from the dead for all, 
precluding any need to discuss the Jewish Question. On the other hand, Vischer does not 
claim that the equality between Jews and Gentiles obviates discussion of Jewish peculiarity 
in total. The Jews and Gentiles can claim equal citizenship in the Kingdom of God, but God 
does not revoke his promise to either.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 "The Bethel Confession: August Version." 
387 Wilhelm Vischer, “Esther,” TEH Heft 48 (1937). 
388 Wilhelm Vischer, “Esther,” EQ 11, no. 2 (1939), 15. 
389 Wilhelm Vischer, "Esther 1939," 15. 
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He goes on to suggest that the delay in Christ’s return results from the Jews’ refusal 
to convert. He calls for the preservation of the Jews as opposed to the discrimination of them 
because they remain a central aspect of the Christian mission. God desires their salvation, 
Vischer interprets from Paul, and cannot “invalidate this possibility of salvation” since God 
does not break promises.390 
 Vischer’s interpretation of Esther uses the entire corpus of Scripture to argue for the 
relenting of discrimination against the Jews in central Europe. In the end, though some may 
view his argumentation as archaic, one must not fail to see his purpose in writing as well as 
his audience. Rolf Rendtorff notes Vischer’s uniqueness in his day in that he struggled with 
the position the Jews held in biblical studies and theology while most simply ignored the 
issue altogether.391 Vischer’s stance against the dominant voices of the day should be 
considered nothing less than brave. Just four weeks after Hitler’s call for a boycott of all 
Jews and their businesses, to begin in April 1933,392 Vischer presented to a conference in 
Lemgo an essay called “Zur Judenfrage,” which consisted of three main theses: 
1. die vom Neuen Testament gezeigte Notwendigkeit eines biblischen Kanons, der 
das Alte Testament enthalte, für den christlichen Glauben; 2., daß dieser doppelte 
Kanon dem Glauben des geistlichen Israels (= der Kirche) die Erkenntnisgrundlage 
für den Willen ihres Herrn ist und 3., daß derselbe für die Lebensordnung von 
Völkern und Staaten richtunggebend ist.393 
What becomes clear in these three theses is how much Vischer’s biblical theology 
contributes to his political stances. However, it may also be possible that his political 
circumstances contributed to his unique interpretive methods as well. They are likely in 
symbiosis. Note, for instance that he wrote his interpretation of Job in 1932, before the 
NSDAP came into power. “Hiob, ein Zeuge Jesu Christi” lacks not only mention of the Jews 	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392 See Klaus Scholder, Churches and Third Reich, 264ff. 
393 Stefan Felber, Wilhelm Vischer Als Ausleger, 61-62. 
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and their relationship to the Bible or the Church, but also lacks the more forceful 
Christological interpretation that appears in the Christuszeugnis. Nevertheless, the Job essay 
of 1932 still contains a somewhat striking Christological interpretation of the book of Job 
that many in his cultural and historical context would have been shocked to hear. Thus, one 
can postulate that Vischer’s theology and hermeneutical presuppositions regarding the role 
the Old Testament plays in the faith of the Christian leads him to his stance on the Jews and 
their relationship to the Tanakh, but that the political situation as it emerged in 1933 gave 
him the impetus to make more politically assertive statements.  
One thing clear all along is that though the political climate of the time meant that 
many dismissed the Old Testament from Christian theology on account of its Jewishness 
even before 1933,394 Vischer always maintained that the Old Testament was a Christian 
book. For Vischer, one needs the Old Testament to know about Christ, for… 
…the Old Testament tells us what the Christ is; the New, who He is… So the two 
Testaments, breathing the same spirit, point to each other, ‘and there is no word in 
the New Testament that does not look back to the Old, in which it is foretold’, and all 
the words of the Old Testament look beyond themselves to the One in the new in 
whom alone they are true.395 
 
The New Testament’s claims about Christ sends him to the Old Testament to discover more 
about Christ, which points him back to the New Testament. The New Testament, though, 
cannot exist without the Old Testament. Wilhelm Vischer’s recognition of the importance of 
the Old Testament to Christian theology leads him to appreciate the culture from which it 
arises. His essay on the book of Job shows how he depends on both testaments to interpret 
the text, though in a manner which is more subdued than in his work just a brief period later. 
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Vischer’s Interpretation of the Book of Job 
 Vischer’s work begins by presupposing the general consensus of the question the 
Book of Job intends to answer—why does God allow an innocent person to suffer? But 
Vischer makes some important observations early on that he expands in the body of his 
essay which put that question in doubt. Consider that the original controversy between God 
and the Satan does not concern itself with suffering. Also note that the sufferings of Job are 
not spelled out specifically in the dialogues. Thus, the actual question that Job intends to 
answer is “can someone fear God for nought?” That scholars suggest this so rarely should 
strike one as odd since the Satan asks the question explicitly and it spurs the suffering that 
Job experiences.  
Vischer goes about his commentary scene by scene, highlighting and explaining the 
aspects of each scene that contribute to his argument. Vischer reads the whole book as if it 
attempts to answer the Satan’s question, “Does Job fear God for nought?” until a satisfactory 
answer can be surmised. The Satan wonders if piety can ever exist outside of self interest 
and doubts God’s confidence in Job.  
Piety, according to Vischer, means “to fear, love and trust God above all things,” 
which Job does display after losing both his belongings and his health.396 In the first 
instance, when Job loses all that he has, he only says, “The Lord gives and the Lord takes 
away; blessed be the Name of the Lord.” In the second instance, Job responds to his wife’s 
complaints about his integrity saying, “Shall we accept the good from God, but the evil (ער) 
shall we not accept?” In both of these responses, Vischer notes that Job keeps his focus on 
God rather than the goods that God grants. He writes with respect to Job’s second saying and 
in a clear allusion to Nietzsche, „Er will nicht Güter, nicht das Gute, er lebt von Gottes Güte, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job I," 24. 
 148	  
die jenseits von gut und böse ist.“397 That is, “He wants not goods, nor the Good, he lives by 
God’s goodness, which lies beyond good and evil.”398 One should read the rest of the book, 
Vischer contends, to uncover the meaning of this.  
What is the nature of “God’s loving-kindness, which lies beyond good and evil”? 
The poet of the dialogues has perhaps taken it as a challenge to elaborate on this notion that 
the narrator sets up in the prologue. Vischer does not use the word midrash, but the picture 
he draws indicates that midrash is what the poet undertakes. He writes, “But now someone 
takes up the challenge which is thrown down (Is it the same or another ‘Poet’?), treads upon 
the bow as it were and stretches upon it the bowstring of the speeches with a power and 
tenseness such that at any moment the bow threatens to snap.”399 Thus, the dialogues of Job 
explore what it means to exist by God’s loving-kindness, even if that loving-kindness does 
not manifest itself in what we generally recognize as “goods” or “good.” The friends speak 
words and phrases with presupposed definitions of God’s loving-kindness. On the other 
hand, Job, who has had every possession stripped away, must work out a new definition of 
God’s loving-kindness spurred by his presuppositions being stripped away along with his 
possessions.  
 The rest of Vischer’s work highlights the message of each section and relates it back 
to the initial issue to resolve. In most cases, he focuses on the main point, but he does wrestle 
with some exegetical issues, generally as they relate to the thesis of the work. Regarding 
chapter 3 of Job, Vischer notes the Leitwort “to hedge” ךכס in verse 23, which refers back to 
the hedge in 1:10. Vischer notes that these are the same expressions, however, the word used 
in 1:10 is, in its conjugated form, the homophone—ךושׂ. Vischer does not discuss the 	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technical aspects of this exegetical issue, nor does he really explain the significance of the 
repetition of the phrase. He merely draws attention to the phrase. What he also points out is 
that, despite this common phrase the prologue and chapter 3 share, Job’s complaint in 
chapter 3 does not mention his sickness or losses.400 Instead, he releases a “cry of a man who 
cannot live without God.”401 This is certainly a debatable point. Job curses the day of his 
birth and mimics God’s speech in Genesis 1:3 but instead calls for there to be darkness 
instead of light. Vischer recognizes this parody but elides the next line, which calls for God 
not to care about it. What Vischer argues is not that Job is calling for God not to care about 
the day, but that God has already ceased caring for it. Job, at first glance, seems more upset 
by God’s presence rather than his absence. In 3:20, Job asks, “Why does he give light to the 
one in misery?” and Vischer records this verse in his essay. However, Vischer flattens the 
agency in the phrase by omitting the verb.402 The light that Job feels he lives in, Vischer 
implies, is not the light of God. 
 Before dismissing Vischer’s ongoing exegesis based on this potential exegetical 
mishap, one must consider the complexity of Job’s argument. In later chapters, Job does 
seem to be saying exactly what Vischer argues. Though one could condemn Vischer for 
betraying his prejudice despite his claim to have followed the message of the book without 
prejudice,403 one must proceed through his argument to determine how accurate his claim 
may be. 
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 Vischer sustains his thesis—that Job’s cry “is the cry of a man who cannot live 
without God”404—throughout his work, highlighting those passages in the various speeches 
that argue his points. In the section on chapters 4 and 5, for instance, he accuses Eliphaz of 
presenting a refined temptation of the Satan by connecting piety with advantage. This, 
according to Vischer, actually subverts piety because the person who “does good to get good 
by it does not fear God simply for God’s sake—‘for nought’.”405 Vischer explains this after 
cleverly noticing Eliphaz attempting to do the opposite—warn Job of the cunning of the 
serpent in the Garden of Eden. Vischer does not equate the serpent with the Satan, but leaves 
his readers to connect the ironic dots. His insinuation makes the friends seem sneakier than 
the serpent itself. In Job 5:12, 13, Eliphaz uses the common wisdom term םורע (crafty, 
cunning) to discuss the futility of one’s intelligence in a battle to match wits with God. Of 
course, one finds this same word in Genesis 3:1 describing the serpent who will claim that 
the eating of the fruit will bestow an intelligence near to God’s for the consumer. Thus, 
Eliphaz, in warning Job of the serpent, becomes like the Satan, whom people will associate 
with the serpent by the intertestamental period.406 Vischer notes that this early speech is 
“well meant… and… beautifully expressed,” which heightens its duplicitous nature. Eliphaz 
accuses Job of falling for the serpent’s temptation, but it is Eliphaz who has become the 
devil’s advocate. 
 Job’s responds, according to Vischer, with the “greatest prayer of his life.”407 He 
desires God to kill him since God has seemed to have abandoned him. However, the 
dynamic present in this poem is complicated, as in Eliphaz’s. For instance, Job still appeals 
to God, as he does in all of his speeches. His friends speak to him, but Job turns from them 	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to God. The question arises as to how Job interprets God’s actions. The imagery in the book 
of Job presents him as feeling like a sample in a Petri dish. “What are human beings that you 
make so much of them?” Job asks while parodying Psalm 8. Vischer quotes this verse, but 
does not exposit it. Instead, Vischer discusses the meaning of righteousness. Before moving 
on to this discussion of righteousness, one must ask if Vischer’s exegesis of this section is 
justifiable in light of some of what Job has to say. There certainly exist complications. One 
notes that Job does seem to ask God to leave him alone, but he never seems to abandon God 
himself. Also, note that Job will not experience any more afflictions that he could attribute to 
God. Rather, he experiences an inner torture throughout the dialogue that Vischer, himself, 
attributes to God not answering him. Job’s eventual satisfaction arrives with the storm. Job 
complains of God’s oppressive behaviour because someone who dares never abandon God 
has no other way to explain the torture of having been abandoned. This is a difficult concept 
to understand for anyone, and it remains that way for Job’s friends as well. 
 When Vischer discusses God’s Gerechtigkeit (הקדצ), he has to distinguish between 
what, in English, can be conveyed between the two words righteousness and justice. Job 
concerns himself with righteousness or piety (Frömmigkeit) but the friends are more 
interested in justice (ein juristisches Verhältnis unter dem Gesetz des Ausgleichs von 
Verdienst und Lohn).408 This distinction becomes a corollary to the main thesis of the book. 
The friends argue that Job receives what he deserves and, though Job does suggest elsewhere 
that he does not receive what he deserves, at the end of chapter 7, Job desires instead a 
change in focus. He asks for a pardon from God. Vischer interprets this change in focus as 
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that of Job’s interest not in deserved equivalence, but the “Goodness of God… from realms 
beyond Good and Evil.”409 God condescends to his creatures rather than seeking out justice. 
 The speeches continue in much the same manner, with the friends focusing on one 
type of Gerechtigkeit and Job focusing on the other. Vischer’s comments mainly recount the 
issues, highlighting passages that move his argument forward. His comments on the friends 
become smaller as they repeat themselves. Job receives fuller treatment since Vischer sees 
Job’s journey as the important theological point to exposit.  
 What Vischer takes care to point out is that though the friends’ arguments seem to 
change, their main thesis remains the same. Eliphaz’s generous tone in chapter 4 moves to 
vehemence as his frustration increases. He gives Job the benefit of the doubt, comforting Job 
with God’s sense of justice early on. If Job acts piously then God will treat him well. By 
chapter 22 Eliphaz accuses Job of horrible improprieties, forgoing all pastoral comforts. 
However, the sentiment is the same. God acts with perfect economy, giving goods for equal 
value and doing nothing for nought. The speeches of Bildad and Zophar receive little 
treatment, Vischer mainly highlighting what they say with a few words. He implies that their 
thesis adds nothing to the conversation and that, despite their ignorance of the court scene in 
the prologue, the friends act as the Satan’s advocate. 
 While the friends may change focus but remain on course with their thesis, Vischer 
contends that Job essentially develops his thesis through the course of the conversation. 
Eventually, the question of the book changes and one can witness this transformation 
through Job’s speeches. The seeming betrayal of God from Job has shattered his theology. 
Vischer compares his theology to the potsherds that Job holds, also containing a veiled 
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reference to his nakedness.410 Job then listens to his friends but must dispute what they say 
because their opinions do not make sense with respect to his own experience. Vischer also 
presents Job as one in tune with a logical theology despite the transcendent God at the centre 
of it. The friends hold to a theology of absolute righteousness, but Job does not see how a 
law can stand over God. If Vischer correctly interprets Job’s refutation of the friends, then 
the reader must reconsider what scholars generally perceive as Job’s court case against 
God.411 For if no law can exist above God, then a legal proceeding would not hold up. A 
court case assumes that the plaintiff and defendant both stand under the law. 
 Dhorme first mentions Job’s legal action regarding chapter 13. He states, concerning 
13:17-21, that Job demands a “regular lawsuit… and he only wishes that the machinery of 
divine justice did not exceed his strength.”412 Dhorme’s analysis reflects the typical 
commentator and can also be seen in more colloquial renditions of Job like Wiesel’s God on 
Trial. So Vischer’s interpretation, that Job’s friends imagine Job putting God on trial, 
demands closer inspection. Whoever instigates the suit, one can feel confident of its 
imaginary nature. The legal proceedings work as a rich metaphor, but no actual court case 
occurs. However, forensic imagery appears throughout the book beginning with the Satan, 
whom Vischer describes as a district attorney. In the poetic dialogues, the first character to 
reintroduce the metaphor is actually Eliphaz in chapter 5. He argues in verse 4 that a fool’s 
children will be crushed in court (at the gates of the village) without a defender, warning Job 
of taking things too far with his invective. The next mention of the metaphor comes from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Vischer does not explicitly refer to Job 1:20, 21, but could have enhanced his metaphor noting that when 
Job tears his robe he does not replace it with sackcloth; Job follows this symbolic act with a pronouncement of 
his nakedness in verse 21. 
411 See David J. A. Clines, Job 1-20, 305; Carol A. Newsom, “The Book of Job: Introduction, Commentary, 
and Reflections,” in NIB Vol. 4 (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 435; and Norman C. Habel, The Book of Job, 
OTL (London: SCM Press, 1985), 223. Of these three, Habel seems most confident that Job is actually wanting 
to take God to court. However, Habel sees Job as having dismissed litigation in chapters 9-10, “but the derision 
of his peers seems to have spurred him to strengthen his resolve.” (Norman C. Habel, The Book of Job, 223.)  
412 Édouard Dhorme, A Commentary on the Book of Job, trans. Harold Knight (London: Nelson, 1967), xl. 
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mouth of Job, but he seems to resist taking God to court. In Job 9:32, Job questions the 
possibility of bringing a suit to God since God’s transcendence renders him incapable of 
defeat and no arbiter exists to mediate between God and a human. In chapter 10, Job sustains 
the metaphor but renders the idea unfair because of the nature of God. Vischer deserves 
credit for noting Job’s resistance to the court case. However, Job continues to broach the 
topic in chapter 13 despite Zophar’s omission of the metaphor. Perhaps a proper 
understanding of the court case is that Job imagines that the friends see him as bringing a 
suit to God since that is the ready-to-hand metaphor for a dispute. Many translations sustain 
the metaphor by translating certain phrases with their legal connotations. In 13:3, Job uses 
the hiphil form of חכי which has forensic connotations. However, it can also refer to 
arguments outside of the courtroom. When coupled with the preposition לא, as in 13:3, it 
simply means to argue with someone. That Job desires a face-to-face meeting with God, 
rather than one mediated through an arbiter, suggests a split from the forensic metaphor. On 
the other hand, the word חכי in the hiphil is disproportionately common in the book of Job 
compared to other texts and appears four times in chapter 13 alone. Despite the fact that 
none of the uses connotes a clear forensic thrust, the common appearance of this Leitwort 
does impress upon the reader a courtroom image. However, when seen from the point of 
view that Vischer proposes, Job does seem to dispute the idea of a court case. Job 13:8 
promotes this idea well. Job uses here the legal term ביר, but he uses it in an interrogative 
sentence describing the friends. Here lies a clear example of Job questioning his friends’ 
imaginations, which see Job as bringing the suit to God. Job denounces the defences as 
insubstantial—like a dream. In fact, he actually defends God to the friends in 13:9-12. 
 Vischer sees Job’s questions as introspective as well as disputatious toward the 
friends. Job does seem to wonder about the true nature of his relationship to God, but 
Vischer argues that Job dismisses the suggestion that they share a legal relationship. Rather, 
 155	  
Vischer sees Job in a much more intimate relationship with God. He puts it thus: “Job is 
concerned with a totally different kind of ‘Right,’ namely the question whether God’s 
relationship to him is a legal one or a relationship of an entirely different kind. Put quite 
briefly, whether God is his Friend or his Enemy.”413  
 So Vischer argues that, despite the appearance of a courtroom drama, Job does not 
take God to court. Instead, Job plays out a family dispute. He cannot take God to court but 
he does present his case. Vischer does not present a long argument for his interpretation but 
merely lays out his reading, so it remains difficult to find his reasoning behind calling the 
court case a figment of the friends’ imagination. However, one can see that the actuality of 
the legal process in the dialogues is suspect and by the coming of the storm the case is all but 
forgotten. Because Vischer only grants this passage a small amount of space due to the scope 
of his essay I do not want to dwell too heavily on the passage here. However, his claim does 
bear a great deal of weight for the overall thesis that he shares with Barth and Kierkegaard—
that of Job’s disinterested devotion to God despite the events that befall him. 
 Note that, thus far, despite the title of his essay, Vischer has not shown Job as a 
witness to Jesus Christ. In the section on chapters 16 and 17, Vischer faces a passage with 
Christological potentialities. “But now behold my Witness is in heaven,” Job says, but 
Vischer unflinchingly attributes the Witness to the generic “God,” never insinuating or 
raising the possibility that the Witness might be Christ. When Job says, “My ‘Mediator’ is 
my real Friend,” Vischer sees this as Job’s “appeal against the Enemy-God to God the 
Friend.”414 This leads to Vischer’s discourse on chapter 19, which raises a new question that 
the rest of the book will attempt to answer—whether Job’s trust in God is justified. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job I," 50. 
414 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job I," 51. 
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 When Vischer arrives at chapter 19, his Kierkegaardian and Barthian influences 
shine through. He notes the importance of the intimacy between Job and God. No outsider 
can truly understand Job’s experience or his relationship with God. He accentuates the 
emphatic ינא in verse 25, writing, “Und ich, ich weiß, mein Löser lebt.”415 One senses that he 
emphasises the subjectivity of truth, but he also notes that Job’s struggle is one about (um) 
God. The friends have all but disqualified themselves from the debate. Though they continue 
to speak, the focus is now entirely on Job and his relationship with God. Job sees this and so 
he looks to God to save him from God. The friends cannot save him, but Job never acted as 
if they could. However, Job sees God as his attacker and saviour, thus everything else is 
stripped away.  
 Vischer inserts a coda after his discourse on chapter 19. He sees this as a shift in 
focus. Job has fulfilled his duties and proven the Satan wrong. God has won the wager. But 
Job cannot now be satisfied. The question of God’s goodness arises. When the focus 
becomes that of God and Job with everything else removed, the Law of Recompense cannot 
remain a factor. One cannot use an outside influence to define God’s goodness. Instead, we 
must understand God’s goodness as a goodness to “me” “which transcends Good and 
Evil.”416 Only God can answer this. 
 Vischer opens himself up perhaps to a strict individualistic theology, but quickly 
flips that to a brief discussion on the Kingdom of God. When dealing with God and the 
individual, one must also see the corporate nature of the individuals to whom God relates. 
This is no cheap safety net for Vischer, but a way for him to discuss the realm and nature of 
God’s goodness. The friends discuss the way the world works. They concern themselves 
with order and cause and effect, but Job, because of his subjective experience, cannot agree. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 Wilhelm Vischer, "Hiob, Ein Zeuge Jesu Christi," 19. 
416 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job I," 53. 
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Thus, the world works differently and God must act differently than the friends suppose. 
God deals with each individual individually, so the systematic rule of law does not come into 
play. The world is not good because it is ordered to be so, but it is good “because it is the 
object of [God’s] goodness which fundamentally has nothing to do with good and evil, 
fortune and ill-fortune, reward and punishment, advantage and disadvantage.”417  
 Vischer senses this from Job’s speech in chapter 21 when Job asserts that God does 
not seem to care about what is righteous according to humans. Humans cannot teach God 
knowledge, so we cannot use our understanding of righteousness to control God. The 
evidence lies before us: the good and evil both die; so do the wealthy and poor. 
 The friends, however, hold fast to their argument. Though the details change, the 
general tenets remain the same. Vischer argues that their skilful edifice upon which they 
balance their claims bears a remarkable resemblance to the Satan’s scepticism in the 
prologue. “The kernel (der Kern),” says Vischer, “the very axiom of the theology of the 
friends is just that not for nought.”418 By showing how they so resemble each other Vischer 
further relates the prologue to the dialogues, even after the question of the book has changed. 
He does not argue that the same author wrote the two sections of the book and he does not 
seem to think that is even the case. However, by tracing the line of thought throughout the 
book, he argues for a linear reading of Job. This line of thinking climaxes with Bildad’s last 
speech, which Vischer argues, sums up the friends’ view of God and the world. Bildad 
finally says, “upon whom does not God’s Light shine?” and “Who is clean in the glare of 
this Light?”419 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II," 138. 
418 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II," 140.  
419 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II," 141-42. See Job 25:3,4. Vischer does not seem to quote directly from 
any known German text; the second of these quotes is loosely based on 25:4—“diesem Licht” refers to לא in the 
Hebrew text.  
 158	  
 When Vischer arrives at Job’s final speech, he offers an alternative to the “customary 
view” of the passage, which he states that Job describes his earlier happiness and his current 
state and argues that he did not deserve this “reversal of fortune.”420 Vischer’s alternative 
view sees God as the key to Job’s state. When Job walked with God, he received honour, but 
since “God abandoned him” his honour was broken.421 Vischer is correct in showing the 
importance of Job’s perception of God’s role in Job’s honour. Job’s final defence begins 
with an extended description of God watching over Job and his household. Not until this 
description is complete does Job describe his former royal role in his community.422 One 
should note here that Vischer describes God as verborgenen. This is not Job’s description, 
but one that Vischer likely received from his relationship with Barth and his own Lutheran 
background. 
 The most important aspect, however, is that God is the cause of Job’s honour. The 
world may seem random to Job, but he remains certain that God is the cause of his fortune 
and misfortune. This actually differs from the friends’ hypothesis which argues that Job 
causes his own fortune and misfortune because the rules exist and Job’s actions, not God’s, 
trigger God’s blessing and wrath.423 Job disputes this thesis one last time before making his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II," 141. Note also that Vischer moves chapter 28 just after the Elihu 
speeches. I discuss that move in another section. On another note, the customary view that Vischer describes is 
not as obviously common as he insinuates. For instance, Budde summarises chapter 29, “Früher war ich bei 
Gott in Gnaden und der glückichste Mensch, jetzt in tiefster Ungnade und der unglückichste.“ (Karl Budde, 
Handkommentar Zum Alten Testament: In Verbindung Mit Anderen Fachgelehrten. Abt5. 2, Die Poetischen 
Bücher. Band 1, Das Buch Hiob (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1896), 163.) Yes, Budde discusses 
Job’s state as happiness, but that is a result of God’s grace. Dhorme displays, perhaps, a view closer to what 
Vischer describes. There is less of a cause/effect relationship between Job’s current state and God’s grace. 
When Dhorme quotes 29:2, he does not elaborate on God’s role in his state, but lets the verse speak for itself (p 
lii). In a modern context, one could regard the phrase, “In the days when Eloah made me secure” as a figure of 
speech along the lines of “Lord-willing.”  
421 “fallen lassen” (Wilhelm Vischer, "Hiob, Ein Zeuge Jesu Christi," 24.) 
422 Eventually, Andre Caquot will elaborate on the royal traits in Job and dedicate his paper to Vischer in 
Vischer’s festschrift. (André Caquot, “Traits Royaux Dans Le Personnage De Job,” in Maqqél Shâqédh: La 
Branche D'Amandier: Hommage À Wilhelm Vischer (Montpellier: Causse, Graille, Castelnau, 1960).) 
423 Recall that Aquinas and Calvin, among others, argue that the book of Job has much to say about God’s 
providence, which would seem to be the case with Vischer as well. The differences between the interpretations 
far outweigh the similarities, however. See especially Calvin, who elevates Elihu in his reading. Vischer, as 
noted below, essentially dismisses Elihu as inconsequential to the narrative presented in the book of Job. 
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mark at the base of his final plea. So Job’s final stance is that he concerns himself not with 
the law, but with God. “The reality behind the world and Man’s life is not a law but the 
personal Truth of the Creator.”424 So the question changes from “Is this man really true to 
God?” to “the question of faith in God’s own Truth.”425 The first question has an answer—
Job is the proof. To the end, Job has remained true to God despite all that opposes him. God 
seems to have abandoned him, but he remains true to God.  
 Vischer’s discussion of the Elihu speeches and the hymn to Wisdom, which he places 
between the Elihu speeches and God’s theophany, briefly summarise the sections and all but 
dismiss them as late interpolations that add little to the book itself. Elihu argues that God 
chastens his people through suffering and converts them back to him. The hymn to Wisdom 
presents an orthodox view of Old Testament Wisdom literature. Vischer finds no fault with 
either of these passages, per se. However, he argues that they do not answer Job’s question 
and Elihu’s speech, in particular, begins with the fallacious presupposition that God sent Job 
sufferings in order to convert him. The reader knows this not to be the case. Also, no one 
pays any notice of Elihu. So Vischer concludes that Elihu comes from the pen of a different 
author and that the hymn to Wisdom, though majestic in many ways, also merely delays the 
gratification that comes from the storm that arrives in chapter 38.  
 When God does arrive at the climax of the book of Job, Vischer sees it as the 
definitive answer to the questions laid out in the book. Many have complained that the 
speeches accomplish little with regards to the message of Job, but Vischer argues that no 
other answer would do. The issue of chinnam arises again and God most definitely lands on 
the side of freedom. The Satan argues that Job acts according to God’s gifts to him and the 
friends argue that God acts according to Job’s actions. Job, however, shows that he serves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II," 143. 
425 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II." 
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God despite his personal state and God, in his speeches, shows his people that “not aim and 
not advantage, but God’s free, happy goodness is the meaning and cause of the world.”426 
God directs his will to the creature and “the creature toward Him.”427 It is not immediately 
clear what Vischer means by God’s “goodness.” Recall that in discussing Job’s response to 
his wife that Vischer suggests that Job desires “not goods, not the thing which is good; he 
lives of God’s goodness which lies beyond good and evil.”428 God’s goodness is somewhat 
ineffable in that our human understanding of morality is intrinsically based on our 
understanding of good and evil. If God’s goodness lies beyond a human understanding of 
morality, Job must trust God and not any by-product of God’s activity.  
Vischer’s use of the clause “beyond good and evil,” as mentioned earlier, most likely 
stems from Friedrich Nietzsche’s book Beyond Good and Evil.429 It is difficult to say how 
much Vischer had Nietzsche’s ideas in mind when he used the phrase since he does not 
elaborate on the thought or mention him by name. On the other hand, Nietzsche “dominated 
the intellectual and cultural landscape in Germany” in the 1930s430 to the point that allusions 
like the ones in Vischer’s essay would certainly have evoked some nod in the philosopher’s 
direction by the casual reader of Vischer.431 
Using some caution, one should also note that Nietzsche’s description of the phrase 
“beyond good and evil” actually goes far in helping to explain what Vischer might have 
meant by the phrase in this context. In fact, much of Nietzsche’s book Beyond Good and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II," 147. Vischer quotes Calvin on Psalm 104:31, who writes “Status 
mundi in Dei laetitia fundatus est.” Vischer’s reformed tradition draws him to Calvin’s theology, which 
influences the thesis of Vischer’s essay. Note again, however, that Vischer does not cite Calvin on Job in any 
place.  
427 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II," 147. 
428 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job I," 42. 
429 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosphy of the Future, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(London: Penguin Books, 1990). 
430 Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook (London: Routledge, 2002), 290. 
431 Vischer would also allude to Nietzsche a few times in the Christuszeugnis, quoting him at length in one 
footnote. (Wilhelm Vischer, Das Christuszeugnis 1, 156 n.160.) 
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Evil resembles Job’s complaints about his friends and their philosophy as interpreted by 
Vischer. Nietzsche himself writes, “To recognize untruth as a condition of life: that, to be 
sure, means to resist customary value-sentiments in a dangerous fashion; and a philosophy 
which ventures to do so places itself, by that act alone, beyond good and evil.”432 The truth is 
elusive and “false judgments” are a part of life, according to Nietzsche. It is not obvious to 
him that we can discover the truth as many philosophers insist we can. 
Much of the first section of Beyond Good and Evil comes in the form of Nietzsche 
describing and disparaging the philosophers who came before him, suggesting that their 
quest for truth and value lacked the undergirding they claimed it had. He describes his 
predecessors as displaying “insufficient honesty” regarding their practice… 
…while making a mighty and virtuous noise as soon as the problem of truthfulness is 
even remotely touched on. They pose as having discovered and attained their real 
opinions through the self-evolution of a cold, pure, divinely unperturbed dialectic… 
while what happens at bottom is that a prejudice, a notion, an ‘inspiration’, generally 
a desire of the heart sifted and made abstract, is defended by them with reasons 
sought after the event…433 
 
Likewise, Job’s friends focus on the results of Job’s life as evidence of his original actions. 
They are so tied to their interpretation of the system in which they perceive God to work that 
when Job suffers without evidence of having sinned, they work backward to determine that 
he must have sinned. Everything that occurs on the earth is tied to their notions of morality.  
They have reduced their religion to a system or a metaphysic.434 That is, while Job 
devotes himself to God, the friends seem to devote themselves to the laws that God purveys. 
The laws themselves, though, are seemingly corrupt. That is, the friends’ perceptions of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 36. 
433 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 36. 
434 See Tanner on section 6 of Beyond Good and Evil: “For although we think of Christianity as primarily a 
religion, it is, like all systems of religious belief, based on a set of views about the way things are, in other 
words a metaphysic.” (Michael Tanner, “Introduction,” in Beyond Good and Evil By Friedrich Nietzsche 
(London: Penguin Books, 1990), 14.) 
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laws of nature as set in motion by God are faulty. They are based more on tradition than 
anything else.435 Nietzsche later in the book seems to describe the mentality of Job’s friends 
in what he calls human herds: 
(family groups, communities, tribes, nations, states, churches), and always very many 
who obey compared with the very small number of those who command—
considering, that is to say, that hitherto nothing has been practiced and cultivated 
among men better or longer than obedience, it is fair to suppose that as a rule a need 
for it is by now innate as a kind of formal conscience which commands: … in short 
‘thou shalt’.436 
Job stands out from his friends in that he does not blindly follow the laws established by the 
generations that preceded him. He does not work backward from his suffering to what might 
have instigated it. 
Here, however, Vischer’s Job and Nietzsche part ways. They are both seeking that 
which is beyond good and evil, but Job seeks the “goodness of God which lies beyond good 
and evil.” Job does not seem to be a part of the ‘herd,’ which relies on the law as instilled in 
tradition, but he does resemble Nietzsche’s description of “slave morality” in that he devotes 
himself to the originary purveyor of the law.437 Both the Job of the dialogues and Nietzsche 
agree that values are not natural, they do not exist “in the fabric of the world… to be 
discovered by us,”438 but Nietzsche argues that value is something we have invented. Job, on 
the other hand, sees the values as thrust upon us by an outside force who exists above the 
values and is capable of overriding them by his very nature. The existence of God as 
purveyor of the law allows Job to differentiate himself from Nietzsche, who regarded “the 
great men of the nineteenth century with suspicion, with the signal exceptions of Napoleon 
and Goethe, the two men who emphatically didn’t think of themselves as acting in obedience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 See Job 8:8,9: “Ask the former generation and find out what their ancestors learned, for we were born only 
yesterday and know nothing.” 
436 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 120. 
437 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 197. 
438 Michael Tanner, "Introduction," 19. 
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to laws from beyond or outside.”439 Vischer’s Job differentiates himself from Napoleon and 
Goethe in that he acts in obedience to something from the outside—only that something lies 
beyond good and evil. 
Beyond Good and Evil begins with Nietzsche’s assumption made clear in The Gay 
Science and Thus Sprach Zarathustra that God is dead. Tanner describes it as “in large part 
an exploration of how greatness is rendered impossible if we continue in the habits of 
thought instilled by two millennia of Christianity while abandoning the presupposition of the 
whole enterprise: God.”440 Note also Nietzsche’s more well known follow-up to Beyond 
Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morality, where he writes, “Fortunately I learned early 
on to distinguish theological from moral prejudice and no longer sought the origin of evil 
behind the world.”441 Here he shows that he is relatively uninterested in the idea of God as 
origin of morality. He takes as a priori the non-existence of God. Job finds the abandoning 
of God anathema. The friends seem to avoid God as a personal being by focusing on his 
laws and actions. Job’s focus is on the purveyor of the laws over and sometimes against the 
laws themselves, which Vischer maintains is the key difference between Job and his friends.  
If, then, the answer has to do not with human morality as tied to the understanding of 
good and evil but with the goodness of God beyond good and evil, the only satisfactory 
answer for Job must be a revelation of God. The friends cannot answer questions about God 
even if they had the right answer. Vischer takes this further, arguing that physics, 
metaphysics, apologetics, and even dialectic theology lack when trying to describe God. God 
is “unbekannte” and “just when He reveals Himself in Truth as our God, as the Friend of 
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Job, then is His revelation of Himself the abyss which no man can fathom.”442 So the 
purpose of the speeches is to reveal God to Job, but in such a way as to maintain the 
hiddenness of God—the Deus Absconditus. By remaining hidden, God remains free and thus 
he answers the second question of the book of Job, according to Vischer. God does not act 
according to a code or law, but acts beyond good and evil. The friends cannot contain the 
righteousness with which they occupy themselves. Righteousness comes only through 
relationship with the hidden God and God remains hidden, even in relationship, so that the 
relationship can remain for nought.  
 After his analysis of God’s speeches, Vischer presents a rather brief summary of the 
epilogue. He does not add much in the way of interpretation. Vischer forwards the 
uncontroversial reading of Job repenting in dust and ashes. Because of this, Job’s theocentric 
view of the world brings more pleasure to God than the friends’ apologetics, which place 
conditions above God. Therefore, God grants Job blessings that go beyond his pre-
catastrophic state. One shortcoming of this analysis is the question concerning Job’s 
blessing. What is the cause of that blessing? Vischer seems to suggest that God pays Job 
back for his devotion, but this seems to threaten the idea that Job is pious for nought. Vischer 
does suggest earlier that Job has proven his piety during the dialogues and now God must 
prove his devotion to Job. But Vischer does not say this and only leaves his readers with the 
dots to connect.  
 Finally, after the full exegesis of the book of Job, Vischer ties his reading together 
with his Christology—something promised in the title of the article itself. Vischer seems 
aware of the controversy that he may instigate with such a figural reading. This becomes 
evident in his introduction of a quote by Bernhard Duhm. Duhm suggests that the epilogue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 Wilhelm Vischer, "Hiob, Ein Zeuge Jesu Christi," 29. Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II," 148. 
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of Job is an addition to the poetry in order to appease the readers. Vischer highlights Duhm’s 
comparison of the ending to that of Shakespeare’s plays taken from earlier sources. What 
Duhm means is less important than that Vischer takes this anachronism of a Shakespearian 
ending to an Ancient Near Eastern poem as license to make a much less anachronistic 
comparison between the book of Job and the Christian story. It is natural to see parallels 
between stories and often fruitful to make such parallels. Vischer indicates that his 
Christological approach begins with this parallel between two culturally related texts. The 
Jesus story did not arise out of a vacuum but was the product of a particular literary tradition 
and Weltanschauung. The New Testament constantly refers to the Old Testament to make its 
case, positing its foundation on the literary tradition of the Hebrew Bible. Vischer states that 
the conclusion to the book of Job “has a genuinely Israelite and biblical touch,” which it also 
has in common the story of the empty tomb of the Gospels.443 
 Because it has this close connection with the Gospel story and other biblical texts, the 
book of Job has ethical implications as well. He writes: 
The realistic earthly conclusion of the Book of Job points strongly to the lesson that 
the practical decision whether God is really God, that is to say is our God, falls in 
this present life. Faith lives [from] the reality of communion with God in the practical 
things of this earthly life; either God is here and now my god, Victor over sin and 
death, or He is not my God. That is, as we have seen entirely the faith of the Job 
speeches.444 
 
Vischer’s claim here echoes what he insinuates in other words earlier and what he will repeat 
a few paragraphs later—that the book of Job points beyond itself. The literal meaning has 
spiritual implications. The very format of the book illustrates this. Earlier, he says that the 
“conclusion, which is closely connected with the initial paragraphs of the story, has, after the 
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spiritual turn given to the problem through the speeches, a remarkable force.”445 That is, the 
concreteness of the prose and the heightened style of the dialogues suggest a concrete-
spiritual dualism. The book of Job is not just a story, but an ethical call. The book and its 
message refer the reader to God. When the fundamental question of the book changes from 
“can a human serve God for nought?” to “is Job’s trust in God’s goodness justified?”446 the 
book refers back to God. In doing this, the natural referent becomes the ultimate answer to 
these questions. The Christian will certainly see Christ as a component of the affirmation of 
these questions. It would be naïve to think the Christian reader can bracket Christ out of the 
reading of Job. Vischer does not speak of influence—whether Job has any bearing on the 
telling of the Gospels—but implies that the framing of the stories are inherently alike 
because of the shared context of their cultural and literary traditions.  
 He does not leave it there but presents several parallel examples of the Jobian 
trajectory in the Gospel narratives beginning with Jesus’ temptation by Satan himself. Next 
comes the comparison of Peter to Satan when the disciple rebukes Jesus. This is an obvious 
parallel to the friends of Job whom Vischer likens to the Satan of the prologue throughout 
his piece. The cultural and literary contexts of the two stories apply a pressure that 
influences such thinking. Akin to this is Vischer’s next example, which shows Satan 
embodying Judas. In all of these examples, Jesus does not sin despite the great temptations. 
However, the biggest temptation comes as he suffers on the cross and the people wonder 
why he does not save himself. Yet Jesus, like Job, knows he is right and resembles Job again 
in his recitation of Psalm 22. These are remarkable parallels that make a good case for 
Vischer’s thesis. He downplays the typology implied by the parallels and lets the parallels 
speak for themselves. 
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 Recall briefly the cultural context in which Vischer presents his interpretation. The 
book of Job, found in the Hebrew Bible, a collection of books deemed unimportant to 
Christian theology at best, and harmful to European culture at worst,447 Vischer argues is 
intrinsically related to Christian theology. Christ and Job react to their similar sufferings 
similarly, which should come as little surprise since they are offspring of the same culture 
and worldview. They are also servants of the same God and are so devoted to that God that 
they resemble each other in their devotion.  
Vischer ends his analysis with a brief homiletic flourish. He encourages those living 
in “the midst of the battle of Faith, it may be in darkness and perplexity, in conflict and 
suffering.”448 Recognizing the possible impetus for Vischer’s writing on Job as argued in the 
opening section of this chapter, one could see his conclusion as a reference to the battle of 
Faith within the German context. One year later he would compose the Bethel Confession, 
which confronts the darkness and perplexity of interbellum Germany head on. In his 
interpretation of Job, he recognizes the suffering that comes from theological conflict and 
shows that both Job and Christ trod through it similarly. 
Summary 
 Vischer’s exegetical method shares many similarities with Karl Barth with 
significant differences. The differences will be spelled out more thoroughly in the evaluative 
chapter, but the similarities are obvious. For one, neither shies away from historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 Richard Gutteridge provides many examples of this type of anti-Semitism, among them Friedrich Delitzsch 
who writes in his new edition in 1921 of Die grosse Täuschung (‘The Great Deception’), “all the Old 
Testament books from Genesis to Daniel have in their religious bearing for today, and especially for us 
Christians, absolutely no significance.” (Richard Gutteridge, Open Thy Mouth, 41.) One should note, however, 
that included among the anti-Semitic voices of the era are those who saw the Old Testament as useful as a tool 
for promoting anti-Semetism. Gutteridge presents as an example Helmut Schreiner who “insisted that there was 
no greater witness against modern Jewry than the whole spirit of the Bible.” (Richard Gutteridge, Open Thy 
Mouth, 41.) Examples abound of both, but especially the former, which seemed to have dominated the 
Zeitgeist, evidenced by the dwindling provision of chairs of Old Testament studies at the universities in 
Germany. (Richard Gutteridge, Open Thy Mouth, 55.) 
448 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II," 150. 
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criticisms regarding the history of the text. It does not seem to be a problem for 
interpretation to Vischer that some passages from Job were written at different times than 
others. On the other hand, he does attempt to present a final form reading, albeit using a non-
extant final form than those at hand. That is, he modifies sections according to his own 
critical hypotheses but interprets the story from beginning to end. It is imperative to his 
interpretation, for example, that the Job of the prologue and the Job of the speeches and the 
Job of the epilogue are all the same Job, but it may be necessary for reasons not fully 
explained to move chapter 28 to a different location. This is problematic, of course, because 
it leaves Vischer open to the criticism that he moves segments of the text in order for them to 
fit his theology. Theological presuppositions are unavoidable, whatever one’s convictions 
regarding historical criticism, but Vischer hurts his credibility when he moves passages 
around in what seems like a way to endorse his position. Of course, it is difficult to say what 
came first, his critical conclusions or his theology. The next section will detail Vischer’s 
method of interpretation of Job in order to place it beside his interpretation and theological 
claims, which come after. Following the next section will come an evaluation of his method 
and interpretation. 
Method of Interpretation 
 As mentioned above, Vischer insists on interpreting the book of Job as a whole. The 
prologue of the book of Job drives his interpretation. At first glance, this would seem the 
appropriate way to interpret Job. The prologue sets up all we need to know before the reader 
moves into the dialogues which are poetically vague and universal in their descriptions of 
sufferings. The prologue gives us something to pin to the dialogues. Vischer is very aware of 
what is at stake in the prologue and this drives his interpretation of the dialogues. However, 
what is at stake is not Job’s suffering but the freedom of God and humanity. 
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 Despite Vischer’s insistence on reading the book of Job through the message of the 
prologue, he generally accepts many historical critical claims on the book from scholars in 
his historical and geographical context. This is not widely evident in the first half of his 
study, which is par for the course in Job studies. The more problematic sections of the book 
arrive in later chapters. Vischer begins his discourse on chapters 23-27 questioning whether 
the words in these chapters stand in their right place.449 He is concerned with the lack of 
symmetry in the speeches and suggests attempting to restore the text to its original 
composition. In the previous two cycles of speeches, Job speaks in between the comments 
offered by Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar, respectively, but in this section Job responds to 
Eliphaz and Bildad only. Zophar offers no council and Bildad’s comments, in merely six 
verses, are much shorter than anything previous. This is a common concern in Job studies 
and has remained so for a long time.450 Vischer, whether because of space, the genre of his 
work, his hermeneutic, or a combination, does not present his own reconstruction. What he 
does say is that “The symmetry of the conversation is upset; and we ought perhaps to 
endeavour to restore the original arrangement. But any such attempt must in no case be 
based upon the misconception that Job maintains, in contradiction to the friends, that it ever 
finally goes well with the ungodly. That would be a one-sided distortion of his meaning.”451 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 Wilhelm Vischer, "Hiob, Ein Zeuge Jesu Christi," 23. 
450 In Clines’ recent commentary on Job 21-37, he moves 24:18-24 to the end of chapter 27 in order to give 
Zophar a last chance to speak. But Clines also reassigns 27:7-23 to Zophar, thus giving Zophar a full speech. 
Clines’ explanation is reasonable in some respects and he makes his reader aware of some of his motivations. 
But to grant Zophar a full speech means that he must also reassign passages from chapters 25 and 26 and 
reorganize that section in order to grant Bildad a fair number of lines. Clines is aware of the difficulties in such 
a reconstruction and catalogues up to seven different reconstructions on chapters 25 and 26 by various 
commentators. Clines himself makes some important comments regarding hermeneutics and the role of the 
commentator. He claims that “it is necessary for the sake of the exegesis to make decisions, right or wrong, 
about who is speaking at any point.” Clines is, by no means, the first to attempt such a reconstruction and his 
catalogue includes several works that would have been available to Vischer at the time of his writing, including 
Good, Dhorme, Strahan, and Duhm. (David J. A. Clines, Job 21-37, vol. 18a, WBC (Nashville: Thomas Nelson 
Publishers, 2006), 629.) 
451 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II," 141. “Die Symmetrie des Gesprächs ist gestört. Man muß vielleicht 
versuchen, die ursprünliche Verteilung wieder herzustellen. Nur darf ein solcher Versuch auf keinen Fall von 
dem Mißverständnis ausgehen, Hiob behaupte im Gegensatz zu den Freunden, daß es den Gottlosen immer gut 
ergehe.“ (Wilhelm Vischer, "Hiob, Ein Zeuge Jesu Christi," 23.) 
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That is, that Job’s words might resemble his friends in that they all do see God as just. Job, 
however, argues that one might lack the perspective that would allow one to interpret it. 
Vischer’s summary of the text omits discussion on the disputed passages, a move the relative 
scope of his essay allows him to undertake. 
 Vischer, therefore, opens up the possibility of a reconstruction of 23-27 but avoids 
having to make a decision because the passage as it stands does not hurt his overall thesis 
any more than a reconstruction would help it. On the other hand, there are cases where 
Vischer does not shy from radical reconstruction of the text. His readers will notice in the 
very next section that he skips over chapter 28 with nary a word to discuss chapters 29-31. 
He does not just excise the chapter from the book, but places it after the Elihu speeches. 
Neither of these passages, it turns out, contribute much to the story, according to Vischer, 
and both have questionable provenance. Note that Vischer gives little evidence of their 
extra-Joban milieu other than a vague description of their “Kennzeichen.”452 No one in the 
narrative seems to take notice of Elihu and Chapter 28, he claims, is not motivated by the 
context. Nevertheless, he does not excise the passages from his own interpretation of Job. 
Rather, he gives them their due and shows that they neither add nor take away anything from 
the broader meaning of the book. 
 It is not entirely clear why Vischer moves chapter 28 to where he does. He, along 
with many scholars regard it as a later interpolation, but he does not explain why it fits better 
between Elihu’s speech and God’s speech. In fact, it seems to disrupt Elihu’s mention of the 
storm in his speech that foreshadows God’s arrival in a tempest. Vischer presents vague 
motivations and seems intent to deflect attention away from the chapter without wholly 
excising it from the book. Clines, likewise, wonders why it remains in the book since, in its 
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received locale, it is generically an aberration.453 However, most commentators seem content 
to keep it in its traditional place. Clines views it as the last section of Elihu’s speech since it 
does not carry a prose introduction. He moves chapter 28, then, to a position after chapter 37 
and then moves Job’s final speech after chapter 28 so that Job has the last word until God 
arrives on the scene. Vischer takes a less radical approach, but does place chapter 28 directly 
after chapter 37.  
Chapter 28 does not come from the mouth of Elihu, according to Vischer, but he 
argues that it does have a similar message. The general redundancy of the Elihu speeches 
and the hymn to Wisdom adds to the sense of delayed gratification one perceives while 
reading the book of Job. The devotion Job has to God makes all the words of those other 
than God like burning embers on his head. However, Vischer does not excise the superfluous 
texts. He places them just before God speaks from the tempest. By then Job has made his 
case and “it is God he wants,” not more arguments defending God.454 
One should also recall the importance of chapter 19 in Vischer’s exegesis of Job. 
Recall that Vischer sees that chapter as the main turning point in the book since he feels it 
definitively answers the Satan’s question in the prologue. The second question, which asks 
about the nature of God’s righteousness, can only be answered by God himself. Because 
God does not arrive on the scene of the drama until chapter 38, Vischer can change the 
positions of the remaining chapters of the dialogue with little risk of disrupting the narrative 
since they seem merely to delay the gratification of the tempest. Chapter 28, along with 
raising the problems that Vischer highlights, ends by declaring that only God can answer the 
question raised in the dialogues. It seems strange to voice this position and then postpone 
following through on it for another ten chapters, thus Vischer’s relocation of several of the 	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454 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job II," 144. 
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passages between chapters 19 and 38 may be partially driven by his thesis of the book of Job 
as well as his genuine historical critical concerns.   
 Other indications of Vischer’s indebtedness to general historical critical scholarship 
appear in his acknowledgments of other sources in the Ancient Near East. For instance, he 
suggests that Job’s final defence compares favourably with the Egyptian Book of the 
Dead.455 He backs up this claim with a quote from the “Book of the Dead” to show how this 
may be the case but does not cite which specific text he quotes.456 The connection may be 
only that, “ein Anschluß,” he does not suggest which book is influencing which or even the 
obvious differences between the two. It is not really a very helpful comparison since it does 
not suggest the significance of the connection. When one looks more closely at the passage 
he cites, a closer connection seems evident. The “Protestation of Guiltlessness,” the passage 
Vischer cites from the Egyptian Book of the Dead, acts as a “negative confession” of guilt 
for a recently deceased person. After the passage that Vischer notes as parallel to Job 31:6 
(“Let him weigh me on scales of righteousness; let God know my integrity”), the supplicant 
recites a long list of actions he did not commit, much as Job does in the remaining verses of 
chapter 31. Vischer’s comparison between Job’s final confession and the Book of the Dead 
actually reveals more the influences of his own work rather than the influences of the book 
of Job. Vischer does not offer much in the way of his secondary sources, but these nods to 
findings among critical scholars display his interests in historical criticism. Because his 
interest ultimately lies in the theology to which the book of Job points, he does not dwell 
much on the historical aspects of the text. The book of Job may contain parallels to extra-
biblical sources, but it is not the pre-history of Job with which Vischer concerns himself. 
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456 The specific text he quotes is “The Protestation of Guiltlessness.” (James B. Pritchard, ed. Ancient Near 
Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament, 3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 34-36.)  
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 Besides presenting a reconstructed text and recognizing extra-biblical sources, 
Vischer attempts to exegete the entire text of Job as a single narrative though the narrative is 
one of his reconstruction. One fascinating interpretive move arises among another 
potentially corrupt text. Job 19:27-29 has troubled interpreters for a long time because of its 
grammar as well as its message.457 Pope comments on verses 28 and 29, “These lines are a 
jumble of verbiage and possibly the text is damaged or misplaced.”458 Dhorme, whose 
commentary precedes Vischer by only a few years, follows Ball in declaring the MT of verse 
29 “ungrammatical and untranslatable,” and so lists modern interpreters’ reconstitutions of 
the text based on the Greek version.459 Vischer, according to his translator Allan Ellison, is 
content to allow the verse to stand as it does in the MT rather than reconstruct it based on 
other texts. However, because of its difficult interpretation based on its overwrought 
grammar, he seems to interpret the phrase as incoherent babble from the mouth of the 
character of Job rather than a corrupt text. Vischer’s interpretation of 27b is that “Hiob 
verliert das Bewußtsein.”460 Ellison adds an editorial note in parentheses, “The exclamation 
‘My reins are consumed in me’! together with the sobbing incoherence of the next two 
verses, suggests that Job, in the agony of his great declaration of faith, loses his sense for 
some time.”461 The German original of Vischer’s text is not so clear. Vischer does not 
explain his interpretation of verse 27 and seems to ignore 28 and 29 altogether. This may 
result from a number of possible interpretations. He may, as Ellison indicates, view the 
jumbled incoherence of 28 and 29 as coming from the mouth of one who has feinted, 
speaking unconsciously. Secondly, he may merely not deal with the two verses just as he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 “If you say, 'How we will persecute him!' and, 'The root of the matter is found in him'; be afraid of the 
sword, for wrath brings the punishment of the sword, so that you may know there is a judgment.” (Job 19:28, 
29 NRSV) 
458 Marvin H. Pope, Job: Introduction, Translation, and Notes, vol. 15, AB (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1965), 135. 
459 Édouard Dhorme, Job, 288. 
460 Wilhelm Vischer, "Hiob, Ein Zeuge Jesu Christi," 20. 
461 Wilhelm Vischer, "Witness of Job I," 52. 
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does not deal with much of Job, because they do not advance his argument. Thirdly, the 
verses in question are not only difficult grammatically, but also theologically. Vischer would 
not be the only critic to have a problem with the retributive message in 28 and 29 coming 
from the mouth of Job. Pope questions whether the verses should not be somewhere in the 
speeches of the friends and Vischer may agree. Moving them would certainly help Vischer’s 
argument concerning the message of Job. Dealing with these verses in a critical manner, 
however, would not fit the genre of Vischer’s work and so rather than argue for their proper 
place, he likely skips over them altogether. It will become clear in his later discussions that 
Vischer would not have a huge problem with a reconstructed Job that includes moving entire 
chapters to more apt settings for this is what he does with chapter 28. However, with two 
verses, he may have thought it disruptive to the larger task of interpretation. 
Job as a Witness to Jesus Christ 
 The larger task of interpretation for Vischer leads to the finale of his essay—how the 
book of Job bears witness to Christ. It is safe to say that whatever fame Vischer has enjoyed 
over the years, much of it is due to his essays and books that show how the Old Testament 
bears witness to Christ. His most famous book is entitled Das Christuszeugnis des Alten 
Testaments and bears a resemblance to the essay on Job and his other essay on Esther 
mentioned earlier. In all of these texts, Vischer exposits Old Testament passages (in the 
cases of Job and Esther, the entire books) and shows how they resemble either passages of 
the Gospels or aspects of the character of Jesus Christ. In Das Christuszeugnis, however, the 
parallels are made much more explicit.  
 As an example of how the book differs from Vischer’s essay on Job, note how 
Vischer treats Cain’s sign in Genesis as an idea of a covenantal sign binding people to God. 
He notes that in Ezekiel 9:4, an angel receives instruction from Yahweh to mark the 
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foreheads of those that sigh and groan for the abominations done in the land. The mark (the 
word taw in Hebrew, the last letter of the alphabet spelled out), Vischer notes, would have 
been in the shape of an X in the Old Canaanite alphabet. Vischer then writes: 
We may thus with a fair degree of probability assume that the cross with which Cain 
was branded and which in Christianity received a new significance is the ancient sign 
of Jahweh. The fact that in Revelation 7, in almost literal dependence on Ezekiel 9, 
the 144,000 slaves of our God are marked on the brow with this seal… before 
destruction is let loose… confirms the view that the Christian seal of the living God 
is the same symbol as the sign found in the vision of Ezekiel and upon Cain.462  
 
Vischer makes a similar point in describing Job 31:35 where Job presents his mark (taw). 
However, despite translating taw as cross in his essay, he merely leaves it at that.463 Vischer 
does no more than call the mark a cross, which it technically would have been. He does not 
speculate that this cross bears any relationship to the Cross of Christ other than draw the 
reader to its possibility on his or her own. 
 To be clear, Vischer points briefly to the taw in Job 31:35, but of course presents a 
more expansive Christological reading at the end of his exposition on Job. Thus, the 
differences between the Christuszeugnis and his essay on Job are not drastic, but are mainly 
due to emphases.  
Where the passage on Cain’s sign resembles the Job essay is how his understanding 
of influence seems almost elusive. He does not find the cross on which Christ died in the Old 
Testament. He is not allegorizing in the same way as many pre-critical scholars might have. 
Instead, he is subtly implying a cultural connection between the narrative of Cain, the 
prophet Ezekiel, the author of Revelation, and symbol of Christ’s atoning sacrifice. To be 
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sure, he holds to a theology of a sovereign God directing these connections, but related to 
that is the intrinsic relationship between the Old Testament and the New Testament.  
The inherent relation between the two testaments is also one of the important, yet 
subtle points of his essay on Job. As I argue in the first section of this chapter, one of his 
reasons for this may have been his valid concern that the Old Testament had been 
increasingly seen as unimportant in Christian theology and in New Testament studies, based 
partly on rampant and established anti-Semitism in Europe at that time.  
In the final chapter, I will compare the typological imagination of Vischer in his 
essay on Job with those of Barth and Kierkegaard in their respective works on Job. In doing 
so, I will examine closely Vischer’s later claims to oppose allegory and typology as 
hermeneutical tools in his exegesis.464 In brief, he finds the use of allegory as strained and as 
ignorant of the meaning present in the text. When comparing Job to Christ, he uses the terms 
Zeichnis (sign), Gleichnis (parable), and Vorbild (model), resisting more spiritual 
connections for terms that point to resemblance or literary parallels. The conclusion to 
“Hiob, ein Zeuge Jesu Christi” seems to act merely to point at the resemblances between the 
story in the book of Job and the life, death, and resurrection of Christ.  
The import of the resemblances is that the book of Job “points beyond itself.”465 The 
beginning of the book of Job asks the question of whether a human could be a disinterested 
devotee to God. Job answers that in the affirmative with his life and his speeches. The 
question Job asks is to what end does he devote himself to God. In other words, the book of 
Job points beyond itself and back to God. Christ embodies the movement displayed in the 
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book of Job in his life, death, and resurrection, thus the book of Job eventually points to 
Christ, whose life also points to God.  
In Vischer’s Job, everything points to God and God remains the end point to all 
questions. The friends appeal to reason and tradition, imagining that Job desires to put God 
on trial, but that would place God under reason and tradition. For Vischer and the Job he 
presents, nothing can be above God. God, therefore, is a completely free entity in the book 
of Job, a notion on which Karl Barth will elaborate in volume four of his Church Dogmatics, 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: A Witness to the True Witness: Karl Barth’s Unique 
Contribution to the Interpretation of the Book of Job 
 
 Karl Barth’s exposition of Job in §70 in Church Dogmatics IV/3.1 has garnered little 
attention in the years since it has been published and almost none from biblical scholars. 
Daniel Migliore compares Barth’s reading to Ernst Bloch’s, detailing the significance of 
Barth’s adherence to the final form over and against Bloch’s search for a subversive text 
behind the final form.466 The value of Migliore’s essay notwithstanding, the end product is 
more concerned with Bloch than Barth; Barth is more important as a supporting reference 
than a subject of examination. Harold Schulweis uses Barth’s text on Job as a way to 
compare Barth’s view on God to a Jewish understanding—the Book of Job being a text that 
both Jews and Christians have in common.467 Nicholas Adams compares Calvin, Barth, and 
Aquinas’ readings of Job as a platform on which to discuss the merits of public debate.468 
Otto Bächli presents a detailed exposition of Barth’s interpretation of Job in his book Das 
Alte Testament in der Kirchlichen Dogmatik von Karl Barth.469 Though a valuable resource, 
Bächli mainly lets Barth speak for himself, granting an extraordinary amount of space to the 
words of Barth rather than his own analysis of how Barth’s Job fits into his larger work on 
“The True Witness.” Bächli’s introduction contains his most astute analysis of Barth’s 
method of exegesis in §70, stating that exegesis is for Barth not so much Illustration, but 
rather Quellenangabe, thus exegesis does not play the role of Hilfsfunktion, but rather 
Grundfunktion. Of the few scholars that discuss Barth’s Job in detail, Sussanah Ticciati’s 
published dissertation is the work that most closely resembles the approach of biblical 	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scholarship in that her purpose is to introduce Barth’s interpretation of Job as a platform for 
her own interpretation of Job.470 Ticciati focuses on Barth’s attention to the character of Job 
as right and wrong and sees obedience as the main issue at stake in the book of Job. The 
following differs from all of these previous publications in that it is concerned with Barth’s 
interpretive strategy in his discourse on Job and how that strategy leads to his interpretation. 
Ticciati sees Barth’s focus on Job’s free obedience as key to his reading—his already 
developed theology driving his exposition.471 She discusses Barth’s use of historical 
criticism in a brief footnote, arguing that his comments are clearly “not integral to his 
argument.”472 This chapter argues that, though Barth does not contribute to historical 
criticism in ways that advance the historical-critical agenda, he does broadly use the findings 
of historical criticism to advance his own theological agenda. That is, he does not dismiss 
historical-critical theories on Job in the way that Ticciati seems to insinuate, but incorporates 
them in unique, and perhaps eclectic ways. What follows is an analysis of Barth’s 
interpretive strategy of the Book of Job, including his interest in the history of the authorship 
of the book, showing that his integrated approach, which includes historical criticism, 
theology, and a proto-canonical approach, contribute to a typological reading of Job that 
presents to Barth’s reader a picture of a freely obedient Job, a freely active God, and a group 
of friends who view God in such a restricted manner that they exhibit a sinfulness 
destructive to Christian theology.  
 As one reads through Barth’s interpretation of Job many familiar themes in Barth’s 
theology emerge. These topics share such an enmeshed relationship that discussion of one of 
his theories necessitates the knowledge of another. I will begin my discussion on Barth’s Job 
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with discussion on Barth’s doctrine of revelation, which relates to Job in that it explains how 
the Old Testament fits into Barth’s doctrine. Revelation also helps explain how Barth 
interprets the God speeches in the Book of Job, and also begins to shed light on Barth’s 
Christological exegesis and typological imagination. Following the brief discussion on 
Revelation comes an exploration on how historical-criticism of the Book of Job aids Barth’s 
interpretation of the book as a cross-section of the Church’s relationship to God. Next I 
discuss typology and the placement of Barth’s interpretation of Job under the heading “The 
True Witness.” Before concluding with an evaluation of Barth’s method and interpretation, I 
will look closely at how the theme of freedom underlies Barth’s discourse. Space precludes 
an extended exploration of this major theme in Barth’s Dogmatics but even a cursory 
reading of Barth’s Job will note the importance of Job’s freedom in obedience to God and 
God’s freedom in electing Job and how this freedom eventually mediates the extended 
discourse on suffering that Job and his friends undertake in the bulk of the book.  
At one point in the large print of §70 in Church Dogmatics IV/3.1, Karl Barth 
discusses the problem with doctrine and the person of Jesus Christ as follows: 
Doctrine… participates or does not participate in the truth to the extent and in the 
measure that directly or indirectly it teaches Him or fails to do so. But he cannot be 
enclosed or confined in any doctrine concerning Him, not even the most correct 
Christology… He is not conditioned by nor bound to it, as it is conditioned by or 
bound to Him.473 
This brief statement addresses many of the points that Barth will engage in the next one 
hundred pages of his Dogmatics. Most directly, it deals with the freedom of God in his 
relation to humanity—that no doctrine can contain God for then it will be superior to God.474 
Secondarily, this statement leads to the importance of the historicalness and personality of 
God’s true Witness in Jesus Christ. Since doctrine is generally abstract and does not account 	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474 Recall Vischer’s assessment that God is not subservient to the law that God purveys.  
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for one-to-one contact, it is not a wholly adequate medium with which to discuss God. 
Thirdly, since he dedicates roughly 40% of the next 100 pages to his exegesis of Job, it is 
difficult not to notice how Barth’s writings might relate to his excursuses on Job. One way 
this particular quote relates to Job is that it instructs the reader to resist a one-to-one 
correspondence between Jesus and Job. It is tempting to think of typological exegesis as one-
to-one comparison, but in Barth’s case it is closer to metaphor in that the type points to the 
anti-type or some tertium quid. If a critic were to describe a character with the common 
designation “modern-day Falstaff,” the description would break down awfully quickly if 
using strict allegorical parameters. But if the one describing the character only means that 
Falstaff points to the modern-day figure, then a “type” of allegory seems to have been 
employed. This is what Barth will do with Job and Jesus to some extent and this is indicated 
in the line quoted above. If Barth were employing allegory à la Gregory the Great then 
Christ, as the anti-type to Job, would be bound to the description of Job just as he explains 
cannot happen with a free Christ. On the other hand, one could equally fall into the trap of 
thinking that Job is bound to Barth’s Christology. Neither of these is the case, as will be 
shown below. 
 Barth discusses Jesus Christ as the true Witness in three sections, each followed by 
an interpretation of an element of the character of Job. After his discourse on Jesus and Job, 
he discusses the falsehood of humanity. He finds this analogous with Job’s friends, the 
interpretation of whom follows. 
The first section on Jesus Christ discusses his relationship with God and describes it 
as one based on freedom—the freedom of God to crown the man Jesus Christ and the 
freedom of Christ to obey God.475 Jesus as a man is able to relate to humanity but his 
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relationship with God gives him the ability to condemn humans as well. Barth then describes 
the aspects of Job that are similar to this as an illustration of a free relationship between a 
human and God. He admits that any number of New Testament passages could suffice when 
illustrating what he has described in the large print thus far. However, the story of Job seems 
to draw him more and he even suggests that it is the story of Job that is the basis for the large 
print rather than vice versa. What follows is a general introduction to Job which leads to a 
description of the man Job. This is based on the prose description in the book, which Barth 
suggests is the pure form of Job. He sees him as pious and unique to the point that, despite 
his fallibility, he will not fail in the wager placed on him. God in his infallibility can 
guarantee that Job will succeed. Nevertheless, Barth’s main point about Job and his 
relationship to God is that this is a relationship based on freedom—God’s freedom to elect 
and Job’s freedom to obey.476 When God blesses Job at the beginning and end of the story, it 
is a free act, not one based on reward and punishment. Taking his cue from Vischer, Barth 
sees the key phrase in the book to be Satan’s wager questioning Job’s decision to follow God 
“for nought” (chinnam) in the same way that God blesses Job freely.477 After introducing 
this hermeneutical key to his interpretation of the story of Job, Barth moves back to his 
description of the true Witness. Job acts as a type of the true Witness because, like Christ, he 
is a “free servant of the free God,” but Barth is very careful to point out that Job’s 
similarities with Jesus Christ should not be exaggerated.478 Job, instead, “belongs to the 
context of the witness of the history of Israel which is only moving towards the history of 
Jesus Christ.”479 Barth leaves his essay on Job behind for a while to continue his exposition 
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of Jesus as true Witness, noting that Job should remain in one’s mind as a “type of Jesus 
Christ, a witness to the true Witness.”480 
 The image of the suffering Christ dominates the large print of this section of §70. 
When explaining the depths to which Christ will plunge himself in order to relate to 
humanity’s suffering, Barth commonly uses the phrase “Gethsemane and Golgotha.” Christ 
becomes hidden and unrecognizable to us but does not leave his pure form of Victor 
behind.481 This idea is Barth’s basis for exegeting the sufferings of Job, putting into question 
the traditional position of Job as theodicy. “God Himself suffers with us as [Christ] suffers,” 
Barth writes.482 Thus, Barth continues to focus on free obedience as the main problem in 
Job, complicated by an unknown form of God. Just as Christ takes on a different form in his 
suffering, so does Job. The transformation of Job from chapter 2 to chapter 3 is as striking as 
the transformation of Christ in Philippians 2. Barth continues, “It is not that he does not 
remain the same. As the same both in God’s relationship to him and his to God, he will later 
reappear in the pure form which for the moment is concealed.”483 However, Christ’s person 
complicates the analogy by acting not only as the anti-type to Job but also to God. God also 
appears in an alien, transformed image and this mysterious persona of God—a veiled 
revelation—is the source of Job’s suffering. Job cannot reconcile the God whom he 
worshipped in the prologue with the God whom he worships in the dialogues. Thus the 
suffering comes from the worship itself—though he is ignorant of this God, he remains 
faithful. Barth’s attraction toward paradox comes to the fore here—human and divine, 
hidden and revealed, right and wrong—however, Job’s relationship with God remains intact 
and the tension between these opposites creates tension in Job. 
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 The Word and words of God as a response to God’s alienation to humanity is Barth’s 
third topic. Through the power of the Holy Spirit, God speaks the word only he can speak 
through all of history. This is emulated in the activity of Christ on the Cross. The event that 
Barth uses to describe this effective word is the sigh that Christ breathed when he died. “It is 
at once the death-cry of the man who dies in Him and the birth-cry of the man who comes to 
life in Him.”484 The reconciling power of God reveals itself through a suffering person. 
Humanity’s response is to “be ready to be told by Him that we shall find Him precisely 
where we do not think we should look for Him, namely, in direct confrontation with and at 
the very heart of our own reality… The lonely man of Gethsemane and Golgotha, the lonely 
God, then comes together with lonely man isolated in his deepest need.”485 Barth illustrates 
this in God’s speeches to Job—a fascinating interpretation of God’s confusing response in 
the Old Testament book. When God speaks to Job out of the whirlwind, Job’s response 
suggests that he is not confused. Barth reasons that this is because God reveals himself to 
Job as the God Job has not ceased to worship. The tension that Job feels between the God 
who has blessed him and the one who attacks him is released when it is revealed that they 
are one and the same and that God makes a movement toward Job. The election of God by 
Job is shown to have been reciprocated. Thus Barth finds in the Book of Job, not an 
unsolvable quagmire but a profound illustration of the free God and free human in dynamic 
relationship. 
 Barth follows this last section of “The True Witness” with a discourse on “The 
Falsehood of Man.” This particular type of sin, Barth explains, is “possible and powerful 
only in this age. It takes place as man desires and attempts to avoid Jesus Christ as the true 
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Witness encountering him. Man would rather escape this encounter.”486 The reason for this 
is that “man in this era is exposed to a relatively much stronger unsettlement and constriction 
by the painful truth of God than in any other sphere”—that being the truth of God present in 
the suffering and death of Christ.487 Despite this being a distinctively Christian sin, Barth 
finds his most adequate illustration of this falsehood in the pre-Christian Old Testament, 
presumably because Job has so far done an excellent job of emulating the true Witness in his 
suffering and communicating with God. The friends are so confident of their doctrines that 
they refuse to see the true Word of God revealed in the suffering normally reserved for the 
sinful and cursed human. 
 The above, then, is the context in which one finds Barth’s Job, which seems unusual 
in the modern era. It is uncommon for commentators to discuss Job Christologically, but 
Barth cannot deny the context in which he, himself, finds the book of Job. Its placement in 
the Canon focuses the interpretation on what Barth sees as the centre of the Canon—Jesus 
Christ. Because of this, he is able to see a different side of the speeches of God—a side 
where God is not merely (and to many, inadequately) responding to Job in the whirlwind, 
but where God is speaking to Job through the suffering Job is experiencing. Thus, Barth 
presents a reading of Job that bypasses theodicy by virtue of a canonical approach and a 
theology of address that stems from his doctrine of revelation. 
Revelation and the Book of Job 
 As noted in the brief analysis of John Calvin’s sermons on Job, Calvin interested 
himself greatly in the hiddenness of God in the book. God’s veiled state leads to the 
suffering of Job more than his physical ailments. As a Reformed theologian himself with 
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Lutheran influence, Barth’s interest in God’s veiling should not surprise. One may recall 
Calvin’s interpretation of the Book of Job as meditation on the hiddenness of God’s 
providential activity. However, Barth’s interpretation of Job shares little in common with 
Calvin’s in most other ways. In fact, the hiddenness of God in the Book of Job is less overt 
in Barth’s reading, perhaps because it is a presumed feature of God based on Barth’s 
aversion to natural theology. The dialectical theology that he espouses takes the veiling of 
God as an a priori fact about God that only God can overcome. The dialectical method of 
theology that Barth helped to establish early in his career has undergone many explanations 
by many theologians over the years.488 Rather than retread this well-worn path, I will merely 
highlight the features of it that benefit this present study. 
 Dialectical theology relates to Barth’s Job in that the tension that the dialectical 
theologians attempted to hold between the via positiva of the scholastic method and the via 
negativa of mysticism mimics the tension between Job and his friends during their 
dialogue.489 Job’s friends’ attempts to describe God definitively frustrate Job and his 
personal experience which seems to negate the friends’ objective reasoning. In the end, 
Barth shows that Job’s friends, like the established theologians of previous generations, are 
both right and wrong and that Job is both wrong and right. God alone can intervene in the 
discussion and even then does not directly answer the question, remaining veiled even in his 
revelation.  
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 The Bible witnesses to God’s revelation in Jesus, whom Barth calls “The True 
Witness” in the section of Dogmatics where one finds his interpretation of Job. The Word of 
God, thus, comes to us in three forms: God reveals the Word in Christ, but the Word is 
proclaimed in preaching and it is written in the Bible.490 As Colin Gunton explains, however, 
God remains veiled in this act because even though the hidden God finally reveals himself in 
the person of Jesus Christ, “it is not obviously God…, it [is] just a man wandering around 
teaching.”491 However hidden God remains in Jesus, one cannot separate God from Jesus. 
God, in some ways, must be revealed in Jesus Christ because God is not God without Jesus 
Christ.492 So when Barth discusses the Book of Job and what it says about God’s relationship 
to humanity, he must also discuss Jesus Christ since Jesus, the “God with man,” is the true 
revelation of God.493 Though Christ does not appear in Scripture until the New Testament, 
his intrinsic relationship with God the Father necessitates discussion of him in the Old 
Testament. 
 If Jesus is God revealed and the Bible acts as that revelation written down, Barth 
does draw a distinction between the two Testaments. The Old Testament documents the 
expectation of God’s revelation and the New Testament recollects God’s revelation. This is 
not to say that the time for expecting the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is not revelation 
itself, for Barth says that “because it is the time for expecting it, it is itself revelation-
time.”494 The Bible’s authority comes in its witness to revelation of the highest order even 
though it bears the words of humans.495 
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as the veil hiding revelation from us.” (Mark S. Gignilliat, Karl Barth and the Fifth Gospel: Barth's 
Theological Exegesis of Isaiah, Barth Studies (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 31. 
491 Colin Gunton, The Barth Lectures (London: T & T Clark, 2007), 80. 
492 Colin Gunton, Lectures, 112. 
493 Roger R. Keller, “Karl Barth's Treatment of the Old Testament as Expectation,” AUSS 35, no. 2 (1997), 167. 
494 CD I/2, 86. Roger Keller may explain this better than Barth himself when he writes, “revelation in the OT is 
actually the expectation of revelation, or most properly, expected revelation… Because the OT community 
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 Barth finds reason to hold to this doctrine of the Old Testament in the writings of the 
New Testament. Because the New Testament treats the Old Testament as an authoritative 
witness to the revelation the New Testament recollects,496 one should not shy from the 
position that the Old Testament participates in the revelation of Christ, however hidden 
Christ is in the words of the Old Testament. This does not mean that Barth holds the New 
Testament in a more dignified place, only that both Testaments witness to Christ, one before 
the Incarnation and one after it.497 
 Barth’s doctrine of revelation explains in part Barth’s readiness to find Christ in the 
Book of Job, since Christ is present in the Old Testament in this unique way. However, 
before we look more closely into the intricacies of his typology it is necessary to explore his 
use of historical criticism. Barth’s aversion to natural revelation means that God does not 
work through human agents (other than Jesus). Thus, the words of the Bible are not God’s 
words but bear witness to God as Word.498 The words of the Bible, therefore, may contain 
histories independent of the Canonical text. The Book of Job is certainly not immune to 
these histories. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
awaited and expected God’s revelation of himself in the future, they already had and participated in that 
revelation.” (Roger R. Keller, "Expectation," 168.) 
495 Emil G. Kraeling, The Old Testament Since the Reformation (London: Lutterworth Press, 1955), 168. See 
also Alan Richardson, "Rise," 322. 
496 Roger R. Keller, "Expectation," 169. Barth writes, “But the New Testament writers are utterly unanimous in 
seeing, not in Judaism—not one of them was concerned with that—but in the history of Israel attested in the 
Old Testament Canon the connecting point for their proclamation, doctrine and narrative of Christ; and vice 
versa, in seeing in their proclamation, doctrine and narrative of Christ the truth of the history of Israel, the 
fulfillment of the Holy Scripture read in the synagogue.” (CD I/2, 72.) 
497 Emil G. Kraeling, Old Testament, 169. 
498 Alan Richardson, "Rise," 322. 
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Historical Criticism in Barth’s Treatment of Job 
 Barth’s use of historical criticism is not a major aspect of his exegetical method.499  
In some passages, he deals theologically with what seems like a source-critical issue. Ticciati 
insinuates that this is the case throughout Barth’s Job discourse, writing that “he proceeds 
with his argument in a way that bypasses [the results of historical criticism], not allowing 
them to get in the way of his theological insights.”500 This may be the case in a few passages. 
For instance, in discussing the divine names in Job, he writes: 
it cannot be an accident, that this proper name of God in the Old Testament 
[Yahweh]… is predominant in the explanatory opening chapters (1-2), being always 
used except in a few more general references, but that in the whole of the central 
section… it is replaced by the generic names Elohim and Shaddai, only to recur quite 
suddenly in the introductory verses to the divine speeches… and to become 
predominant again in c. 2. Thus Yahweh, the Lord of Israel and its history… is the 
God whose servant is Job the Edomite.501  
If this were to come earlier in Barth’s discourse, it would perhaps seem a little naïve. One 
can easily attribute the change in divine names to the multitude of authors writing in various 
settings which utilize different names for God. However, Barth is aware of the finer points in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499 Barth’s use of the historical-critical method is quite complex and it seems that he uses it in different ways 
throughout the Church Dogmatics. Kathryn Greene-McCreight, Ad Litteram: How Augustine, Calvin, and 
Barth Read the Plain Sense of Genesis 1-3, Issues in Systematic Theology; 5 (New York: Peter Lang, 1999) 
lays out a bibliography of several works regarding Barth and historical-criticism on note 84 of page 233 to 
which I would add discussions by Paul McGlasson, Jesus and Judas: Biblical Exegesis in Barth (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1991); Mary Kathleen Cunningham, What is Theological Exegesis? Interpretation and Use of 
Scripture in Barth's Doctrine of Election (Valley Forge, Pa: TPI, 1995); Mark S. Gignilliat, Fifth Gospel, and 
Leroy A. Davis, “Typology in Barth's Doctrine of Scripture,” AThR 47, no. 1 (1965): 33-49. For a useful work 
describing Barth and historical criticism in his commentary on Romans, see Richard E. Burnett, Karl Barth's 
Theological Exegesis: The Hermeneutical Principles of the Römerbrief Period, WUNT (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2001). For Barth in his Philippians commentary, see Bruce McCormack, “The Significance of Karl 
Barth's Theological Exegesis of Philippians,” in The Epistle to the Philippians By Karl Barth: 40th Anniversary 
Edition (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002); and Francis Watson, “Barth's Philippians as Theological 
Exegesis,” in The Epistle to the Philippians By Karl Barth: 40th Anniversary Edition (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox, 2002). 
500 Susannah Ticciati, Disruption, 4. 
501 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 427. 
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the history behind the text and even seems to have a strategy in dealing with these sources, 
though it does not fall into the conventional usage of his day.502  
 In CD IV/2, Barth explicitly discusses how he incorporates biblical criticism into his 
exegesis. In introducing his interpretation of the Numbers 13-14 narrative concerning the 
spies of Moses in the Promised Land, he discusses the transmission of the text into its final 
kerygmatic form from chronicle, saga, and “that which has been consciously fashioned, or 
invented, in a later and synthetic review.”503 It is clear that the history behind the text has 
some importance in providing information regarding purpose. In the case of Numbers, Barth 
recognizes a typological relationship between the initial failings in the conquest of the 
Promised Land presented in the Numbers narrative and anxieties in Israel’s return from 
Exile—when part of the narrative was presumably written. This background is only one part 
of the interpretation of the text and once distinctions have been made concerning the makeup 
of the text, “they can be pushed again into the background that the whole can be read… as 
the totality it professes to be.”504 Thus, the background of the text is merely that—
background. The text as Barth receives it is the important element to him, no matter how 
historically accurate the narrative or the findings of historical critics purport to be. By 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 That being said, his source-critical assumptions are not widely attested today. He largely follows the 
conclusions of the day. He mentions Oettli, Lamparter, Hölscher, and R. de Pury in addition to Vischer and 
Kierkegaard. Often though, he criticizes their conclusions to make his point. Hölscher, his contemporary, he 
chides for trying to identify Job’s illness in 7:4 as elephantiasis (399). On the other hand, Hölscher seems to 
provide Barth with theory that Job 28:28 is not original to chapter 28. (Gustav Hölscher, Das Buch Hiob, vol. 
17, HAT (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1937), 68.) With Oettli, a scholar from the previous generation, Barth 
accepts a new translation and a summation of Job’s last speech. One assumes that he consulted other sources 
and accepted the consensus opinions, but we cannot be sure. 
503Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, vol. IV.2 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1960), 478-79. Though he does not say so, it is possible he has in mind the three constituent parts—J, P, and 
E—that make up this narrative according to historical critics. (See Martin Noth, Numbers: a Commentary, 
trans. James D. Martin, vol. 7, OTL (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1968), 101-03, as well as Rolf P. and George W. 
Coats Knierim, Numbers, vol. IV, FOTL (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 7, 183-93. The original German 
version of Noth’s commentary is from 1966, so would have succeeded CD IV.3 but typifies the consensus of 
the era nonetheless. 
504 Karl Barth, CD IV.2, 479. See also Gignilliat, who writes of Barth’s Old Testament exegesis following 
Greene-McCreight, “It is the text which governs the interpretive process rather than historical-critical 
reconstruction.” (Mark S. Gignilliat, Fifth Gospel, 4.) 
 191	  
pushing the history into the background Barth promotes an interpretive stance that he calls a 
“tested and critical naivety.”505 
 The tested and critical naivety relates to his doctrine of revelation. Gunton explains 
that Barth viewed the Bible as imposed on humanity. That is, the readers of the Bible are in 
some ways passive agents who receive the Bible, thus Barth accepts the Bible as correct in 
its proclamations. God reveals himself in the scriptures and we trust God more than 
ourselves. Therefore we must take historical criticism as useful but not entirely trustworthy. 
It can benefit us as long as we are aware of our prejudices in encountering its conclusions.506 
Most importantly, the results of historical criticism should not act as ends in and of 
themselves. In the case of his commentary on Philippians, Barth concerns himself less with 
Paul as subject of his study than Paul as witness to revelation.507 His approach changes 
somewhat between the publication of his Romans commentary and his Philippians 
commentary and this is evident in his exegesis in the Church Dogmatics. Historical criticism 
is no longer anathema but a tool.508 When the tool, however, proves inappropriate for the job 
at hand, Barth sets it aside, as seems evident in his work on Numbers and also Job. Barth’s 
acknowledgement and use of historical criticism contributes to his typological reading of Job 
by taking the focus away from authorial intent or the original Sitz im Leben. He instead reads 
every text of scripture in the light of the Bible as a whole. Problems do arise, however, when 
he interprets according to some of his theological presuppositions and in other cases does not 
follow his own post-critical theories. 
When Barth recognizes the history behind the text, particularly in Job, it is not 
always clear that he does much more than acknowledge this history. One might surmise that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
505 Karl Barth, CD IV.2, 479. 
506 Colin Gunton, Lectures, 73-74. 
507 Bruce McCormack, "The Significance of Karl Barth's," xviii. 
508 Francis Watson, "Barth's Philippians as Theological Exegesis," xxx. 
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he is merely attempting to gain credibility with the biblical scholars of his era who are 
preoccupied with historical criticism. Thus he agrees with their assessments with little or no 
protest. However, Barth’s hermeneutic does not allow him to dwell on what the text used to 
be. Instead, he focuses on the writings that would be canonized as Holy Scripture later in 
their existence.509 In his reading concerning God’s speeches to Job, Barth muses, “we have 
here two different compositions which have been brought together from obviously different 
sources. (The question suggests itself whether there did not once exist a whole corpus of Job 
literature of which a selection has now been assembled in the present Book.)”510 This 
parenthetical statement brings to light Barth’s confidence in the existence of multiple 
sources of the Book of Job—sources that are unavailable to us but whose hypothetical 
existence still affects one’s interpretation in subtle and nuanced ways.  The “existence” of 
words that are unavailable have no definable meaning; for a dogmatician, these hypothetical 
words do nothing but bring one’s focus to the seams of the text. At these seams, two 
seemingly disparate texts rub against each other and the friction creates some of the energy 
that Barth draws from to make theological claims. He begins this interpretive technique early 
in his work on Job. 
 Early in his discourse, Barth acknowledges the likelihood of seven authors of the 
Book of Job composing the following sections: the prose chapters 1-2 and 42; the dialogues 
with the friends at 3-24, 27, and 29-31; problematic dialogues in 25-26; the Elihu speeches at 
32-37; God’s first response at 38-39; God’s second response at 40-41; and the hymn on 
wisdom at 28. Although he does not say it, Barth presumably would acknowledge an eighth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509 Early in his discourse on Job, Barth expresses the importance he places on the received text in a 
parenthetical note on C. G. Jung’s Antwort auf Hiob. He writes, “From the human standpoint this is a very 
penetrating study, and incidentally it throws a good deal of light on the psychology of the professional 
psychologist. As an attempt to explain Job and the Bible, however, it suffers quite hopelessly from the fact that 
according to his own declaration on p. 15 the author is quite ‘unashamedly and ruthlessly’ giving expression to 
his very remarkable impressions. Hence he cannot possibly read and consider what is actually there, and his 
work is quite useless in this regard.” (Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 384.)  
510 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 428. 
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author who writes connecting verses at the seams such as some of the verses at the beginning 
of 42 that would make little sense without the dialogues but are written in the style of 1-2 
(unless these could be answered by the missing sections of the folktale). A ninth author 
would likely have written 28:28.511 Barth then states that “at some time and by some person 
all this came to be seen and understood as the unity which it now constitutes in the Canon. 
We remember these problems and hypotheses as we now turn to consider the whole.”512 It 
might occur to Barth’s addressee that “remember these problems” is all that he does. He is, 
in actuality, rarely explicit concerning the purpose of remembering these problems. 
However, the acknowledgement of the history behind the text does seem intimately related 
to the overall interpretation of the text, especially with regard to the one who will eventually 
arrange these disparate texts. 
The real author to Barth is the redactor513 who lends meaning to the speeches by 
placing them aside the other speeches and then places that unit of speeches in the text as a 
response to Job and his friends and as the climax to the “folktale.”514 This body of work, the 
Book of Job, is then placed by another editor (perhaps the community of believers) in the 
context of the Canon, lending it more meaning. In a way, the Book of Job acts as a 
microcosm of the Canon as a whole. The smaller pieces contain some meaning, but the 
meaning is focused or generated as the context changes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 426. 
512 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 384. 
513 Cf. Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929), who argued that even if the Torah was a composite of several different 
sources writing in different periods, the redactor was the true “Rabbenu” (Our Teacher). “The Torah which 
speaks to the Jewish soul is the Torah which is now in our hands.” (Louis Jacobs, The Jewish Religion: A 
Companion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 429.) 
514 Note, however, that occasionally he suggests that the text itself has its own motivation. For instance, when 
discussing the various histories present in the final form of Numbers 13-14, he states, “It is only then that they 
can say what they are trying to say.” This is likely only a literary device and should not be understood in a 
mystical way. 
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As in the Canon itself, the independent documents in Job are difficult to reconcile 
with each other. But the tension should not merely be reconciled. Another explanation could 
be sought after. In Barth’s own words: 
It might… be suggested that in chapters 3-31 we have an independent text which 
really intends to leave matters like this, both as between Job and God and also as 
between Job and his friends, thus indicating the indissolubly problematic existential 
situation of man at peace and yet also at odds with God. But we cannot be satisfied 
with this if we consider the whole span of the Book. The overriding purpose of the 
whole is to show that this situation is intolerable and that it is in fact resolved.515 
A source-critical analysis that finds several different stories and can reconstruct the plots 
would not be an invalid scholarly project. One story would be of a man who loses everything 
and gains it back two fold and the other would be of a man with unidentified loss carrying on 
a debate over existential matters with a group of people with no resolution—like an ANE 
Waiting for Godot. But these independent narratives are non-extant and instead we have a 
single plot that is filled with tension. 
 Barth has two strategies for dealing with this tension.516 The first is in the level of the 
final form of the Book of Job and the second is based on his theological presuppositions. On 
page 398 of CD IV/3.1, Barth intimates the importance of the redactor to the interpretation 
of the Book of Job. The contrast between the character of Job in the folktale and the 
dialogues is so surprising that one could hardly expect a single author to produce such a 
work, so Barth implies. In fact, the redactor, or so it seems to Barth, sees a problem in Job’s 
initial responses to his injury in 1:21 and 2:10. Hypothetically,517 the redactor has in hand 
two texts. One is the folktale and the other is the poetic dialogues. The dialogues need an 
introduction to set the stage of Job’s complaint. The problem is that the folktale seems to 
raise a problem and solve it in a relatively short manner lacking much drama. Thus, by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
515 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 422. 
516 Resolving is not the right word since tension is an important element of his exegesis. 
517 The irony of the following reconstruction is noted at both the level of the attention to the history behind the 
Book of Job and the authorial intent of Karl Barth himself. 
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attaching the dialogues to the folktale, he suggests that Job’s comments in 1:21 and 2:10, 
which imply that God has won the wager versus the Satan, do not tell the whole story. As 
Barth writes, “with the fine sayings in 1:21 and 2:10 he has merely plotted the way, 
according to the obvious view of the redactor and apparently of the incomplete folk-saga 
reproducted [sic] in the Book. He has now to tread it.”518 Thus, to Barth, Job’s suffering is 
not in his loss of possessions or in his illness but in what comes later, in the treading. For 
later, in the dialogues, he comes to the realization that his piety must not have mediated to 
him the knowledge of God since he cannot reconcile the God that he worshipped on behalf 
of his sons with the one that has caused his suffering. This is what Barth calls the 
“knowledge and ignorance of God in headlong collision and unbearable tension.”519 
 From a literary standpoint, the above explanation is unusual but certainly not 
unacceptable. It is common in narratives to present an ostensibly resolved conflict only to 
have it uprooted by previously overlooked psychological issues or unexpected outside 
influences. In the ancient world, the Oedipus trilogy comes to mind. Cosmic influences are 
also not rare in narrative and drama throughout the ages. Thus, in Barth’s explanation, the 
history (Geschichte) at play in the Job story is subject to the true history of God. As Barth 
himself explains: 
If there is no doubt that the poem is related to the saga, that it is inspired by it and 
links up with it, there is also no doubt that the picture which is given of Job cannot be 
harmonized with that of the saga nor the words put in Job’s mouth literally 
interpreted in the light of it in the sense of pragmatic history.520  
Rather, one needs to interpret them in the sense of true history. Thus, the story of Job, in its 
final form, is to be interpreted in light of the cosmic reality behind the history that humanity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 398. 
519 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 401. 
520 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 401. 
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experiences on a day-to-day basis.521 This is the basis for Barth’s typology in his Job 
discourse. He is not merely exegeting Job for the sake of understanding the text itself. He is 
interested in the true history, the object of the text. How Barth does this is the topic for the 
next section below. 
Typology in Barth’s Job 
 Theoretically, Barth’s reading of Job would not need as much attention to the 
background of the text as he gives. One could explain the drastic change in Job’s character 
from the prologue to the dialogues and back through a variety of means. One can easily 
imagine a psychoanalytic reading of the character of Job that argues that Job is experiencing 
the effects of posttraumatic stress disorder, for instance.522 In a more rhetorical-critical 
reading, Job’s confidence in God might be shaken through his waiting on the ash heap. The 
reader questions Job’s integrity because of the discrepancy between Job’s initial reaction to 
his suffering and how he expresses himself in the dialogues. In the end, the reader’s 
definition of integrity and his understanding of Job’s suffering change because of the effect 
the text has on its audience. At first, it seems plausible that Barth’s attention to historical-
critical matters is merely a product of his own cultural and historical context. The culture in 
biblical scholarship and theology in the middle of the last century necessitated such 
discourse since opponents could question one’s credibility for not taking seriously such 
minutiae. But perhaps Barth has a different strategy in mind altogether. His interest does not 
seem at all to be to bolster his image among the broader academic community. His stature at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521 This is not a perceived cosmic reality, of course, without God revealing it. 
522 Of course, it should surprise no one to find out these studies exist. See Clifford Haughn and John C. 
Gonsiorek, “The Book of Job: Implications for Construct Validity of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Diagnostic 
Criteria,” Mental Health, Religion & Culture 12, no. 8 (2009): 833-45. Another article that hints that Job might 
suffer from PTSD is Fred Johnson, “A Phonological Existential Analysis to the Book of Job,” Journal of 
Religion and Health 44, no. 4 (2005): 391-401. Jung’s previously mentioned Antwort auf Hiob acts more as a 
psychoanalytic reading of God than of Job. (C. G. Jung, Answer to Job, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1954).) 
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the time of writing CD IV/3 was massive and, after all, he was writing a Church Dogmatics. 
His attention to critical matters could very well have come from his culture or his interest in 
the truth of history. However, it could also be an intrinsic part of his typological reading of 
the Bible.  
 In the juxtaposition of the multitudinous texts of Job that Barth hypothesizes, a single 
Job narrative emerges. Barth does not deny that the various sources of Job have their own 
integrity, but to reconstruct these stories is to lead one astray from the story before the 
reader. As mentioned above, the book of Job has much in common with the Bible as a 
whole. Multiple texts with various authors placed into a particular context create a single 
unit with a particular focus in the Bible as well. 
 By drawing attention to the multitude of texts that make up the final form of Job, 
Barth does not merely “provide a starting point” for exegesis or “help to prevent subjective 
excess” as Bruce McCormack argues.523 Barth also shows the futility of searching too hard 
for authorial intent or meaning behind the text.524 And yet he still is able to use the text for 
his theology because it is not the author that generates the meaning. Rather than the text as 
the source for meaning alone, Barth sees the text as pointing to the object of the text. Thus, 
one could argue that the Book of Job is no different than any of the other books of the Bible, 
since they all point to Jesus Christ. However, it is clear that Barth sees the Book of Job as 
unique in the way that it points to the true Witness and also to what aspects of Christ that it 
points. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523 Bruce McCormack, “Historical-Criticism and Dogmatic Interest in Karl Barth's Theological Exegesis of the 
New Testament,” LQ 5 (1991), 221. 
524 McCormack faults Mark Wallace for anachronism when Wallace argues that Barth interprets under the 
assumption of the intentional fallacy. Of course Wallace could contest McCormack’s claim by citing the 
intentional fallacy with regard to Barth himself. Barth’s actual intent with his use of historical criticism can 
only be hypothesized. Furthermore, as Cunningham and McGlasson have both suggested in their analysis of 
Barth’s exegesis, what he says he will do and what he does do not always match up, so trying to determine 
Barth’s hermeneutic based on his explicit intentions is flawed. See Mark I. Wallace, “Karl Barth's 
Hermeneutic: a Way Beyond the Impasse,” JR 68, no. 3 (1988), esp. 400-02. 
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In its context, Barth’s interpretation of Job is used to illustrate his doctrine of 
reconciliation and Jesus’ role in it as the true Witness. Thus, Barth treats Job as “an analogy 
in relation to Jesus Christ, and with suitable qualifications Job may thus be called a type of 
Jesus Christ, a witness to the true Witness.”525 To call Job merely analogous to Jesus, 
however, would not have the same force that Barth employs. There is clearly more 
significance to the book of Job than its ability to illustrate the object of faith. Nevertheless, 
Job as analogy of Christ is clearly important and he shows how it works on a number of 
levels. Primarily, however, Job is analogous to Christ in his relationship to God in the face 
of adversity.526  
 There is little controversy in Barth’s explication as to the potential meanings of 
difficult passages in Job. Since it is not a proper commentary, it is possible that Barth 
wrestled over ambiguous passages before settling on a particular meaning. Perhaps his proto-
canonical approach confirmed one meaning over another because of the context in which Job 
finds itself. Whatever the case, Barth writes with confidence that the advocate (16:19) and 
redeemer (19:25) to whom Job appeals in his ostensible court case against God is God 
himself. This reading is certainly plausible, but it is not definite. However, it is very 
important for Barth’s particular interpretation.527 In Barth’s own words, Job… 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 401. 
526 In the earlier example of a modern literary character described as a “modern-day Falstaff,” the signifier is 
Falstaff and the signified is, say, Ignatius J. Reilly of A Confederacy of Dunces by John Kennedy Toole. The 
goal is to describe Reilly as a fat blowhard and an effective way to supplant that image in someone’s mind is to 
conjure up an already existing, well-known character. This seems to be Barth’s main goal in describing Job as a 
witness to Christ—Job is the signifier and Christ is the signified. However, there are elements in Barth’s 
interpretation that turn the signifier-signified relationship around. The signifier-signified relationship in this 
type of description is not limited to chronology, not just in Barth’s reading of the Bible, but also with the 
history of literature. A later text may gain notoriety beyond the text that precedes it as Shakespeare’s plays 
have done with regard to his influences such as Ovid. See Mike Higton, “The Fulfilment of History in Barth, 
Frei, Auerbach and Dante,” in Conversing With Barth, ed. M. A. Higton and J.C. McDowell, Barth Studies 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) for a related phenomenon with regard to Dante, Virgil, and Barth himself. 
527 The reading popularized by Handel that the redeemer in 19:25 is the person of Christ is significantly not the 
reading that Barth presents. The scope of this project does not allow for a full evaluation of Barth’s Trinitarian 
theology; it should be enough at this point to refer to the primary way in which Barth’s typology works—Job is 
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looks to the one and only God who ‘even now’ (16:19), even in the hostility of His 
attitude, is the same as He will be, who will set that limit in His own time and 
manner, who is thus his Witness, Advocate and Guarantor, who even now is for him 
as He is against him. In this way, and this way alone, Job is a real Israel, a witness of 
the truth, and as such also a witness of Jesus Christ.528  
Even in the worst of his suffering, Job does not cease to cling to God. He worships his 
enemy even as he accuses him. Barth sees in this a parallel with Christ who obeys the God 
who sends him to suffer. He is worshiping and obeying the one who forsakes him. In the 
case of Job, God appears alien and foreign, in opposition to Job’s previous understanding of 
him and Job’s friends’ current understanding of him. And yet Job does not stray for a better 
God—one who fits into his paradigm. His understanding of God changes, but it is the same 
God. This clinging as Christ clings leads to his witnessing to Christ in other ways.  
 In all four of his sections on Job, Barth discusses the unmasking effect both Job and 
Christ have on sin. Barth describes this particular sin as that which is pious and even 
sincere.529 The friends of Job seem so theologically astute and even pastorally attentive that 
one must remind oneself that God will ultimately condemn their talk and uphold Job’s 
borderline blasphemy.530 Their theological acumen, however, is why their sin, in the end, is 
so insidious. “We should not be dealing with the falsehood of man if it openly betrayed itself 
in the speeches of these men,” Barth writes.531 They are right when they argue with Job that 
God is always “holy, righteous and wise, and therefore is always to be glorified.”532 
However, in the case that appears in the text, the situation is that Job is in the right despite 
his words and that the friends are in the wrong despite theirs. Barth attributes this primarily 
to the posture towards God of each friend. The friends speak as though they are speaking for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a witness to the true Witness. Thus Christ is seen as pointing to God in this case more than he is one with God 
and that Job is identified with Christ more than appealing to him. 
528 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 425. 
529 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 454. 
530 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 455. 
531 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 454. 
532 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 454. 
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God and standing alongside God. Job, however, “simply stands before and under God.”533 
Job is not interested in helping God, but in confronting God. “The real truth of God and 
man,” Barth writes, “is valid when God and man are engaged in eye-to-eye and mouth-to-ear 
encounter.”534 It seems as though Barth, though he never gives a linguistic or philological 
explanation, is not convinced by the German translations of Job 42:7, 8. Most English 
translations render God’s rebuke of Job’s friends as “You have not spoken right of me/about 
me as my servant Job has.” See KJV, NRSV, RSV, NIV, ESV. The Unrevidierte Elberfelder 
(1905), Luther Bibel (1912), and German Schlachter Version (1951), German versions 
available to Barth at his writing, all render the prepositional phrase in question „von mir.“ 
While these are justified readings, the MT contains the phrase ַיֵלא םֶּתְַּרבִד א֗ל/ lo’ dibbartem 
‘elay, which would be more naturally translated “you have not spoken to me.” The 
implication with the more literal rendering is that Job’s speaking to God is more important 
than his friends speaking about God.  
While it is generally dangerous to base a reading on a preposition, it is important to 
note how this changes the focus of how Job is right and his friends are wrong and how it 
benefits Barth’s reading in particular. Barth did not use the Hebrew in his exegesis and so 
likely did not dwell on the phrase despite it benefiting his reading. On the other hand, he 
may have been influenced by the Vulgate, which translates the phrase in question “non estis 
locuti coram me rectum” (“you did not speak rightly to my face”) in 42:7 and “locuti estis ad 
me recta” (“you did not speak rightly to me”) in 42:8. Both of these are closer to the “literal” 
Hebrew while the LXX has the more vague “ου γαρ ελαλησατε ενωπιον µου αληθες ουδεν” 
(“you have not spoken the truth of me…” but which could also read “you have not spoken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 457. 
534 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 458. 
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the truth in my presence”) in 42:7 and the erroneous “ου γαρ ελαλησατε αληθες κατα του 
θεραποντος µου Ιωβ” (“you have not spoken the truth against my servant Job”) in 42:8. 
 With this in mind, Barth also notes that the friends are “strikingly unhistorical” in 
their speech. God is “active merely as [the] Architect, Guarantor and Executor” of a system, 
but does not act as a true personality.535 The friends’ platitudes do not relate to Job’s 
situation as one that is dynamic—a point that Barth sees as critical in understanding Job’s 
relationship to God. Thus, Job’s words, despite their harshness, are original and fresh and 
relate to a living God.  
 It is this falsehood that both Job and Christ reveal through their active relationship 
with God. In the case of Job, this revelation has less to do with Job’s actions as unmasking 
the falsehood of the friends and more with God’s reaction to Job and his friends. God 
announces that the friends did not speak right with respect to God while Job did. This points 
back to the dialogue and declares Job’s friends as unhistorical and their posture with God as 
inappropriate. Job, however, has had the correct posture and God declares him correct. To be 
sure, this is not obvious as the dialogue unfolds. Even knowing how the scene in heaven has 
transpired, that Job’s friends are wrong and Job is right still comes as a bit of a surprise by 
chapter 42. This may help explain why Barth chooses to write a fourth section where he 
exposits the falsehood of the friends. Still, the declaration is unmistakable and thus somehow 
Job is right in what he said or how he said it.  
 The specific sin that Barth discusses in this fourth section is one that “takes place as 
man desires and attempts to avoid Jesus Christ as the true Witness encountering him.”536 
Thus, the personality of Jesus Christ is the key aspect here just as the personal, encountering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 459. 
536 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 435. 
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God is the key concept lacking in Job’s friends’ theology. What relates to this thesis is that 
Christ reveals the free personality of God through his suffering, not merely that an innocent 
and just person suffers because of a wrongheaded understanding of justice. Note also the 
revelation of the God who confronts sinners through Jesus Christ. The sinner has difficulty 
grasping a God who confronts his people through a suffering messiah because the sinner 
does not want to accept a God that reveals himself in this way.537 Thus, to Barth, Job as one 
who suffers at the hand of God is an adequate illustration of this unmasked sin. God 
confronts sinners in both cases in a way that is difficult to accept and only the ones who 
choose to confront God are seen as just. However, the story does not end here.  
In the Book of Job, the friends are brought back into communion with God, 
significantly, through the activity of Job, the witness to the true Witness. That both Job and 
Christ intercede marks another way in which Job is seen as analogous to Christ. “We must 
not forget,” writes Barth, “that the true Witness does not merely unmask them but also 
effectually intercedes for them, and in so doing comes to share in a new, visible, divine 
blessing.”538  
Barth couches Job’s intercessory activity not only in the two instances of sacrifice 
and prayer in the prologue and epilogue, but he also sees Job as intercessor in his final 
speech in the dialogues. In chapters 29 and 31 of the Book of Job, Job gives his final defence 
and it is one based not on what he has not done but what he has done, namely what he has 
done for other people. Thus, Job is shown as a type of priest, doing the work of God for the 
common person. However, the cultic activity is primarily seen as in Job as typical of 
Christ.539 It is clear that Barth sees Job as type of Christ not only in his sacrificing a burnt 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 452. 
538 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 386. That “new, visible, divine blessing” is Job’s restored fortunes, which typify God 
exalting Christ “to the highest place” to be given “the name that is above every name.” (Philippians 2:9) 
539 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 384. 
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offering for his sons and his friends but in his sacrificing of himself for the poor, widow, and 
fatherless. In the large print, when discussing the true Witness, Barth describes Christ’s self-
sacrifice as a free act. Job, like Christ, not only gives a burnt offering at the behest of God, 
but also gives of himself as an act of free obedience. Here, Barth shows again the importance 
of seeing the entire Book of Job as a unit, for the meaning is created by the juxtaposition of 
those three scenes—Job as priestly intercessor and Job as human sacrifice. In doing this, the 
example of Christ is also presented in a practical way. 
 As Barth states quite often, Job is not Jesus Christ. This seems obvious, but in doing 
so he seems to be protecting himself from anyone claiming he is allegorizing.540 Job, rather, 
“belongs to the context of the witness of the history of Israel which is only moving towards 
the history of Jesus Christ.”541 So despite the similarities between Job and Jesus Christ, 
Barth also presents differences. One obvious difference between Job and Christ that Barth 
repeats throughout his discourse is the sinfulness of Job. Using the Lutheran phrase simul 
iustus et peccator, Barth describes Job as “right in all his sayings as the servant of Yahweh, 
and in none of them as fallible man.”542 Lest anyone think that Barth sees Job as a pre-
Christian Christ, the fact that he dwells on Job’s sinfulness is not even a necessary reading of 
the character of Job from a strictly exegetical level. Clines argues that Job being described as 
“blameless” should be taken literally in 1:1 because in the dialogues, “the issue is never 
whether his sins are serious or slight but simply whether he is a sinner or not.”543 Barth does 
not argue for such a reading perhaps because of his belief that no one other than Christ is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
540 As shown in chapter one, Barth has a concern over his exegesis being perceived as allegory. However, his 
exegesis is “reminiscent in many ways of the exegesis of the early Fathers” despite his “vehement rejection of 
the ancient word ‘allegory’.” (Henri de Lubac, Scripture in the Tradition, Milestones in Catholic Theology 
(New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2000), 77.) 
541 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 388. 
542 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 386. 
543 David J. A. Clines, Job 1-20, 12. 
 204	  
sinless.544 It is more likely that Barth sees God’s rebuke of Job in 38:2 and 40:2 as well as 
Job’s response to God in 40:4 as indicative of Job’s sinfulness. Whether this is a necessary 
exegetical move is debatable.545 What is important for this section is that Barth does not see 
Job as like Christ in his blamelessness.  
More specifically, the metaphysical aspects of Christ’s being are a factor in their 
differences. Job’s finite existence makes him fallible while “Jesus is already Victor even as 
he goes to the defeat of Golgotha.”546 Clearly, Job cannot compare to Christ in this aspect of 
his being. In Barth’s world, Christ is a totally unique person in that he exists on a different 
plane. Job is not unified with God in the way that Christ is but must wait for God to confront 
him. The pure history, in which Christ reigns as Victor for all time, where Christ can be the 
focus of all history, allows Barth to distinguish between Job and Christ while also giving 
him the ability to present Job as a type of Christ in a way more significant than mere 
analogy. Though Job is analogous to Christ, Christ’s eternal state, however theologically 
credible or dubious Barth presents it, allows Job to point to Christ in all time. So Barth 
finding limited parallels between Job and Jesus Christ betrays not only a literary 
phenomenon but also a theological one.  
Job is not like Christ, as Barth also explains, in that there “can be no question of any 
work of salvation being accomplished in the drama of his history.”547 Yes, Job intercedes in 
two ways, but God effects the salvation of his friends. Even so, Job’s intercessions are not 
necessary for their salvation in the way that Christ’s are. In the case of Christ, his activity at 
Gethsemane and Golgotha is effective in a way that Job’s sufferings cannot be. 	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545 On page 407 Barth disagrees with Kierkegaard’s assessment that “in spite of everything [Job] is right.” This 
is a point to be discussed in the beginning of the next chapter in which Barth and Kierkegaard’s readings are 
compared. 
546 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 388. 
547 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 388. 
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Thus, Barth’s case for Job as a type of Christ is a sophisticated and complex reading 
of the two biblical characters. Besides exegesis, theology and metaphysics also take part in 
his analysis of the sufferings of Job. His explication of Job in light of his dogmatic analysis 
of the true Witness has many twists and turns, but they are all interconnected, mainly held 
together by a lengthy theology exposited in the previous three and a half volumes of the 
Church Dogmatics.548 One related doctrine that deserves special attention is that of freedom 
since Barth refers to both Job and God regularly as free agents in the drama.  
Freedom in Barth and Barth’s Job 
 Before discussing freedom in Barth we should take care to note something that Barth 
himself does not do, which is to define what he means by freedom. Barth invokes the term 
Freiheit often and in different ways in his work, not seeming to bear in mind that many 
people speak of the importance of freedom in many different ways.  
George Hendry lists five different types of freedom in Barth’s thought, noting that 
Barth uses them all interchangeably and only explicitly eliminates caprice or arbitrariness 
from his theology.549 The types of freedom that Barth discusses are freedom as gratuity, 
freedom as option or choice, freedom as self-determination, freedom as initiative, and 
freedom as energy, by which he means that God exists in freedom.550 Hendry’s distinctions 
help us in our interpretation of Barth’s Job since one can see how these concepts arise in 
Barth’s thought regarding both how God acts toward Job and how Job acts toward God. 
Certainly we can also eliminate caprice from his interpretation, but elements of the other 
distinct definitions of freedom bear out in Barth’s reading. 
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 Before discussing freedom in Job, however, some background on Barth’s use of 
freedom generally bears mentioning. In the creation of the world, God expresses freedom in 
all of the categories Hendry outlines.551 God shows initiative in choosing to create the world, 
a wholly unnecessary act. This first act establishes God’s freedom, but also arises because 
God exists in freedom—one cannot understand God without understanding that God is free. 
Even in the act of creation God sustains his freedom by remaining transcendent. God is not 
tied to the world and so can love the world freely.552 This being said, God has the freedom to 
enter the world and becomes immanent in the revelation of Jesus Christ.553 Thus God’s 
whole being reflects on the freedom so intrinsic to the Trinity. 
 In God’s freedom in the creation of the world, God bestows freedom on his creatures 
as well. God “does not want to rule over puppets and slaves but rather in the triumph of the 
free decision of faithful servants and friends.”554 God’s creatures receive the freedom to 
choose to obey. In this act, one notes Barth’s interest in Job’s freedom to obey God. Job’s 
own self determination gives him the opportunity to obey God, an aspect of the Book of Job 
with which many interpreters do not concern themselves. 
 In this granting of God’s creatures’ freedom, humans also have the ability to disobey 
and, thus, live outside God’s covenant. In this loss of freedom at humanity’s own hands, one 
sees the necessity to discuss this concept in the doctrine of reconciliation, where one finds 
Barth’s interpretation of Job. God’s choice to become immanent in the person of Jesus Christ 
instigates the restoration of freedom in humanity. God’s cooperation with humanity in the 
Incarnation and sacrifice of Christ brings humans back into the covenant, restoring the 
freedom to obey. 	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 God’s freedom, then, emanates throughout his being and activity in the world. As a 
consequence of God’s freedom in the Gospel, one cannot turn theology into a system.555 
God’s freedom in his transcendence and his freedom in his immanence does not allow for 
rules to govern God’s behaviour. Likewise, humanity’s call to obedience does not relate to 
the obedience of a series of rules or laws but a personal God—and not only a personal God, 
but a God who lives with us as one of us.556 
 All of this, one sees in Barth’s interpretation of Job. Job chooses to obey God, not a 
system or a series of rules in the way that Job’s friends are wont to do. Job also elects God as 
God is, not as he is supposed to be. Most importantly, Job serves, obeys, and elects God in 
his gratuitous and free choice. In Job, Barth is able to illustrate much of his theology of 
freedom. Job’s decision to obey God reflects the divine purpose of Christ’s reconciling act, 
but Job also anticipates Christ’s reconciliation in his own cultic activity on behalf of others. 
At the end of the book, Job sacrifices for his friends in order to bring them back into the 
covenant with God so that they may have the freedom to obey God as well.  
Evaluation of Barth’s Job 
 At the beginning of Barth’s discourse on the book of Job, Barth explains that he had 
already had before him the character of Job as analogy for his previous discussion on “the 
True Witness.”557 One marvels at how much of the book of Job he engages with in order to 
complement his large print work on the reconciliation of Christ. The book of Job fits in very 
well to his program. However, like all interpretations of books so difficult as Job, Barth’s 
discourse does warrant criticism. One need be careful to review Barth’s reading in context of 
his apparent intentions, but even then he appears to fall short of a watertight essay. 	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 The most egregious example of Barth’s inconsistencies is in his dealing with chapter 
28, the so-called “Hymn to Wisdom.” Barth begins his exegesis of this passage by 
discussing a problem that many critics have noted—that of the poem’s placement in the 
book. Barth is quite sure himself that “it certainly does not belong to the original body of the 
central poetic section of the Book, but has been inserted from another source.”558 Barth even 
questions the intention of the final redactor who places it in the final speech of Job since “it 
has no obvious connexion with what precedes or follows.”559 Nevertheless, Barth notes that 
“the reason for its inclusion is not difficult to see.” All of this is in keeping with the rest of 
Barth’s work in biblical criticism—that the poem is a later addition to the text is not a 
problem since the final form is really what should concern theology. But two red flags arise 
in the next paragraph that could undermine Barth’s attention to the text itself, suggesting that 
his theological presuppositions may hold too much sway over his interpretation—perhaps he 
uses the canonical form of the text only when it suits his theological argument. The first 
issue comes at the end of his exposition of chapter 28. After working through the chapter 
verse by verse, he eventually reaches what he calls “the message of the poem.” This is found 
in verse 27: “Then did he see it, and declare it; he prepared it, yea, and searched it out.” The 
action is therefore God’s—“from above downwards.”560 This leads to Barth’s exposition of 
God’s speeches which show the initiative and freedom of God. The problem is that Barth 
must somehow excise verse 28, which states that “the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom…”—a 
conclusion to the poem that suggests that human activity could be the key to unlocking 
wisdom. Barth claims that “in the original form it does not seem even to contain [this] well-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 This is still an unresolved issue among many scholars, the most recent emendation coming from Clines who 
places the poem in the mouth of Elihu, but still entertains the possibility that it finds its inception in a separate 
source altogether. (Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 425.) 
559 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 425. 
560 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 426. 
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known saying… having probably been added as v. 28 by an apprehensive scribe.”561 This is 
not an uncommon conclusion by any means.562 However, it seems inconsistent with the rest 
of Barth’s interpretive strategy. Perhaps if there were manuscript evidence to suggest that the 
story of Job was told without verse 28, then Barth’s argument would carry more weight 
since there would be an extant final form that could conceivably be in the Canon. But only 
scant evidence exists that more than one word in verse 28 could justifiably be excised.563 
This is, perhaps, a minor problem, but it is certainly due to his vehement opposition to 
natural theology and not just the text of Job.564 It is also not the only issue that arises upon 
closer inspection of Barth’s exegesis. 
 In the same paragraph as the above issue, Barth questions the inclusion of the Elihu 
passages in the book of Job. Earlier in the section he suggests that the Elihu speeches 
accomplish very little in their inclusion by stating: “In a way which is dramatically 
disruptive, or dramatically most effective, [the Elihu speeches] merely prolong the existing 
stalemate [between Job and God].”565 This perception, in and of itself, may not create too 
many difficulties. Barth certainly is not alone in his assessment of Elihu—recall that 
Kierkegaard omits him entirely from his interpretation. It is unreasonable to see Elihu as the 
hero of the story like Calvin does.566 Nevertheless, Elihu’s speeches are quite substantial, if 
in nothing but length, and should probably be granted more attention than the wave of the 
hand Barth gives them. The problem seems to be that Elihu does very little to advance the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 426. 
562 Of the scholars that Barth sites, Hölscher omits it from the original with little discussion. (Gustav Hölscher, 
Das Buch Hiob, 68.) Dhorme, whose important commentary first appeared in French in 1927, gives a much 
longer explanation of 28:28’s likely late inclusion which reflects Barth’s. Dhorme writes, “The whole poem on 
Wisdom was intended to show that it is inaccessible to man and that God alone can discover it… V[erse] 28… 
is added in order to draw a practical conclusion.” (Édouard Dhorme, Job, 413-14.) 
563 The words are either םדאל ןה ינדא  with none in LXX.  
564 Vischer sees the verse as a good summary of the chapter but that the chapter only delays the gratification of 
the Tempest. 
565 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 422. 
566 See Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom; and chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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message that Barth wants to promote. Because Barth focuses on the “true history,” that 
object to which the text points rather than the text itself, he seems to neglect the characters 
and events that neglect his message. Elihu does not point to the eschatological reality that 
Barth wants him to, thus he does not find his way in Barth’s reading. 
 These problems regarding the historical-critical method are certainly not many.567 
However, they do hinder Barth’s overall message, throwing into question his conclusions. If 
his method accepts the final form of the Book of Job as authoritative, regardless of its history 
of transmission, presenting a particular message on the sovereignty of God, then perhaps 
Barth’s reading needs some modification, for his preferred reading is not really the final 
form. On the other hand, it is remarkable that he is able to do what he does at the mercy of 
his already developed theology.568 Other problems persist in his typology, however. 
 Ticciati’s complaint that Barth’s reading is reductionistic is not entirely fair. Though 
the literature is minimal, a surprising number of writers label Barth’s exposition of Job with 
the moniker “mini commentary,” which leads to the assumption that Karl Barth is saying all 
that need be said concerning Job, but in a condensed manner.569 Despite the importance of 
the small print texts in the Church Dogmatics, the context of §70 is a theology of Jesus 
Christ as the true Witness. Thus, a full exposition of Job would lack the focus that Barth 
requires at this point. It is impossible to say what a full exposition of Job would look like—if 
he would treat the characters (especially Elihu) more fully or not. Where Ticciati’s 
complaint becomes more valid is in Barth’s use of language. She notes that in discussing the 
themes of Job, Barth uses the “Barthian categories of freedom, knowledge, truth etc.” rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
567 One could likely find many other problems related to the accuracy of Barth’s comments regarding historical 
criticism but they are beside the point of this chapter. 
568 Susannah Ticciati, Disruption, 30. 
569 See Daniel L. Migliore, "Barth and Bloch;" and Harold M. Schulweis, "Barth's Job." 
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than terms more closely associated with Hebrew Wisdom literature.570 This complaint has 
some validity perhaps, but Barth’s error is, again, certainly attributable to the context of his 
exposition—that of his broader Church Dogmatics. Also consider that he is expositing the 
book in the context of the Canon. Neutral terms mitigate the differences between the various 
genres in the biblical text. One should recall, also, that Barth embeds his interpretation of 
Job within the larger context of the reconciliation of Christ. These categories that Ticciati 
calls Barthian are also New Testament and biblical categories.571 Even so, this is problematic 
as well. Yes, Job’s meaning becomes more focussed in the context of the Canon, but it still 
retains its generic particularities that help to generate meaning. The generic particularities 
need not be flattened because of the unity of the biblical text. Even Barth would probably 
agree that the diverse witnesses of the Canon are more rhetorically powerful as truly diverse 
witnesses rather than a monolithic text. This is consistent with his recognition of the diverse 
witnesses of Job. Those authors, despite writing in different styles of poetry and prose, were 
still writing within the confines of Wisdom literature. Thus, Barthian terms may seem 
somewhat unnecessary throughout discussion on the text, but they also enliven Job to exist 
outside the confines of his own literary context.  
 On a more theological level, Barth’s typology is unnecessarily complex and 
intertwined. Barth’s radical version of trinitarianism raises too many problems with regard to 
our concept of time and Job’s typological relationship to Christ. At times, Barth seems to 
imply that Job’s relationship with God is so tied to Christ that Job loses all particularity. 
Job’s every action is in some way treated as if he pointed to Christ. By focusing on this 
aspect of Job so much, it puts into question even the significance of the Incarnation itself. If 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 Susannah Ticciati, Disruption, 6. 
571 The Greek words ελευθερία, αλήθεια and their cognates are used numerous times in the New Testament. 
The Hebrew word for knowledge, תעד, on the other hand, is a very common word in Wisdom literature, used in 
the book of Job ten times. 
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Job is seen as an extension of Christ, would Job need Christ in the way the church has 
understood the incarnation traditionally? The metaphysical gymnastics that Barth undertakes 
is too speculative and thus less convincing than the mere fact that Job and Jesus are both 
characters in the same anthology. This raises its own problems of course, but it is much 
easier to argue that the church has in hand a Bible with the Book of Job, four Gospels, and 
the Pauline corpus than to argue for the existence of a metaphysically complex “true 
history,” even with evidence from said books in the Bible. The Bible, of course, does point 
to God. The individual books present a view of a God who exists independently of the Bible. 
The text, that is, is not all there is but preaches a true God. However, Barth’s insistence of 
the freedom of God outside of a system starts to deconstruct itself in the realization that a 
system starts to emerge in Barth’s theology.  
Barth’s interpretation is heavily tied to his theology. In this way, it may betray his 
own maxims on the freedom of God and how God cannot be tied to a system. Does he grant 
enough freedom to the Book of Job to let it speak on its own? Of course, much of what Barth 
does is unavoidable. Others may reach different conclusions regarding the Book of Job, but 
if one enters into the Book of Job with some conclusions as to who God is or what the Bible 
teaches, much of what emerges from the close reading of the text will be predetermined. No 
interpretation of the Book of Job could truly withstand such criticism; if one were to read the 
Book of Job and a radically different vision of God were to emerge from the presupposed 
God of the reader, the resulting theology may look different but undergirding the new vision 
would lie a theology that allowed for such a transformation.  
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Chapter 6: Evaluation and Conclusion 
In some ways, this thesis is an attempt to show how the ideas of others have been 
disseminated into Barth’s interpretation of Job. Barth has received Job, yes, but he has also 
received others’ receptions of Job. Recall in the first chapter’s discussion on hermeneutics 
and the defence of reception history as filtered by Bakhtin’s theories of dialogue and 
utterance that we do not stand on the shoulders of giants as much as we stand on the 
shoulders of those standing on the shoulders of others, with only a few giants between us. 
Obviously, we can consider Gregory, Calvin, Aquinas, Luther, Kant, Kierkegaard, and Barth 
as giants or no giants exist, but even these giants are dependent on their predecessors to a 
greater extent than is often acknowledged.  
The different interpretations also benefit from different approaches and the various 
and, at times, vivid imaginations that inspire new discoveries of the book of Job. The three 
interpretations focused on in the three previous chapters have much in common; the main 
differences might arise primarily from the different approaches warranted by the different 
fields in which the scholars find themselves. One writes as a philosopher, one as a biblical 
scholar, and the last as a theologian and the results are commensurate with their disciplines.  
The results of the different approaches, however, are striking in their similarities if it 
is not evident at first. In comparison to the various interpretations of Job throughout history, 
these three are of a piece. Where they coincide the most is in their typological imaginations 
and their focuses on the themes of divine and human freedom. This concluding chapter will 
primarily lay bare the particular similarities in the three interpretations while looking at the 
direct dialogue between the different works. The chapter and thesis conclude with the 
possibilities Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth grant to future Job interpretation as the book 
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continues to grow in great time. I look specifically at one passage, Job 8:1-20, and how our 
three scholars might bring to light new ways of viewing the words of Bildad the Shuhite.  
 
Barth’s reception of Kierkegaard’s Job 
The section in which Barth depends the most on Kierkegaard is his second discourse 
on Job. The section supports the large print of his Church Dogmatics in which he argues that 
to understand Jesus Christ, we must examine Christ in his “pure form” of eternity, as well as 
“what He has concretely been and done in His history on earth.”572 
The section on Job, which is set off from the section on Christ by the size of its font, 
continues his interpretation of the book by showing that Job, too, has both a “pure form” in 
the prose prologue, which represents Job’s relationship to God in eternity, in addition to his 
historical form in the “main central section,” which shows him as more contentious.573 But 
Job, himself, encounters a God who seems different to him than the pure God of his previous 
knowledge. God, therefore, reveals himself in two forms as well. Barth eventually shows 
how this affects our understanding of Job, arguing that Job’s “true grief… and the real 
subject of his complaint” is his relationship with this God who presents himself in a form 
familiar to Job at times but who has revealed himself in a form that Job has trouble 
recognizing in the plot of the book.574 
The seeming contradiction of forms signals to Barth a dynamic relationship between 
Job and God. God, in revealing himself to Job in an alien form, has required of Job a “step 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 389. 
573 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 398. 
574 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 404. 
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forward” to meet him.575 To explain Job’s subsequent step, Barth invokes Kierkegaard’s 
category of repetition and continues to refer to Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Job until the 
end of the section, sometimes supporting his interpretation with Kierkegaard’s work and 
occasionally disagreeing with Kierkegaard. His first allusion to Kierkegaard comes when 
Barth suggests that Job needs to express his free faithfulness with a “repetition of his 
existence.”576 
It will strike careful readers of Kierkegaard’s Repetition that Barth may be taking 
some liberties with the meaning of repetition. In fact, it seems that when Barth does disagree 
with Kierkegaard, he may really be disagreeing with Constantin or the young man in 
Repetition.577 Earlier receptions of Kierkegaard’s work tended to underestimate the 
importance of the pseudonyms, not fully appreciating the Dane’s ironic rhetoric. Barth, 
himself seems to have been tripped up by the significance of the pseudonyms, which should 
not be a huge surprise. As noted in chapter 3, the meaning of repetition has eluded many 
readers and some have even questioned whether repetition has any meaning at all.578 
Barth’s reception of Repetition is of interest because he seems dependent on 
Kierkegaard’s theory while at the same time protesting claims by Kierkegaard or his 
pseudonyms that do not seem to warrant dismissal, but actually support Barth’s own 
interpretation. Barth’s understanding of the category of repetition, on the other hand, betrays 
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575 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 405. 
576 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 405. 
577 Nicholas Adams notes this problem as well but seems to have a different interpretation of Repetition than I. 
(Nicholas Adams, "The Goodness of Job's Bad Arguments.") I agree with Adams that “it is rather difficult to 
say boldly, as Barth does, that the remarks on Job [in Repetition] are whole-heartedly endorsed by 
Kierkegaard,” but Adams seems to think that Constantin is a more trustworthy source than the young man. As 
chapter 3 of this thesis should make clear, I believe the young man, despite his changing mind throughout his 
letters, presents the more sympathetic understanding of repetition in the book. Consider that the young man 
shares much in common with Kierkegaard himself, but also that he embodies the hermeneutical principles of 
Kierkegaard much better than Constantin, who tends to contradict himself throughout. The young man, by 
contrast, displays a developing conscience. 
578 See Roger Poole, Communication, 79-81. 
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Kierkegaard. The maieutic rhetoric of Kierkegaard, which utilizes unreliable pseudonyms to 
draw the reader to a position or belief beyond that of the narrator, does not seem to receive 
the attention of Barth. That is, Barth does not appear to take into account the significance of 
the unreliability of the two unreliable narrators in Repetition when referring to Kierkegaard’s 
work. 
Barth is right that Job needs a repetition to reach a deeper understanding of God—to 
recognize God in the second form. On the other hand, he seems to take from Constantin’s 
understanding that repetition is something that one can control. As Kierkegaard’s book infers 
through Constantin’s failures at repetition, one cannot bring upon a repetition through one’s 
own will. When all avenues lead to dead ends, then repetition is possible. 
Barth defines repetition as “an expression of the free faithfulness with which [Job] 
has turned to God.”579 Job needs, according to Barth, to express his free faithfulness with a 
“‘repetition’ of his existence with the same free faithfulness in the divinely established 
covenant.”580 
The nuance is indeed subtle and does not underscore a major impasse between the 
two thinkers. The passive nature of a Kierkegaardian repetition does not preclude any action 
by the participant. The young man experiences a repetition because he decides to wait for his 
storm. The waiting, as Job indicates he does at the end of chapter 36 and which is 
accentuated by the subsequent arrival of and speech by Elihu, marks a decision by Job. The 
decision to wait may be the “free human decision” that Barth argues is required of Job. Barth 
suggests as much when he notes that “the first thing to be seen and said is that in it he 
accomplished the repetition required of him.”581 Nevertheless, Barth surprisingly seems to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 405. 
580 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 405. 
581 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 406. 
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think that one can engender a repetition on one’s own. Kierkegaard, through the experience 
of the young man, shows that repetition needs a transcendent action by a transcendent agent.  
The end product of the analysis of this particular aspect of Barth’s interaction with 
Kierkegaard does not derail Barth’s interpretation of Kierkegaard on its own. It does, 
however, show that Barth’s reception of Kierkegaard may lack the necessary nuance to 
understand Kierkegaard, due to his placement in the history of Kierkegaard studies. Full 
appreciation of Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms does not emerge for several years, so 
Barth’s understanding is expected.  
What also bears mentioning, though, is where Barth openly disagrees with 
Kierkegaard. He obviously appreciates the path Kierkegaard takes him on the way to 
understanding Job, but shows an ambivalence toward some conclusions he makes. For 
instance, Barth quotes the young man’s December 14 letter, which declares that the “vital 
force” in Job is that, “despite everything, [Job] is in the right.” The young man declares Job 
an exception to the rule, proving so by his perseverance. Barth claims this goes too far, but 
does not deal with the January letter where the young man claims that Job was proved to be 
in the wrong. Thus both Barth and Kierkegaard claim that Job was both right and wrong, and 
their claims regarding this suggest that Kierkegaard may have influenced Barth more than 
Barth realizes. 
Barth argues that Job, in expressing his free faithfulness, puts himself in the right and 
the wrong. God’s initial words to Job and Job’s response show God’s displeasure with some 
part of Job’s actions after his fall. God challenges Job in 38:2, asking, “Who is this that 
darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?” Barth argues that Job accepts this 
judgment in his confession in 42:3, saying, “I have uttered that I understood not; things too 
wonderful for me, which I knew not,” leading to his recantation and repentance in 42:6. 
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Barth takes this passage at the face value of the German translation of the Hebrew. Many 
scholars have mulled over the meaning of this troubling phrase. The version in the MT is 
very difficult to translate since the first verb lacks an object. The LXX witness indicates that 
the translator may have read the unpointed verb as a niphal as opposed to the MT’s qal, thus 
“I disparage myself” or “I am rejected.” The second verb, likewise, causes translation 
problems. Possible translations include the traditional “I repent in dust and ashes,” “I repent, 
being dust and ashes,” “I am sorry because of dust and ashes,” and “I console myself with 
dust and ashes.”  
Barth does not question the traditional meaning of Job’s words in 42:6, but does note 
that the wrath of God, “is not really kindled against him, but against the three friends” as 
seen in the very next verse. This is how one knows that Job is both right and wrong to Barth. 
He is wrong in his complaint, shown by his recognition of his overstepping his knowledge, 
but he is right with regard to the limits of his knowledge. He does not recognize the God that 
confronts him during his trials and so is wrong in his pronouncements. However, these same 
pronouncements prove that he is right since he makes them as “the servant of Yahweh.”582 
Kierkegaard also claims Job is both right and wrong, and does so in relation to the 
eternal and the temporal as well. From the young man’s January 13 letter, to which Barth 
does not allude, the young man writes: 
Was Job proved to be in the wrong? Yes, eternally, for there is no higher court than 
the one that judged him. Was Job proved to be in the right? Yes, eternally, by being 
proved to be in the wrong before God.583 
Kierkegaard discusses this theme in several of his works, most significantly in Either/Or. 
The concluding discourse of Either/Or comes in the form of a sermon by a friend of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582 Karl Barth, CD IV.3.1, 406. 
583 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 212. Emphasis in original. 
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pseudonymous Judge.584 The preacher quotes Job 40:2, where God says that “Thou shalt not 
contend with God.” The preacher interprets the Joban passage as meaning that “you shall not 
wish to prove yourself in the right before Him.”585 He then argues that “there is only one 
way of supporting the claim that you are in the right before God—by learning that you are in 
the wrong,” clearly anticipating the young man’s arguments in Repetition, published later in 
the year. When the lily and sparrow fall, they are in the right before God, but “only man is in 
the wrong, for to him alone is reserved that which to all other creatures was denied… to be 
in the wrong before God.”586 
The preacher deals with the contradictions inherent in the idea that being in the 
wrong before God edifies the one who is wrong, which should result in being in the wrong 
less and less, but that not being in the wrong would deny the righteous person the edification 
that comes with being in the wrong. He attempts to rectify the contradiction in Either/Or by 
distinguishing between finite and infinite relationships, consistent with the young man’s 
claims on Job. “To wish to be in the wrong,” the preacher writes, “is the expression for an 
infinite relationship; to wish to be in the right… is the expression for a finite relationship. 
So, then, it is edifying always to be in the wrong, for only the infinite edifies, not the 
finite.”587 
Later in the sermon, the preacher shows how this theme relates to the Kierkegaardian 
notion that truth is subjectivity when he gives the following advice to his audience: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 It seems possible that this passage is from the point of view of the ethical stage, since the Judge indicates 
that it is universally beautiful. However much in the passage indicates that it is a window into the religious. I 
personally believe that it leans toward the religious since the book ends with this sermon and because the idea 
of one being justified by God by finding himself eternally in the wrong before God litters Kierkegaard’s work, 
including his journals and his autonym works. 
585 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Part II, trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong, vol. III, Kierkegaard's Writings 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 346. 
586 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 346. 
587 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 350. 
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…you do not say, ‘God is always in the right,’ for in that there is no joy; you say, 
‘Against God I am always in the wrong.’ Though that which was your wish were 
what others… might call your duty, though you must not only forego your wish but 
in a way be unfaithful to your duty, though you were to lose not only your joy but 
even your honor, you are joyful nevertheless.588  
Here, the preacher focuses on the particular nature of the person speaking and not the 
universal nature of God. The sermon, and the book Either/Or, ends with the preacher 
expounding on the importance of subjectivity and truth in a way that sheds more light on 
Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Job: 
…only by the indescribable emotions of the heart, that for the first time you are 
convinced that what you have known belongs to you that no power can take it from 
you; for only the truth which edifies is truth for you.589 
We determined that Kierkegaard’s Job was right because he held to his convictions 
and reacted according to what he knew to be true. Job embodies Kierkegaard’s claim that 
truth is subjectivity. Despite this, Job is proved to be in the wrong before God. Actually, not 
despite, but because of his being proved to be in the right before God he is proved to be in 
the wrong before him. For Kierkegaard and the preacher in Either/Or, one’s acceptance by 
God depends on being in the wrong before God.  
God censures Job from the thunderstorm according to the young man.590 The rebuke 
from God results in the reconciliation between Job and God—reconciliation being the 
broader theme under which Barth places his interpretation of Job. One would hate to think 
that Barth did not read beyond the December letter of Repetition even if it is fair to concede 
that Barth did not grasp the full nuances of Kierkegaard’s maieutic rhetoric, but the January 
letter in particular seems to conform to much of what Barth proposes. 
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590 Søren Kierkegaard, F.T./Rep, 212. 
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Just before invoking Kierkegaard, Barth claims that Job “would not have been 
obedient if he had not raised this complaint and carried it through to the bitter end in spite of 
all objections.”591 Job’s complaint, in other words, is honourable because it is appropriate in 
relation to his own history with God. He takes his subjective understanding of God to its 
logical conclusions and is right in that case. Barth here seems to intuit Kierkegaard’s maxim 
that truth is subjectivity and thus Job is right in his subjectivity. 
Barth and Kierkegaard, therefore, both see Job as both right and wrong and his 
rightness relates to his subjectivity according to both thinkers. Their similarities do not end 
there, as we see with their similar typological imaginations, something they also share with 
Wilhelm Vischer, as well as all three of the scholars’ focuses on freedom in the book of Job. 
 
Freedom as the major theme of Job in Kierkegaard, 
Vischer, and Barth 
 
 In all three scholars’ views, the book of Job instructs its readers on the notion of 
freedom in the life of the person of faith and especially in the freedom of God. This is 
clearest in the interpretation set forth by Barth, who filters his work through the wager 
between the Satan and God. “Does Job fear God for naught?” the Satan asks in 1:9. That is, 
does Job worship God freely? Barth imports directly from Vischer’s essay the idea that the 
hermeneutical key to the book of Job lies in the wager summed up in the question in 1:9. 
 Vischer and Barth share much in common regarding how freedom plays in the book 
of Job. Their confluence of theology does not begin in their interpretations of Job, of course. 
Their careers paralleled each others’ in important ways, often doing so because of their 
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similar theologies. They were both Swiss theologians who worked in Germany in the 1930s 
and left for Basel during the run up to the Second World War. They each drafted confessions 
declaring the church’s independence from the state and were both reformed pastors, also 
influenced by Martin Luther. It should surprise no one that Vischer’s interpretation of Job 
would contain Barthian elements and that Barth would refer to Vischer’s interpretation to 
supplement his own study. 
 Though Vischer does not refer explicitly to divine and human freedom much in his 
essay, interpreting the entire book of Job through a wager that questions the possibility of 
disinterested piety shows that human freedom remains an important aspect of his 
interpretation. Also, though he may have been compelled to write a long essay entirely on 
the book of Job partly for political reasons, as explained in chapter four, the pure theology 
that he mines from the book of Job dominates his essay. 
 Barth’s own work on Job might not have existed in such a fashion had he not read 
Vischer’s essay. Vischer’s work is the first source to which Barth refers in his own. When 
Barth eventually arrives at 1:9, he credits Vischer for giving the “for nought” the proper 
emphasis and writes that it was “to the best of [his] knowledge something quite new in 
explanation of the book, but it is something which we cannot now dismiss.”592 Barth is 
clearly dependent on Vischer for pointing out the most important part of the book of Job. It 
may even be the case that Vischer drew Barth to the book of Job as a witness of Jesus Christ 
even though Barth claims that “it would be difficult to read the Book of Job attentively 
without being aware of the fact that the figure of Jesus Christ as the true Witness unmasking 
the falsehood of man is delineated in it in distant, faint, fragmentary and even strange yet 
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unmistakeable outline.”593 He certainly knows Vischer’s work well and expands on its basic 
premise to fit his own thesis. 
 Though Vischer does not meditate on the idea of freedom to the extent that Barth 
does, it is Vischer in part that allows Barth to do so. In this way then Vischer shares with 
Kierkegaard, for they both lay important groundwork for Barth’s thesis regarding the 
freedom of God and humanity in the book of Job. 
 Preceding Vischer and Barth by around a century, Kierkegaard also views freedom as 
a major aspect of the book of Job. In his Upbuilding Discourse based on 1:20-21, though 
freedom does not emerge explicitly as a theme, he zeroes in on Job’s worshipful attitude 
after losing his family and possessions. Kierkegaard notes the decision that Job must make 
on whether to worship God or not. Implicit in the discourse is the idea that Job acts freely, 
though it is not the major focus in this work as it is in the works of Barth and Vischer.  
 Divine freedom, on the other hand, does figure in to Repetition in a much more 
explicit way that relates well to the image of divine freedom that Barth would draw much 
later. The progressing narrative of Repetition allows Kierkegaard to show the perils of 
constricting God (or a replacement for God in the life of an aesthete like Constantin) to the 
selfish desires of the human. Constantin seeks to control the outcome of his actions by 
driving for a repetition in his life. His “venture in experimenting psychology” requires the 
placement of God into human parameters. Constantin needs to control God for his 
experiment to work. For various reasons, his experiment fails, but none more important than 
the mere fact that he depersonalizes God, treating God like a force similar to gravity or 
centrifugality.  
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 When the young man starts sending Constantin his letters telling of his own story, he 
displays a similar sentiment regarding the controllability of God. However, the young man 
eventually changes his position on God’s freedom or lack thereof as he grafts his life onto 
the narrative of Job. Once he starts to see how Job’s repetition is dependent on God’s 
freedom rather than a scientific formula, he lets go of his formulaic quest and awaits his own 
storm. The young man’s repetition looks physically different than does Job’s, but the 
spiritual nature of the two repetitions bear important resemblances.  
 The final action of the young man, where he recognizes the freedom of the deity (or 
what stands for God in his worldview), is also a recognition of his own freedom. Rather than 
constrain himself in a formula, he is able to let go of his quest. The letting go induces the 
repetition he desires and the letting go stems from a recognition of freedom.  
 Ironically, the recognition of his freedom also stems partly from appropriating the 
narrative of Job into his life. In seeing how God has administered a repetition in the life of a 
parallel character, the young man recognizes the nature of repetition as emerging by virtue of 
the absurd. In this recognition lies the confluence of divine freedom and typology in 
Repetition. God does not work within an impersonal system, but nor is God capricious. The 
God who worked in the life of Job is the same God who worked in the life of Abraham and 
Jesus and now the young man. Repetition, because of its pseudonymous, and therefore, 
limited nature, cannot explicitly refer to the freedom of God in such a way as Barth and 
Vischer can in their more conventional theological discourses, but the principle of divine 
freedom in the typological paradigm that the two later scholars endorse has precedence in 
this earlier interpretation of Job.  
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Conclusion 
 As argued in the introductory chapter of this thesis, one of the reasons for beginning 
this project was the belief that great literary books exist in great time and that any 
interpretation of that book should take into account its afterlife as readers throughout history 
encounter it. The chapters that follow the introduction attempt to do that with the book of 
Job. The three interpreters I focus on, ironically, do not seem to feel it necessary to look at 
their predecessors with the same verve my introductory chapter calls for. Of course their 
seeming lack of respect for the reception history of Job does not place them out of the great 
time of the book of Job. Though they seem to bypass the scholarship that comes before 
them, they still remain in a dialogue with their predecessors whether they recognize it or not.  
 More importantly, however, is that they do recognize the afterlife of Job in other 
important ways. Though they seemingly try to ignore the work of Gregory, Aquinas, and 
Calvin, they still fall in the same linear projection of Job in great time. Also, great time 
indicates that a great text points beyond itself. Implied in the recognition of a great literary 
text’s placement in great time is a recognition of the texts it inspires. The text in great time 
points to those texts that point back to it. Recollection and repetition dwell together in that 
dialogue. 
 Though Barth, Vischer, and Kierkegaard seem suspicious sometimes of some of their 
forbears in Job interpretation, it is clear that they are, up to a point, dependent on them. More 
importantly, though, they do of course recognize that the text of Job does point beyond itself. 
For Barth and Vischer especially, Job dwells in the Gospel story of Jesus Christ. Though 
they bypass their immediate predecessors to some degree, their recognition of Job’s enduring 
value in the Gospel itself suggests that they see Job as continuing to live and develop as long 
as humanity lives and develops. Thus, Job exists in what Bakhtin termed great time. 
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 To see Job exist in great time requires the recognition that these utterances do not end 
the dialogue. Dialogue is unfinalizable and any utterance anticipates response. This thesis is 
an explicit attempt to participate in this dialogue by bringing to the fore these utterances and 
how they relate to their focus. I have attempted to show how they act as a thread. These three 
participants in the dialogue are like a small grouping of MPs from a political party at a 
parliamentary meeting. They are arguing for a particular cause, but with different styles and, 
perhaps, for different constituents. In their cases, the constituents belong to different epochs. 
When they are done speaking, the dialogue does not cease and neither do their causes. The 
unfinalizability of the dialogue means that it would be somewhat irresponsible to suggest 
that what they say about Job is the end of what can be said about Job. It also means that 
more can be said about what they say about Job.  
 It would go beyond the scope of this particular thesis to attempt to say much more 
about how they contribute to the larger dialogue of Job in great time. What I can show is 
where their contribution to the dialogue might lead. What does the exploration of these 
particular utterances unlock about Job that requires further exploration and future utterances? 
These last few pages are meant to show how Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth might direct 
the reader to think about Job for future participation in this dialogue. Specifically, I will look 
at the first speech by Bildad the Shuhite (8:1-22). 
 Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth have very little to say about Job’s friends 
individually. They tend to consider them as a group rather than individual characters. 
Vischer does deal with their speeches individually, but each of the friends acts more as a 
synecdoche for the trio. Barth deals with all of the friends as a group, noting that “they are 
only secondary characters with no particular individuality.”594 Kierkegaard also treats them 
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synecdochally, collecting them within the person of Constantin. Nevertheless, their brief 
works do inspire further research on the individual poems. 
The obvious theme that surfaces in Bildad’s first speech is his theology of 
retribution, which relates negatively to the theme of divine freedom described above. Note 
the restrictions Bildad places on God in his theological declarations and how those 
restrictions further restrict Job. Bildad presents a very clear declaration of retributive 
theology in 8:4 with his conditional statement regarding Job’s children. “If your children 
sinned against him,” Bildad says, “then he delivered them (םחלשיו) into the hand of their 
crime (םעשפ).” He does not allow for any other factors in the children’s deaths. God is not 
allowed to work outside of the parameters Bildad has laid down. Job, then, can exploit God’s 
restrictions by being pure and upright. The way that Bildad presents it makes one think that 
Job can control God’s actions by following Bildad’s suggestions. This speech by Bildad, 
thus, further accentuates the theme of freedom collectively distilled in Kierkegaard, Vischer, 
and Barth.  
 Individually, each contributor highlighted in this thesis can also inspire further Job 
research as related to Bildad’s speech. The chapter above on Kierkegaard’s interpretation of 
Job in his Upbuilding Discourse and Repetition explores in depth his particular hermeneutic 
in approaching the book. It looks at his use of different genres to explore the generic 
differences between the prologue and dialogues in the biblical book. It also looks at the 
maieutic rhetoric in the second half of Repetition, where the scholar narrator, Constantin 
Constantius, proves to be a less convincing guide toward a proper understanding of the 
philosophical category of repetition than the young man he councils. The result of 
discovering this irony inspires the reader to recognize the similar irony in the book of Job. 
Job’s friends, like Constantin, are able to spout off generally acceptable theological theories 
and yet Job is proven right in the end.   
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 Because Kierkegaard leaves Constantin generally silent throughout the young man’s 
letters, Repetition does not have much to say explicitly on the words of the friends. The 
friends remain relatively silent in general scholarship as well. God does not hold their words 
up in the final chapter, as he does with Job, and so they remain relatively unexplored outside 
of the requisite space warranted in the commentary genre. Kierkegaard’s unusual 
hermeneutical method lends importance to them despite bypassing them himself. 
Consider, in particular, the words of Bildad in chapter 8. Recall Calvin’s general 
reluctance to judge the friends since so much of what they say fits orthodox theology. 
General assessments of the friends, however, recognize that God condemns their speeches as 
not speaking right of God. Bildad’s first speech has much in common with Constantin’s 
narration in Repetition despite sharing little thematically. Bildad’s speech begins with 
several points of irony that serve to draw attention to his faulty theology. 
The speech begins with Bildad criticising Job’s words as a “mighty wind”           
(ריבכ חרו),595 which leads him to discuss Job’s children’s sins and their punishment for them. 
Of course, Job’s children died from a “great wind” (הלודג חור), which may have been 
Bildad’s insensitive way of arguing that Job’s words are destructive.596 However, a strong 
wind can also be creative in the Hebrew Bible and Bildad does not seem to account for this. 
Genesis 1:2 describes the “spirit of God/mighty wind” (םיהלא חור) as the initiator of creation 
in the Priestly narrative. More importantly for this story, God answers Job from a tempest 
(הרעס) in 38:1. Elihu prepares the reader for this mighty wind throughout chapter 37, 
describing God’s voice as thunderous and windy, a voice that God will use to describe his 
creation. With that stormy voice, God will also vindicate Job and condemn the words of 	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Bildad and his companions. Job’s tempestuous talk, then, is much closer to God’s than is 
Bildad’s. 
The irony continues in verses five to seven when Bildad recommends that Job look to 
and plead with God and be pure (זך) and upright (רשי). If he does those things, God will 
restore him to his rightful place. Of course we learn in the very first verse that Job was 
blameless (םת) and upright (רשי). We also learn throughout the dialogues, as stressed in the 
analyses above on Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth, that Job differentiates himself from his 
friends by consistently turning to God in the second half of his speeches. Bildad, therefore, 
may arguably and ironically be right in his prediction, but he does not seem to be aware that 
Job fits his description. However, his lack of awareness of the wager in the heavenly court 
makes his words, as Barth might put it, right and wrong at the same time. 
To be sure, Constantin does not reproduce the words or sentiments of Bildad. On the 
other hand, the irony is remarkably similar. Constantin regularly gives advice to the young 
man, never seeming to realise that the young man’s path fits the profile of Job, who 
experiences the type of repetition the young man seeks. Also, recall that Constantin’s 
comments on repetition seem to deconstruct themselves. Constantin seeks a repetition, but 
not the repetition that he experiences. He wants to repeat his journey to Berlin but makes 
several adjustments along the way to insure he does not actually repeat the journey in full 
(i.e. by sitting in the wrong part of the coach, by visiting Berlin during a different part of the 
year, etc.). The irony of Constantin’s statements draws the reader to contemplate an 
alternative to what Constantin is proposing. That they blatantly contradict themselves in the 
first half of the story invites the reader to consider the young man as that alternative. 
When Bildad speaks, much of what he says seems orthodox. Eliphaz explains in 4:8 
that “those who sow trouble reap the same,” upon which Bildad avers. Bildad speaks with 
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authority since he speaks from within his own tradition (8:8-10). Yet, his words deconstruct 
themselves by reminding the reader of the prologue. Job loses his children from a great wind 
through no fault of their own or Job’s. The book opens with the narrator declaring Job 
blameless and upright and describing his habitual sanctification of his children so that they 
would be blameless before God themselves. Bildad’s words seem orthodox on the surface, 
but their place in the narrative draw the reader to contemplate an alternative. At the same 
time Bildad points forward, predicting what happens to Job in the epilogue, but ironically. 
Bildad surely does not believe that Job is looking to God or is pure and upright or his words 
would likely be more sensitive. There is also irony in God’s condemnation of Bildad’s words 
at the end. Job must sacrifice for Bildad much like he did for his children. Yet his children 
died from a great wind. Bildad’s words work more to condemn himself than they do to judge 
Job. 
The result is that the narrator argues maieutically, much like Kierkegaard in 
Repetition. The friends as a group argue one way and are not only wrong, but their words 
contribute to our understanding of who God is and how God acts. One does not need 
Repetition to come to this conclusion. The utterances lie in the ancient book of Job. 
However, Kierkegaard’s book lends another model with which to compare Bildad’s words. 
Kierkegaard does not offer the model explicitly, either, but leaves it like fruit for the reader 
of Job to pick. 
Barth dedicates one of his four sections of his Job interpretation to the friends 
collectively under the heading “The Falsehood of Man.” He does not deal with the characters 
individually and rarely mentions individual passages by the friends. His general comments 
about them, however, can help illumine individual passages such as Bildad’s first speech. “If 
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they are wrong,” Barth writes, “as they are, it is in such a way that they are also right.”597 
Barth’s phrasing sheds a different light on the speech while the speech sheds a different light 
on Barth’s essay. Barth writes mainly about the orthodoxy the friends pronounce and how its 
impersonal nature hinders the friends from having the right posture towards God. When 
applied to Bildad’s first speech, a different vision arises of his wrongness and rightness. 
Bildad’s opening remarks contain a remarkable number of both right and wrong statements, 
but said in such a way that in hindsight, the rightness and wrongness are difficult to pry 
loose from each other. 
Even in retrospect Bildad’s words seem as if they must be right. If Job is pure (ךז) 
and upright (רשי), God will restore him to his rightful place (ךקדצ תונ) (8:6). At the end of the 
speech, Bildad reassures Job that God does not reject the blameless (סאמיםת־ אל) (8:20). He 
uses the same words with which the narrator describes Job in the first verse of the first 
chapter of the book of Job. Bildad is, of course, right, but in a way that he is also wrong. Job 
does experience these blessings from God, and he is the kind of person Bildad suggests is the 
kind of person to experience these blessings, but the rest of the narrative of Job puts into 
doubt the cause and effect relationship of Job’s character and his final blessings, not the least 
of which being God’s condemnation of Bildad’s words in 42:7, 8. Of course, other words of 
Bildad seem, if not blatantly wrong, then ill-qualified for the context.  
In 8:8-13, Bildad suggests that Job should look at the tradition for knowledge rather 
than their own generation. Those who do not pay attention to their heritage, he insinuates, 
will be like a papyrus with no marsh. These, people, he also argues, are akin to the godless. 
“Such are the paths of all who forget God,” he says in 8:13. Bildad may be right in this 
passage, but it is irrelevant. Job clearly has not forgotten God. After he loses all his 
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belongings, he praises Yahweh (1:21). After he is struck down with sores all over his body, 
he maintains his integrity with God at the bewilderment of his wife (2:9-10). Even after he 
comes close to cursing God in chapter 3, he never ceases to remember God. The passage 
Bildad follows is Job directly addressing God. Perhaps Bildad questions Job’s attitude in 
Job’s parody of Psalm 8, where Job seems to want to be invisible to God, but the passage 
does not really fit the situation. Thus, Bildad may actually be right, but in a way that is 
wrong; the context does not fit the wisdom he ostensibly purveys. 
Finally, let us look at Vischer, who actually addresses Bildad’s speech, though 
briefly and generally. Nevertheless, Vischer’s theme of Job seeking the goodness of God 
which lies beyond good and evil is useful in extracting meaning from Bildad which might 
otherwise lay buried. In fact, just before he reaches chapter 8, Vischer reiterates the theme, 
writing, “And that is the great question of the Book of Job, whether righteousness is the 
deserved equivalence of being good and having good things, or is the Goodness of God, 
which, from realms beyond Good and Evil, condescends to His creatures to whom He wills 
to be good for His own sake.”598 Bildad’s speech, of course, says otherwise. Justice is a set 
phenomenon to which God must conform his actions. “Does God bend (תועי) justice?” he 
asks. Job’s children paid a penalty commensurate to their sins, but Job can reap the benefits 
of upright living. Looking at the plotlines of the book of Job, the logic of Bildad’s claims 
falls apart. Job’s children die because Job was upright and blameless and yet God will still 
restore Job to his right state in the end, though for what reason we are left to speculate. 
Though Bildad’s statements seem logical in the way they define an economy of justice, they 
deconstruct themselves when viewed through the lens of the narrative itself. Bildad is not 
just wrong, but inapplicable. When comparing Bildad’s speech with Vischer’s major 
thematic determinations (the Goodness of God which lies beyond Good and Evil, does Job 	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serve God for nought? and is Job’s trust in God justified?), the themes seem that much 
starker. The cold logic of Bildad is set in contrast to a divine logic that seems almost colder 
in its arbitrariness. The only certain thing we can determine is Bildad’s wrongness in his 
speech on right and wrong. 
Altogether, Kierkegaard, Barth, and Vischer expand and illumine this single passage 
in a way neglected in the traditional literature. The friends garner little attention by 
themselves from most scholars, including from the three we have chosen to examine. 
However, the scholars’ unique perspectives, individually and collectively, help us see this 
speech by Bildad in new light. What looking at this passage in light of the writings of 
Kierkegaard, Barth, and Vischer also shows is how complementary they are to each other. 
The irony in Bildad’s speech relates to Kierkegaard’s maieutic rhetoric, Barth’s paradoxical 
claims that the friends are wrong in a way that they are also right, and Vischer’s claim that 
God’s Goodness is a goodness beyond Good and Evil—all three themes containing instances 
of irony. Kierkegaard, Vischer, and Barth do not merely repeat each other but they do 
forward the discussion of Job in similar ways. Their own readers can bring Job further. 
Kierkegaard, Barth, and Vischer plot the way. Those who receive their plotting must 
tread it. Of course every utterance in a dialogue inspires another. There are no last words. 
Because the book of Job exists in great time, it will never cease to inspire more utterances. 
Job’s friends speak as if their words could be the final ones. Their economy of answerability 
is closed. They become frustrated when their repetition of the doctrine of retribution fails to 
satisfy Job. Job, however, continues to speak until he receives a response from God. With 
God’s response the narrator of Job then finalizes his own utterance, but the dialogue 
continues. 
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